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Preface
Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd and Aparecida Vilaça
The present volume stems from a workshop that the editors organized at 
the Needham Research Institute in Cambridge from May 31 to June 2, 
2017. We observed that in recent years investigators in a number of dif-
ferent disciplines have been questioning the ontological presuppositions 
of whatever branch of inquiry they are engaged in. The problems are 
particularly acute in two areas especially: (1) in the history of ancient sci-
ence; and (2) in the cross-cultural ethnographic study of the knowledge 
and practices of living Indigenous peoples. In the case of the history of 
ancient science, one key question is how and why Greco-Roman and 
Chinese science in particular developed in the ways they did, a topic of 
particular importance in the context of the work currently undertaken 
at the Needham Research Institute and in the Classics Faculty at Cam-
bridge University. In the case of Indigenous peoples, the focus is on the 
ontological clashes related to their contacts with Euro-Americans and 
the subsequent transformations brought by new political movements, 
insertion in the market economy, monetarization, Christianization and 
schooling, themes well-developed by the Brazilian and Cambridge or-
ganizers and collaborators. 
The underlying problem in both types of case can be expressed like 
this. When different individuals, groups or whole societies evidently 
adopt markedly divergent views on the objects in the world around them, 
on the proper relations among humans and between humans and other 
living things, and on how knowledge on such matters is to be obtained, 
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what are we to say? On one view there is a single objective reality, cor-
rect access to which is secured by philosophy, science and mathematics, 
which accordingly supply reliable criteria by which more or less accurate 
accounts are to be judged. In this view it is generally assumed that mod-
ern Western science holds a privileged position, although this is often 
in ignorance of alternative traditions. It follows that this is one reason 
why it is so important to study science in such other cultures as China 
and in India. On the diametrically opposed view, there is no such single 
objective reality. Rather, we should allow that divergent knowledge and 
practices relate to different realities and that those who adopt and live 
by them should be seen as, in an important sense, inhabiting different 
worlds.
Reflecting the aims of the workshop this volume brings together 
specialists from several different disciplines to tackle different aspects 
of these fundamental problems. Historians of mathematics examine 
the commonalities and the divergences in mathematical practices and 
concepts in different cultures separated in time or space or both, and 
they pose questions to do with the very framework within which the 
history of mathematics can be undertaken. The questions of the status 
of the objects that mathematics presupposes and the characteristics of 
the modes of reasoning it deploys are taken up, also, by those whose 
training is in computer engineering. Philosophers and historians of sci-
ence here revisit the problems of mutual intelligibility posed by appar-
ently incommensurable scientific paradigms. Anthropologists who have 
studied Indigenous cosmologies in the field comment on the problems 
of understanding they pose. Several who have direct experience of how 
both schooling and missionary activity effect Indigenous beliefs discuss 
how modern Western scientific ideas impact on the traditional ideas and 
practices of the peoples to whom those ideas are presented as correct 
solutions to the question of what reality consists in and how to investi-
gate it. A particular feature of our approach is to stress the importance 
of intercultural knowledge exchange in the context of Indigenous and 
local understanding on biodiversity matters, an issue that has obvious 
potential consequences for policy-makers everywhere in the world as we 
face the more and more pressing challenges of climate change, the over-
exploitation of natural resources and ecological degradation.
Each of our participants brings a particular set of skills and experi-
ence to bear, but all are united by the sense of the importance of the 
task. To achieve greater mutual understanding across peoples, cultures, 
religions and indeed across intellectual disciplines is as urgent now as it 
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has ever been in human history. Past societies and contemporary ones 
alike are a precious resource contributing to this crucial goal. The aim of 
bringing together leading scholars in a wide variety of disciplines is to 
pool our expertise in a bid to throw light not just on current academic 
problems in each field (such as the ontological turn or the incommensu-
rability of rival scientific paradigms) but also on issues of global practical 
concern. In the event not all of those who gave papers to the workshop 
were able to contribute chapters to this volume. But in rewriting our 
papers we have all been able to draw on the valuable points that were 
made in our wide-ranging discussions. The full list of participants in the 
workshop is as follows:
Mauro William Barbosa de Almeida (Social Anthropology, Universidade 
Estadual de Campinas)
Alan Blackwell (Computer Sciences, University of Cambridge Computer 
Laboratory)
Matei Candea (Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge)
Manuela Carneiro da Cunha (Social Anthropology, University of Chicago)
Karine Chemla (Sinology, Université de Paris)
Serafina Cuomo (Ancient History, Durham University)
Giovanni da Col (Social Anthropology, SOAS, University of London)
Marina Frasca-Spada (History and Philosophy of Science, University of 
Cambridge)
Simon Goldhill (Classics, Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences 
and Humanities, University of Cambridge)
Christine Hugh-Jones (Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge)
Stephen Hugh-Jones (Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge)
Dame Caroline Humphrey (Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge)
Nicholas Jardine (History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cam-
bridge)
Agathe Keller (Indology, Université de Paris)
Tim Lewens (History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge)
Sir Geoffrey Lloyd (Comparative History of Science, Needham Research 
Institute, University of Cambridge)
Willard McCarty (Digital Humanities, Kings College, London)
Anthony Pickles (Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge)
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Joel Robbins (Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge)
Lena Springer (Sinology, Needham Research Institute, University of Cam-
bridge)
Richard Staley (History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cam-
bridge)
Dame Marilyn Strathern (Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge)
Tang, Quan (Sinology, Needham Research Institute, University of Cam-
bridge)
Liba Taub (History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge)
Aparecida Vilaça (Social Anthropology, Museu Nacional, Universidade 
Federal do Rio de Janeiro)
Wu, Huiyi (Sinology, Needham Research Institute, University of Cam-
bridge)




It is our pleasant duty to express our deepest gratitude to those per-
sons and institutions without whom the workshop could not have taken 
place, and first of all for the generous financial support of the Chiang 
Ching Kuo Foundation in Taiwan. Our thanks go next to the Director 
of the Needham Research Institute, Professor Mei Jianjun, who allowed 
us to hold our meetings in the friendly and intimate environment of 
the Institute, and to the Administrative Manager of the Institute, Ms 
Sue Bennett, who oversaw all the complex detailed arrangements with 
impeccable efficiency. We are grateful too for the support, both financial 
and intellectual, that we received from the Departments of Classics, and 
of History and Philosophy of Science, from the Division of Social An-
thropology of the University of Cambridge and from Darwin College. 
1
chapter one
The Clash of Ontologies and the Problems 
of Translation and Mutual Intelligibility
Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd
The studies collected in this volume stem from a workshop that brought 
together specialists in a number of different fields or disciplines who had, 
in recent years, become increasingly aware of facing a set of similar or 
analogous radical methodological and substantive problems. Those fields 
include, especially, social anthropology, the history of philosophy, science 
and mathematics, and computer science. The key problems concern, first, 
the subject matter of each field and the relations between them, and sec-
ond, the character of the understanding within reach. Should we, in each 
case, presuppose that there is a single objective reality that is the proper 
subject of inquiry and in relation to which correct or incorrect judgments 
can be evaluated? Or rather should we deny any such unique objective 
reality and allow that divergent knowledge and practices relate to dif-
ferent realities, to different ontologies, different worlds? In which case, 
the fundamental problem is how any communication or understanding 
across worlds is possible.
I construe my principal task in this introduction as being to offer 
some suggestions concerning the rules of encounter to be adopted for 
fruitful cross-disciplinary investigation. First, I consider it necessary to 
set some limits to how indeed we should understand the similarities in 
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the issues facing different disciplines, which is to qualify, if not to take 
back, what I have just written in my opening paragraph.
We are all faced with radical otherness, whether we are ancient histo-
rians or modern ones or anthropologists. But that otherness takes differ-
ent forms, posing different challenges to our understanding. Alternative 
customs are one thing, values another, ontologies, science, and math-
ematics yet others.
Thus, in some cases (variety of customs) there is no pressure to sug-
gest there is or should be just the one preferred solution (how to organize 
social relations, for example). In others there may be. Where values are 
concerned, we would do well to recognize their heterogeneity. No one 
has a monopoly of the right values to live by. We can and should tolerate 
others’ views. But tolerating others’ views does not mean agreeing with 
all of them; in particular, there is a limit to a tolerance of the intolerant.
But what about where ontologies and science are concerned? Here 
is where one of the major potential conflicts arises. To simplify, but I 
hope not too drastically, we may identify two extreme positions. On the 
one hand (A), there are those (I shall dub them “monists”) who would 
insist that there is just the one world, one reality, the truth about which 
is delivered by science. On the other hand (B), there are those who say 
no (“pluralists”). The evidence (of anthropology and of ancient history) 
shows that ontologies—in the sense of what is entertained about real-
ity—differ. And some of those pluralists would say that each ontology 
can only be judged from inside—that is, that evaluation across ontologies 
is impossible. To anticipate, my view would be to agree with the first but 
deny the second. But that does not settle the issue between A and B, 
since monists would still claim that there is just the one—correct—solu-
tion to what is the case, although that will mean ruling out other ways of 
knowing, other practices, other ways of being in the world, and we have 
all become sensitized to the dangers of doing just that.
Thus, I am used to considering the similarities and differences be-
tween ancient Greek and ancient Chinese thoughts, values, and specula-
tions about the world around them. But those similarities and differ-
ences are not necessarily similar to those that anthropologists who study 
Indigenous knowledge systems encounter. They are not even the same as 
those that face historians of early modern and modern science. To start 
with, the evidence available for each of those endeavors exhibits remark-
able differences. I have to rely almost (but not quite) exclusively on texts, 
the lacunose and biased sources that all stem one way or another from the 
literate elite (even when members of that elite purport to be reporting 
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others’ views). Anthropologists and historians of contemporary science 
can and do interview their subjects and can gauge their reaction to how 
they have been understood. But the character of the reflections that their 
informants themselves engage in exhibits certain differences from the 
theorizings we find in ancient texts already.
But it is not just that we have to use different methodologies: the sub-
ject matter to which we apply those methodologies and that we endeavor 
to understand manifests deep-seated differences. We call the project Sci-
ence in the Forest, Science in the Past. But how far is that repeated 
“science” justified? Does it not prejudge the question of whether indeed 
we are dealing with “science” in such dissimilar cases? In the heyday of 
positivist historiography the answer would have been to have asserted 
in no uncertain terms that those other “sciences” are incommensurable 
with all modern science and do not rate as “science” at all: end of project. 
On that view nothing that diverges importantly in any respect (either 
in substance or in method) from our current knowledge could count as 
“science” but has to be put in the trash cans of superstition or myth or 
the irrational or primitive mentalities or whatever.
I shall have to come back to that view, but it can and should be chal-
lenged straightforwardly and immediately by a reminder of what these 
other systems of knowledge comprised. If we are tempted to say that 
nothing before the so-called Scientific Revolution counts as science, my 
favorite examples to give us pause include the following: ancient Baby-
lonian, and then later ancient Chinese and Greek eclipse predictions; 
Greek and Chinese attempts to determine the size and shape of the 
Earth; ancient and Indigenous modern understanding of the therapeu-
tic properties of plant and mineral remedies; ancient and Indigenous 
modern understandings of animal behavior, of animal reproduction, 
and of the classification of both animals and plants. That is not to men-
tion umpteen examples of technological mastery that imply systematic 
knowledge and, in many cases, presuppose repeated experimentation, in 
metallurgy, textiles, agriculture, navigation, and so on. Even when there 
was no explicit theory about the experimental method there were in 
practice plenty of trial-and-error procedures used effectively to increase 
understanding and control.
Yet am I not myself still presupposing that we can be confident about 
just how such examples are to be evaluated? Can we be confident that we 
are indeed dealing with an “eclipse prediction”? The assumptions that the 
Babylonians made about the signs in the heavens are indeed very differ-
ent from those we would endorse (Rochberg 2016). The heavenly bodies 
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for them and for the ancient Greeks are indeed heavenly, indeed divine. 
Calling these accounts eclipse predictions runs the risk of glossing over 
some major differences in how they fitted in to what else was believed 
about the world, including about the relations of humans to gods. Point 
taken: but the ancients were able on occasion successfully to predict a lu-
nar eclipse, sometimes even a solar one, even though what they made of 
them reflected assumptions about the significance of signs from heaven. 
Interpretations of what occurred differed radically. But the fact of such 
an occurrence was a possible subject of reliable prediction.
Of course, there is a recurrent question of translation, not just in the 
sense of what the terms in the vocabulary used may mean. How far is any 
mutual understanding possible? The Zhuangzi texts from the fourth–
third century BCE have a famous story concerning the person after 
whom the text is named (Zhuangzi 17; cf. Graham 1981: 123; 1989: 
80–81). Zhuangzi was walking along a weir above the River Hao with 
his friend Hui Shi when he said how happy the fish were as they swam 
in the water. How do you know, Hui Shi asks, you are no fish? No more, 
Zhuangzi says, are you me: so how can you know what I know? Hui 
Shi comes back by conceding that not being Zhuangzi he cannot know 
him, but by parity of reasoning Zhuangzi not being a fish cannot know 
about them. But Zhuangzi picks him up. Hui Shi had begun by ask-
ing him how he knew the fish were happy by using an expression that 
more strictly equates to “whence”—that is, from where or from what. 
So Zhuangzi uses it to claim that Hui Shi already knew that Zhuangzi 
knew the fish were happy—and he answers the last question by referring 
to the weir above the River Hao; that is, the place at which he knew the 
fish were happy.
There is a bit of sophistry, then, in that exchange. But ignoring that 
trick, we can identify that recurrent problem of how anyone can under-
stand anyone else, but also see that such a move is eventually self-defeat-
ing. If we go down the solipsist route, there is no more to it. But persuad-
ing anyone that he is right is impossible for the solipsist, for there is no 
one for him to persuade. We are not solipsists and we have to tussle with 
acute problems of understanding others. Yet we do so, generally, in the 
belief that some understanding is possible, however incomplete, provi-
sional, and revisable that is.
Whatever our specialist field of inquiry we are all familiar with the 
experience of terms that have no exact equivalent in our ordinary every-
day vocabulary. The historians come back with qi and logos, the anthro-
pologists regale us with tapu, mana, hau, and many more. But at the same 
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time, it is absurd to conclude that because there is no single exact equiva-
lent in English, we can understand nothing of what those various terms 
mean—in different contexts, where indeed what they mean may well be 
much influenced by those contexts. But that process of understanding 
is likely to be a long drawn out one, never complete. But then our un-
derstanding of what we take to be familiar concepts is never perfect and 
complete either. Indeed, that understanding is constantly on the move.
It is important also to register that this problem does not just affect 
such highly theory-laden terms as qi and tapu. The indeterminacy of ref-
erence infects mundane ones as well. We think we can find approximate 
equivalents between the English word fire and the Greek and Chinese 
terms that are regularly translated like that in English; namely, pur and 
huo. In many contexts that seems to work well enough. But when we ex-
amine what counted as pur and what counted as huo, we encounter quite 
a problem. For many Greeks (but not Heraclitus, and not Theophrastus) 
pur was an element, entering into the substance of many compounds 
when it was combined with other elements. For the ancient Chinese, 
huo was one of the wu xing, but the xing are not elements but phases. 
One Chinese text from the Shang Shu (Book of Documents) is explicit 
(Karlgren 1950: 28, 30). Huo, it says, is “flaming upward” and shui, the 
term regularly translated as water, is “soaking downward.” The five xing 
(the others are “earth,” “metal,” and “wood”) are not substances so much 
as processes. Those differences gave rise to all sorts of misunderstand-
ings when Europeans, Jesuit missionaries in the van, first got to China 
(Gernet [1982] 1985). But the crucial point is that they need not have 
arisen—if, that is, the Europeans had been prepared to examine Indig-
enous Chinese beliefs more carefully. The question that this raises for me 
is how far there are parallels to that when the knowledge of Indigenous 
peoples is confronted by the interpretations put on that by the mission-
aries and teachers instructing them—a theme that Aparecida Vilaça 
especially takes up. Misunderstandings are clearly common: but could 
they, can they, not be avoided, or at least mitigated?
The standard reaction, in the old positivist days, would be to set about 
determining which view of “fire” or “water” is the correct one and to dis-
miss any alternative as a plain mistake. In this context, the temptation, 
which still haunts us perhaps, would be to say the Chinese got “fire,” huo, 
more or less right (it’s more a process than a substance), but the Greeks 
were closer to the mark with “water,” hudor, at least insofar as they treat-
ed it as a substance (even though, for most of them, as an element not a 
compound), a material rather than a process (Heraclitus again excepted). 
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Yet it can be argued, I would argue, that any such temptation should be 
resisted. Rather than say that a process-based ontology is correct and a 
substance-based one mistaken (or vice versa) we should ask what is to 
be said in favor of each of them, in different contexts, and from differ-
ent perspectives. Chemistry cannot settle definitively what “water” is. “Is 
Water H2O” is the title of a splendid study by Hasok Chang (2012), who 
explored what was and is to be said in favor of alternative analyses, HO 
for example, where the hydrogen component is analyzed differently. In 
so many scientific disputes the victory of the winning side tends to be-
guile one into assuming there was nothing to be said for their rivals, not 
only at the time, but even after the victory was secured.
What I do at that point, in response to the competing claims of dif-
ferent ontologies, is to insist first on what I call the semantic stretch of 
the term water (and of hudor and of shui) and then also of the multidi-
mensionality of the phenomena in question. What is there for the terms 
to refer to is not just one thing or process. The answer to that “what is 
it?” question varies with context and perspective. But does that not com-
mit us to hopeless vagueness and fudge? Is not the danger that plural-
ist ontologies lead to ontological chaos? That conclusion can be resisted 
provided that our expectations for synonymy are modest. Once we are 
prepared to examine the full range of the uses of Greek and Chinese 
and English terms in question, we can trace similarities as well as differ-
ences in their senses and their referents. There is no neutral vocabulary 
in which we can do that. But provided we are aware of just that fact, that 
does not constitute any fundamental block to achieving some compre-
hension both of the meanings of Indigenous terms and of the referents 
they target.
On this view, then, the difficulties of translation and of mutual under-
standing should not be treated as a threat but as an opportunity. When 
we encounter strange beliefs and practices we should resist reaching im-
mediately for those labels of the irrational, myth, fiction, mystification, 
and probe further what they mean in context. In my view, a large group 
of problems was not solved but radically lessened when the anthropolo-
gists moved away from the supposition that the beliefs and behavior 
that puzzled them reflected assumptions about causality, to an alterna-
tive set of questions to do with felicity and appropriateness. And one 
such anthropologist, Stanley Tambiah, was certainly inspired to do so 
by his reading of the philosopher J. L. Austin’s distinction between dif-
ferent speech acts (Tambiah 1968, 1973). The efficacy/felicity distinc-
tion can, in other words, be brought to bear to relocate the question 
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of intelligibility to give it a far more manageable, if still to be sure not 
unproblematic, twist.
One of my favorite examples of this comes from our own Western 
society, the practice that used to be common in weddings in Christian 
churches of showering the bride and groom with confetti. When it was 
rice that was thrown, the thought may have been that this expressed 
the hope that the pair would be fertile. Yet those who engaged in this 
practice did not necessarily believe that this was the effect of the throw-
ing of the rice, that the rice had causal efficacy. Rather nowadays the 
thought was that without the confetti the wedding would somehow not 
be a proper wedding. The aim was appropriateness rather than causal 
efficacy—which of course leaves open the question of why it came to be 
thought appropriate.
We should, in other words, aim for charity in interpretation, though 
not in precisely the way Donald Davidson ([1980] 2001) advocated, since 
the point he underestimated was that we must allow that our own con-
ceptual framework will need to be revised as we learn from others. But 
an objector will still protest at my attempt at charity that it simply does 
not allow for error. But if I do not go along with Davidson, no more do I 
sign up to Paul Feyerabend’s “anything goes” (Feyerabend 1975). Judging 
that the ancient Greeks or the ancient Chinese got certain things wrong 
is always tricky, since we have to pay attention among other things to 
those substantial differences in ontological preconceptions that I have 
mentioned. But that does not mean that they were always right and 
never made mistakes. The ancient Greeks and Chinese themselves were 
often in the business of diagnosing mistakes in other ancient Greek and 
Chinese theories, beliefs, and practices. They did not always get it right: 
but they certainly recognized the possibility and the problem of error. 
That is not just a feature of literate societies, of course, for one other 
lesson we have learned from ethnography is how widespread skepticism 
and criticism can be in predominantly oral communities. While some-
times we can react to those ancient Greeks by saying they should have 
been more charitable (a reaction I frequently have when Aristotle is, as 
he often is, in one of his dismissive moods) there are other occasions 
when we can join them in diagnosing error.
The terms in Greek and Chinese that we translate as “heart”—kardie, 
xin—have multiple associations and resonances, some tied up with ideas 
about cognitive functions, some not. But when Aristotle locates the or-
gan on the left side in humans, and when Galen puts it in the center, it 
is not that both are equally correct, though in both cases more is at stake 
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than just a point of anatomy, since symbolic associations and notions of 
hierarchy are deeply implicated. But what about one of the star examples 
usually quoted in relation to the progress of science—namely, heliocen-
tricity? Aristarchus’s view was contradicted by Ptolemy, who insisted like 
most Greeks that the earth is at rest in the center of the universe. But 
though everybody now knows that geocentricity is incorrect, we should 
remind ourselves that we do not see the earth move when the sun sets.
There are, of course, plenty of issues on which modern science would 
be adamant that it has the answers, but plenty where those issues may 
be more complex than a dogmatic science would allow. We now know 
that the anopheles mosquito transmits malaria. Eradicating them helps 
to eradicate that disease, while praying to the Malaria Goddess does 
not. Those prayers do not eradicate the disease: but recall my point that 
efficacy may not always be the goal nor the outcome but rather felicity 
or what is appropriate. How it gets to be thought appropriate to pray to 
the goddess is a formidable problem. But we should not shy away from 
an investigation of the origins and characteristics of ritual behavior and 
religious experience itself, even though I confess to taking a rather dim 
view of much of what passes as answers to those questions.
Whether the ontological turn has helped or not is an issue on which 
opinions will no doubt continue to differ, with plenty of potential for 
confusion about just how “ontological” is being understood. When it 
goes with a warning that what we might take for granted does not nec-
essarily apply to the materials we are puzzling over, it is surely useful. 
When it is thought to validate the conclusion that mutual intelligibil-
ity is impossible, that there is no possible communication across worlds 
and that we are all imprisoned in our particular preconceptions of our 
particular world, it surely isn’t. When it is a slogan to help the cause of 
enfranchising those whom we might otherwise dismiss, ancient Greeks 
or Chinese or Wari’ or Maori, we can endorse it while remaining vigilant 
about its being carried to extremes.
So I think we can and should allow Science in the Forest and Science 
in the Past to be indeed “science” in the broad understanding of that 
term that focuses on aims and methods rather than on results. We find 
in both careful, more-or-less systematic observation, careful description, 
an interest in classification, in explanation, in prediction, in the use of 
experiment in the large sense of trial-and-error procedures. The particu-
lar challenge of these ancient and modern Indigenous materials is to see 
what we can learn from such an exposure to the strange, to unfamiliar 
assumptions and practices. The first thing we can learn, maybe, is simply 
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not to assume that “we” (whoever) are right and “they” are wrong, to dis-
miss their views, as seems to happen still in some circumstances in the 
interactions described by Aparecida Vilaça, Marilyn Strathern, and Ma-
nuela Carneiro da Cunha, for instance. Further, apart from this first les-
son in modesty—or at least antidogmatism—there are concrete points 
to take home from our explorations.
“Mathematics” perhaps provides a particularly interesting test case, 
since here the temptation to legislate has been especially strong. What 
ideas of quantities and shapes will be found useful for different groups 
is not the kind of question to which we should expect a uniform answer 
across the world. We cannot assume that everyone has always had ex-
actly the mathematics they need, for that flies in the face of the fact that 
they often express dissatisfaction with what they have got. On the other 
hand, we cannot rule a priori what mathematics should be for them.
The incommensurability of the side and diagonal of the square holds 
wherever the issue is thought worthy of investigation. But it is not a 
truth that can be put to use (I dare say) in Amazonia. As for its uses 
in ancient Greece, one of those was simply to show how clever those 
who were in the know were: though the surprise among those whom 
they were putting down soon, in fact, wore off. The ancient Indians, too, 
certainly knew about it. But when it came to the construction of the al-
tars that is such a preoccupation in the Apastamba Sulbasutra, they were 
content with measurements that gave rough approximations: they had 
to be.1 The ancient Chinese, too, knew of the incommensurability of the 
diameter of a circle and the circumference, but again were content with 
the observation that closer and closer approximations of the value of 
what we call π can be given.2 We should remark that this is not a matter 
of saying that truths vary: just that the interest in different exemplifica-
tions of truths does.
In this context, what is especially striking about some of Vilaça’s ma-
terials is that while the missionaries and the school teachers tend to be 
stuck with the mathematics they have learned, their Indigenous pupils 
1. For a first orientation on the problems of approximations in classical In-
dian mathematical texts, I may refer to my brief discussion in Lloyd (1990: 
98–104).
2. One of the earliest discussions comes in the third century CE commen-
tary by Liu Hui on the Jiuzhang Suanshu or Nine Chapters on Mathematical 
Procedures (chap. 1: 103–6; see Chemla and Guo 2004: 175ff.; cf. Lloyd 
1996: 152–53).
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seem to be both more imaginative and more flexible, seeing the value 
of their traditional ideas and practices even while they tussle with the 
new-fangled ones the Whites are introducing them to. The aim here 
of our interdisciplinary investigations would be to evaluate the case for 
plural, alternative mathematics, or rather to firm up what it would mean 
to assert or deny such. Suffice it to say for the moment that we should 
surely not be in any way surprised that the symbolic associations of cer-
tain numbers can continue to be important in some contexts, even while 
abstraction is carried to the limit in others.
My Greek-Chinese confrontations can yield further insights both 
about the potential objects of study and about the criteria we should 
adopt for their fruitful investigation. Under the first head I would count 
the ontological alternatives suggested—for example, by the substance/
process dichotomy—and some of the problems with “nature” I do not 
think I appreciated until I saw the Chinese doing cosmology without 
any such notion. That is not as impressive as the anthropologists’ prob-
lematizing person, the individual, agency, causation, relation itself, but 
not negligible nevertheless.
Under the second head I would reckon the advantages, as it seems to 
me, of exposing oneself to others’ expectations for explanation and un-
derstanding, and in particular to taking on board some of the weaknesses 
of what was supposed to be the great strength of the Western tradition 
of science, an insistence on the delivery of certainty via demonstration. 
Modern Western science seems to have needed that ideal in some phases 
of its development. But I return to the key point that the West has no 
monopoly of the truth, not just of results but even of methods. We do 
not have a monopoly of the world either, though that undeniably and 
potentially disastrously is the direction that global capitalism is heading. 
So much more urgent is the task of recovering and appreciating plural-
ism: the Forest and the Past have much to teach us.
Let me then, at the risk of some repetition, recapitulate the position 
I would argue for, focusing on four fundamental points. First, we should 
acknowledge the multidimensionality of the explananda, and allow for 
that pluralism I have just mentioned. Second, we have to accept that there 
is no neutral vocabulary in which to do our work of interpretation; in-
deed, all our terminology exhibits greater or less semantic stretch. Third, 
we should see incommensurability not as a threat but as an opportunity. 
Fourth, that in turn implies that we have to accept the provisionality and 
the revisability of whatever results we claim. This is so much less com-
fortable than what until fairly recently was the customary view—namely, 
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that clearly defined, univocal terms should enable us to identify unique 
problems to each of which there is a single, definitive, certain solution. 
Whether the advantages of my foursome outweigh the disadvantages is 
an issue that will become clearer in the studies that follow.
Those studies deal with a great variety of topics, whether disciplines 
or concepts and practices. But all seek to exploit to the full what we 
can learn from the rich evidence from social anthropology, ancient his-
tory, and modern developments in such fields as computer engineering, 
concerning the practices and conceptions of knowledge entertained at 
different times and places across the world.
Among the disciplines investigated, several contributions focus on 
mathematical traditions, where positivist preconceptions of a supposed 
universality of mathematics are perhaps at their strongest. Aparecida 
Vilaça considers the tensions and possible misunderstandings that arise 
when Indigenous Amazonian peoples are confronted by missionaries 
and educators intent on replacing their traditional practices by what is 
presented as the superior mathematics of Western modernity. Serafina 
Cuomo in turn investigates the pluralism of mathematical practices 
and the different aims and goals of different practitioners that can be 
found already within the Greco-Roman world, and in the process reveals 
the oversimplifications that reference to that world as a single culture 
commits.
Analogously Karine Chemla considers evidence for the variety of 
Chinese mathematics and investigates the possible divergences in the 
ontological implications of different mathematical operations or proce-
dures. Agathe Keller discusses the pluralism of mathematical practices in 
India, noting how much has been lost through the neglect of historians 
who tend to concentrate on elite Sanskrit texts; however, she is able to 
trace interactions and what she calls the dialogue between those texts 
and modern Tamil elementary mathematics. Mauro Almeida similarly 
explores the consequences for ontology and intertranslatability of dif-
ferent perceptions of what “mathematics” comprises. He develops the 
contrast between a narrow focus on objects and a broader appreciation 
of the possible similarities in mathematical structures and pragmatic ap-
plications across widely divergent domains, on the one hand drawing 
from ethnography (Indigenous kinship systems in particular) and on the 
other hand on developments in the history of mathematics since the 
break with the Euclidian tradition.
Manuela Carneiro da Cunha looks at what we take to be one of the 
most basic of human activities, agriculture, and against the positivist 
Science in the Forest, Science in the Past
12
tendency to treat it as mere technology, recovers what we can learn from 
its study concerning the knowledge systems of its practitioners. In the 
process, she is led to challenge some deep-seated assumptions concern-
ing some supposedly inevitable and irreversible progress from foraging 
and swidden to domestication and to complexify the very idea of domes-
tication itself.
Then two contributors from the field of computer science, Alan 
Blackwell and Willard McCarty, look critically at the claims made for 
what we call artificial intelligence and at where the capacities of comput-
ers leave our understanding not just about what can currently be achieved 
by bringing them to bear but also about what future developments might 
hold. The intelligence imputed to the machine depends, indeed, crucially 
on the humans that put it there. Studying what McCarty calls the an-
thropology of the artificially intelligent can throw light not just on the 
nature of intelligence and the variety of modes of reasoning it depends 
on and uses but also on what makes humans human.
Among the fundamental issues problematized in different chapters, 
Marilyn Strathern tackles the sense and experience of time and the con-
cept of law in the shifting conceptual landscapes of Papua New Guinea. 
She explores the underlying ontological presuppositions in play and 
charts the understandings and misunderstandings that characterize how 
negotiations proceed between Indigenous groups and those who have a 
program to impose their notions of order upon them. Stephen Hugh-
Jones confronts questions to do with the usefulness of the notion of “on-
tology” in relation to some complex ethnographic data from Northwest 
Amazonia especially. A special feature of his discussion is to contrast 
high-level analysis on the part of anthropologists or of Indigenous in-
formants with the implications of the actual behavior and practices in 
the many different contexts that go to make up the lived experiences of 
the people concerned. A single underlying ontology turns out not to be 
so easily identifiable as some analyses would like to suggest.
Finally, Nicholas Jardine unites anthropology with history and phi-
losophy of science in a further critical scrutiny of the usefulness and the 
limitations of the notion of diverse ontologies.
In every case, the contributors acknowledge that much further work 
needs to be undertaken. But all open up new avenues of inquiry center-
ing on the key questions of the unity and diversity of notions of under-
standing and the corresponding presuppositions concerning the nature 
of what there is to be understood.
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Inventing Nature: Christianity and Science 
in Indigenous Amazonia
Aparecida Vilaça
The indigenous peoples of the Upper Rio Negro have already made clear their 
interest in sending their children to school so that they can assimilate the sciences 
and bring back their benefits to the villages.
—Gersem José dos Santos Luciano (2014: 337)
Reading the literature produced by anthropologists and speaking to them, I could 
perceive their scientificism. They studied other cultures and other practices with a 
meticulous respect, but with a background of science.
—Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1997: 12; my translation)
The truth or falsehood of scientific knowledge is known through experimenta-
tion. It possesses the quality of verifiability, to the extent that claims (hypoth-
eses) that cannot be proven do not pertain to the domain of science.
—Intercultural high school workbook
(Érika Haese 2015: 235; emphasis in original)
The connection between Christianity and the invention of nature has 
been a common theme in philosophical and anthropological debates. 
By way of example I take two well-known contemporary authors who 
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explore a direct relationship between them. Bruno Latour argues that it 
is the Christian God who enables what he calls the “constitution of the 
moderns,” maintaining “as much distance as possible between two sym-
metrical entities, Nature and Society” (Latour 1993: 127). For Latour, 
the debates that took place in the seventeenth century, especially the 
dispute between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes concerning the allo-
cation of the domains of nature/science and society/politics, gave added 
impetus to the long endeavor to separate these domains, a process first 
begun during the sixteenth-century Reformation (Latour 1993: 33–34; 
see also Lenoble 1969; Viveiros de Castro 2004b: 482).1
Philippe Descola (2005: 540) also identifies Christianity—and more 
specifically, Creation—as the key event characterizing so-called mod-
ern peoples, positing them as paradigmatic examples of the naturalist 
mode of identification that characterizes Euro-American thought and 
founded, according to him, on an “apartheid” regime separating humans 
from nonhumans. He argues that a first operation of purification, relat-
ed to the Greek concept of phusis and its developments by Hippocratic 
writings and Aristotle, was insufficient for men to become exterior and 
superior to nature in Greek thought (Descola 2005: 99–100). A second 
and definitive operation of purification took place with the advent of 
Christianity and “its double idea of a transcendence of man and a uni-
verse created ex nihilo by divine will. From this supernatural origin, man 
assumes the right and mission to manage the Earth, after being created 
by God on the last day of genesis to exert control over Creation” (103).2
Despite the many important differences existing between processes 
occurring in such distinct times and places, I believe that exploring a 
number of ideas concerning the so-called rationalization—or, in Roy 
Wagner’s terminology (1975), conventionalization—of the world, can 
help elucidate the radical transformations experienced by an Amazonian 
people, the Wari’, over a relatively short period of time. Until seventy 
years ago, the latter had never had peaceful contact with White people 
1. See also Strathern (1980: 216n29). Stephen Hugh-Jones (pers. comm., 
September 20, 2016) told me that a Barasana man asked him to explain the 
difference between the social sciences and the natural sciences, which he 
was unable to grasp.
2. For an overview of the discussion on the existence of a concept of nature 
among native peoples, see Wagner (1975, 1977); Strathern (1980); Desco-
la (1986); Lévi-Strauss et al. (1991); Descola and Pálsson (1996); Dwyer 
(1996); Ellen (1996); Ellen and Fukui (1996); Howell (1996); Ingold (2000).
Inventing Nature
17
or other Indigenous groups. Today they are Christians and take biology, 
physics, and math classes in their schools.
My wish is to examine a point seldom explored by ethnographies 
of Amazonia. Despite the intrinsic historical relation between Chris-
tian churches and school teaching ( Jackson 1995: 315; Vilaça 2014)—
among the Wari’ and several other Native peoples around the world, the 
missionaries were also the school founders—these ethnographies tend to 
take Christianization and schooling as distinct and opposite processes, 
the first leading to culture loss and the second to the preservation or re-
cuperation of culture and to political and economic empowerment.
I have no intention of questioning the pertinence of this empow-
erment, of recognized success throughout the world. Furthermore, my 
focus is not on the schools dedicated exclusively to the transmission 
of traditional culture but rather on those that aim to transmit Western 
knowledge, whether or not they assume a relativist perspective, as oc-
curs in so-called intercultural teaching in Brazil. I look to show that the 
transformations in school experiences are in many ways analogous to 
those associated with Christianization, which, as happened in the his-
torical past, also introduced the conceptual foundations sustaining the 
idea of nature and its study among the Wari’.
I wish to analyze these as transformations to their conceptions of 
world and personhood, with an emphasis on the systems of knowledge 
and morality associated with them. I begin by introducing the Wari’.
The Wari’
One of the central features of the expeditions to pacify the Wari’, organ-
ized by the federal government in the 1950s, was the participation of 
fundamentalist Evangelical missionaries from the New Tribes Mission 
(NTM), an entity then just recently formed in the United States. Well 
drilled in military-style camps and trained for linguistic studies, these 
missionaries quickly assumed control of the organization and logistics of 
the expeditions and the first contacts with the Indigenous people.
The expedition members carried with them germs to which the Wari’ 
had no immunity, provoking devastating epidemics. Combined with 
the deaths caused by armed attacks by local rubber bosses, this led to 
the extermination of around two-thirds of the population. Frightened 
and disorganized by their losses, but also very interested in these new 
Whites from a far-off land who had brought them metal tools, effective 
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medications, and food, the Wari’, from 1956 onward, gradually relocated 
from their residences to live near the houses of the Evangelical mission-
aries (Vilaça 2006, 2010).
In 1969, a section of the Wari’ population declared themselves con-
verted for the first time, telling the missionaries that they believed in the 
latter’s God. Some of them had learned to read and write over the course 
of the decade and were able to help the missionaries translate various 
books from the Bible. For a decade, most of the Wari’ who lived with the 
Evangelical missionaries attended church services conducted entirely 
in their own language. Translated excerpts from the Bible were read, 
prayers were offered to God, and people confessed their sins in public. 
According to the Wari’, at the start of the 1980s, as a consequence of the 
many fights between affines that were still breaking out, combined with 
the deaths caused by sorcery and the attacks of animal spirits, the Wari’ 
“abandoned God” and resumed their traditional practices and rites, with 
the exception of cannibalism.
This was how I first found the Wari’ when I arrived in 1986. In 2002 
I was surprised by a strong Christian revival movement, prompted, they 
said, by a fear that the world would end after seeing images of the at-
tack on the World Trade Center on the community television. This left 
them with the certainty—confirmed by the missionaries living among 
them—that the apocalypse was imminent, set to follow the global war 
that was clearly looming. They resumed the church services, prayers, and 
confessions, and began to demonize shamans, who gradually stopped ac-
companying their animal partners in order to follow Jesus instead. Eve-
rything was ready and waiting for this revival: the local churches, Bible 
translations, pastors, hymns, and the missionaries still present in many 
villages. But above all, the Wari’ were nostalgic for the Christian life they 
had once led, which during its boom period had quelled rivalries and 
put an end to food restrictions (Vilaça 1996, 1997, 2009, 2013, 2016). 
To grasp the transformations arising from this process, we need to turn 
briefly to examine pre-Christian Wari’ thought.
Perspectivism and Shamanism
Wari’ is the term for the personal pronoun “us” but also means “person” 
or “human being.” Although known in the region as Wari’, this is not an 
ethnonym per se, therefore, but a position, that of humanity, one that can 
be occupied by the Indigenous people and by animals. Just like the Wari’, 
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animals see themselves as people, wari’, living in houses and holding fes-
tivals, and see the Wari’ in the same way that they are seen by them—as 
prey, karawa.
Although we may seem to be presented with a typically animist on-
tology in which human attributes are extended to animals, a flaw in this 
model was revealed by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1998: 474) in pos-
ing the following question, grounded in Amazonian ethnographic data: 
“If animals are people, then why do they not see us as people? Why, to be 
precise, the perspectivism?” (see also Viveiros de Castro 1998: 484n10; 
2004b: 474). Why the difference? This involves precisely what the au-
thor calls Amerindian perspectivism. In contrast to our own relativist 
multiculturalism, the ontology informing perspectivism, dubbed multi-
naturalism by the author, presumes a series of worlds and a single culture, 
taken here as a set of social practices.
Among the Wari’, for example, although all humans drink chicha 
socially, for themselves it is made from maize, while for jaguars it is made 
from blood, and for tapirs from clay. The most important point is that 
for each of the groups it is chicha that they are drinking, a social drink 
par excellence, characteristic of relations between humans. What varies 
is precisely the material substrate from which it is made. Communi-
cation between these worlds involves not cultural exchange but bodily 
transformation. The Wari’ say that if someone encounters a person in the 
forest who offers them chicha and they perceive that rather than maize 
drink they are being proffered blood, they concluded that the person 
is actually a jaguar and refuse to drink. Were they to accept the drink 
without realizing the difference, it would be a sure sign that they share 
the viewpoint of the jaguar (which sees the blood as drink) and that they 
themselves, therefore, have become jaguars. This implies that although 
they continue to see themselves as a person—that is, someone with a 
human body (which is how jaguars see themselves)—their Wari’ coresi-
dents henceforth no longer see them as persons: in their eyes, they have 
acquired the body of a jaguar and are living in the houses and families 
of these animals.
The shaman is someone able to circulate between different perspec-
tives and thus different worlds using his capacity for controlled bodily 
transformation, acquired through a process of initiation. Thereafter his 
body becomes double, both human and animal, allowing him to tran-
sit between different relational contexts, shuttling continually back and 
forth. This is what enables him to talk to the animals that accompany 
him and ask them to return the people captured or preyed upon by them, 
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triggering a state that the Wari’ recognize as disease (see Vilaça [1992] 
2017, 1999, 2000, 2006).
What we could call someone’s identity, the kind of person he or she 
is, depends on an external observer, since the former always sees him- or 
herself as human: any transformation is perceived by him- or herself 
merely as a change in relational context. In this sense, unlike ourselves, 
the Wari’ used to have no notion of an inner self, a stable person with 
an internalized self-perception of the kind presented to them later by 
Christianity. So rather than an inner self, they had an outer self (see 
Robbins, Schieffelin, and Vilaça 2014).
Given the constant risk of metamorphosis due to the predatory at-
tacks by animals, people were always compelled to make their own view-
point clear. Any demonstration of strange behavior, like the refusal of 
food offered by kin, indicated a process of transformation underway. For 
the Wari’, the only possible explanation for someone spurning food was 
that their vision had transformed, implying that they were recognizing 
other foods, distinct from those of the Wari’, as edible: the person was 
eating with animals and becoming one of them. In sum, there did not 
exist anyone without relations, only persons with the wrong relations. 
Isolation and antisocial behavior were evidence of this.
Divine Creation and the Desubjectivization of Animals
Given this background, it is no surprise that the Wari’ became especially 
interested in one particular aspect of Christianity, the same recalled by 
Descola (2005) and mentioned above, and coincidentally the aspect that 
the missionaries themselves considered the basis of all their teaching: di-
vine creation, which implies the establishment of a new kind of relation-
ship between humans and animals. Excerpts from Genesis, translated 
into the Wari’ language, are found not only in the catechism books but 
also posted on the village church walls and are continually mentioned in 
their prayers to God.
I provide two examples of translations into the Wari’ language:
Genesis 1:28. He spoke contentedly. Reproduce yourselves many 
times. . . . Spread across all the other lands. Be leaders. Be leaders of 
the fish, the birds and all animals. [Bible text in English: Then God 
blessed them, and God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth 
and subdue it; have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the 
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air, and over every living thing that moves on the earth.” (New King 
James Bible online, March 2017)]
Genesis 1:30. Eat all the animals, all the birds, and all the strange 
animals that crawl across the earth too. [Bible text in English: Also, 
to every beast of the earth, to every bird of the air, and to everything that 
creeps on the earth, in which there is life, I have given every green herb 
for food; and it was so. (New King James Bible online, March 2017)]3
It is worth mentioning that the Wari’ did not have a demiurge or any 
idea of a created world. Paletó, my Wari’ father told me:
We don’t know from where our ancestors came. The oldest ancestors 
did not know from where they came. When the youngsters asked 
the elders: “Where did we come from?” “I’ve no idea.” “Who made 
us?” “Nobody made us. We exist for no reason.”. . . We never thought 
about God. We never thought: does God exist? No, never.
And his daughter Orowao Karaxu added:
In the past nobody knew that it was God who had created every-
thing. We met the Whites and learned about him. For the elders, the 
animals always wandered around pointlessly. There was no reason for 
the animals’ existence, they thought.
The fact of creation in itself implies the imposition of the perspective of 
the creator, God, who made men the masters of animals—that is, preda-
tors. The Wari’ enthusiastically recount the moment when they began to 
eat various animals that had previously been prohibited. In the words of 
Paletó:
They used to avoid armadillo, coati. When we encountered the 
Whites, the Christians told us to eat all animals since it was God 
3. On the subjugation of animals, see also Genesis 9:2–3, where God speaks to 
Noah: “2. And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast 
of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the 
earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. 
3. Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green 
herb have I given you all things” (New King James Bible online, March 
2017).
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who had made them. They didn’t cause sickness. Pregnant women 
can eat armadillo, eagle. The latter animal became a true bird (prey) 
for us. They eat electric eel and nothing happens. Why? “I created 
the animals,” said God. “Oh, so that’s how things are, then!” we said.
Conceiving humanity and animality as essentially reversible positions—
since both the Wari’ and their favored prey could be located either in the 
position of humans (wari’), defined as predators, or in the position of 
animals (karawa), prey—the Wari’ experienced life as a constant struggle 
to define themselves as human and thus stay alive. Establishing a single 
direction to predation coincided, therefore, with what the Wari’ sought 
in their day-to-day lives, a movement analogous to generalized brother-
hood, also fostered by Christianity. The latter worked to deter another 
type of predation, namely the attacks perpetrated by affines in the form 
of sorcery (see Vilaça 2016: chap. 5).
Moralities
Albeit diverse authors have shown important coincidences between 
Christian and Indigenous moralities, others have demonstrated that 
such coincidences are partial insofar as they are limited to the spectrum 
of morality that Michel Foucault (1990: 266) called moral codes or laws, 
such as do not kill, do not steal, and so on. Other aspects of morality 
taken in a broader sense, like technologies of the self or forms of produc-
ing people, become profoundly altered (Foucault 1990: 29; 1997: 266; 
Robbins 2004).
Among the Wari’, one of the techniques used, confession, was central 
to the production of an inner, secret self, visible only to the person con-
cerned and to God, an idea clearly opposed to a conception of the person 
determined from the outside, by the other’s perspective, which I call the 
outer self. Crucial to this operation was a transformation in the meaning 
of the Wari’ notion of heart, the center of feelings, morality, and thought, 
previously intrinsically associated with the body, its locus of expression. 
A sad and tearful heart, for example, was inevitably visible in the form 
of an emaciated and sick body (see Robbins, Schieffelin, Vilaça 2014; 
Vilaça 2016: chap. 8).
Traditionally associated both with morality and with thought and 
cognition—the Wari’ would say, for example, that a person who learned 
a task quickly had a good heart—these attributes, shared by animals too 
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in the past, became separated in Christian experience into two distinct 
sites: moral conscience and feelings remained seated in the heart, while 
knowledge related to cognitive processes was relocated to the “head” 
(winaxi’), a place previously without meaning for the Wari’. This sepa-
ration, however, remains ambiguous within the Christian universe and 
only becomes concrete through schooling, where knowledge obtained 
from the world of White people tends to become amoral and discon-
nected from relations. We can turn now to this question.4
School, Science, and Morality
Although the Wari’ undoubtedly possessed a vast ecological knowledge, 
a sophisticated science of the concrete in Lévi-Straussian (1962) terms, 
and knew how to utilize this know-how and exploit diverse species of be-
ings for their own sustenance (see Berlin and Berlin 1977; Berlin 1992; 
see also Lévy-Bruhl 1952, [1926] 1985: 79; Alexiades 1999), there were 
no intrinsic properties that differentiated a priori a subject or object in 
a perspectivist context and the Wari’ found themselves open or exposed 
to surprises all the time. In his first visit to the city of Rio de Janeiro, in 
1992, Paletó updated the myth of the carrying baskets: after the women 
started laughing at the funny way the baskets walked at the trail, the bas-
kets decided to stop walking by themselves, and the women were pun-
ished by having to carry them at their backs. Seeing a mechanical digger 
at work, without noting the operator inside, Paletó remarked that White 
people had been wise enough not to laugh at their objects, which had 
thus kept their agency. Another time he asked me whether the electric 
door to my garage “had a heart”—that is, thought and agency—since, 
unaware of the remote control in my hand, he presumed that not only 
had it opened by itself, it also knew the precise moment to do so.
The subjectivity of objects has been explored by Viveiros de Castro 
(2004b) in an analysis differentiating our own scientific knowledge from 
shamanic knowledge. For the so-called hard sciences, to know involves 
objectifying as much as possible, stripping subjects and objects of all 
subjectivity and ideally transforming them into a set of chromosomes 
4. According to Geoffrey Lloyd (pers. comm., 2017), where different cogni-
tive and affective faculties were to be located was a much-disputed topic in 
pagan Greek. Also plenty of translations from Chinese take the word xin as 
“heart-mind.”
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or atoms. As Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979, 1997) showed in 
their study of a laboratory, even the subjectivity of the researcher ide-
ally must be eliminated. Shamanic science is the symmetrical opposite: 
to know involves subjectifying as much as possible. Hence an object by 
itself offers no interest to investigation unless it can be associated with a 
subject, whether human or animal, through the shaman’s own subjective 
and relational experience (see Lévy-Bruhl [1926] 1985: 63). A piece of 
wood in the forest only becomes an object of research when, for example, 
it is seen by the shaman as a tapir seat, used by the animal-person to sit 
in its home (see Viveiros de Castro in Sztutman 2008: 40–43).
Knowledge based on myths experienced through the transcorporal 
experience of the shamans—who could see other worlds with their own 
eyes and transmit this knowledge to other people in the villages—was 
essentially relational and multiple: in other words, there was no search 
for a single truth. Different shamans gave their version of events, wheth-
er these involved the appearance of a band of peccaries or an illness, de-
pending on the events experienced during their journeys and encounters 
with animals. These practices did not involve the conventionalization of 
diverse understandings into a single body of knowledge through dialec-
tical argumentation. Rather, to use Wagner’s terminology (1975: 116), 
they evinced a differentiating tradition, one that sought precisely a mul-
tiplicity of visions, ignored the idea of contradiction—as indeed Lucien 
Lévy-Bruhl ([1926] 1985) had already observed—and did not valorize 
linear thought.5
Sitting on school benches, especially in the more advanced levels 
of secondary education and university, the Wari’ have begun to engage 
more closely with scientific epistemologies in which the process of ob-
jectification that leads to knowledge is intrinsically related to the notions 
of truth, rationality, and linear argumentation.
5. It is important to note that the use of the term “contradiction” by these two 
authors refers, by opposition, to the paradigms of the philosophy of science 
dominant in the first half of the twentieth century (Carneiro da Cunha 
2012: 457) rather than being determined by the debates between Aristotle 
and Heraclitus on the Law of Contradiction. In the latter case, attributes 
said to be contradictory must be “predicated of the same subject at the same 
time, in the same respect and in the same relation” (Lloyd 1966: 87; see 




The foundation to this epistemology is a naturalist ontology—
whether universalist or relativist—that comprises the polar opposite of 
perspectivism or multinaturalism, which supposes a diversity of worlds, 
or “natures,” experienced by different types of subjects with distinct 
kinds of bodies (Viveiros de Castro 1998). For the Wari’ to be able to ac-
company scientific thought, even basic mathematics or the principles of 
physics or biology, a stable and single world needs to be created, a world 
given a priori, work carried out to perfection by the Christian God, and 
further enhanced by the heirs of Newton, a well-known advocate of par-
simony and elegance in explanations (Rossi 2001: chap. 17). As Jean 
Pouillon (1993: 28) observed, “science is monotheist,” reflecting, among 
other factors, the Christian foundations of its development.
The contrast between Wari’ and scientific-Christian epistemologies is 
even clearer when we recall that Christianity and scientific thought were 
brought to the Wari’ by fundamentalist Protestant missionaries and teach-
ers, who emphasized the veracity of Biblical events, taken literally. As one 
NTM missionary stated in the organization’s catechism manual: “What 
we announce here is precisely what happened literally in time and space. 
It is real, it is a fact, it is history” (McIlwain 2003: 39; my translation).
The mathematical problem of quantities among the Wari’ seems to 
me an interesting line of inquiry for thinking about this scientific-Chris-
tian transformation.
The Intercultural University and Amoral Mathematics
In 2009 the Brazilian state of Rondônia introduced a university-level in-
tercultural teacher training course, along the lines of courses already run-
ning in other regions of the country. The course is devoted exclusively to 
training Indigenous students to become teachers and is taken by a diverse 
range of Indigenous peoples living in the region. This specific case brings 
together students speaking unrelated languages, like Wari’, Tupi-Mondé, 
and Nambikwara. The classes are taught in Portuguese by nonIndigenous 
lecturers specialized in various areas of knowledge. The mathematics 
classes, which form part of the core curriculum, provide some interesting 
examples of the kinds of transformations we have been analyzing. Here I 
focus on the translations of quantities into numbers that return us to the 
principles of conventionalization of the missionary translations.
Like many South American (and Australian) Indigenous peoples, 
the Wari’ do not have a developed numerical vocabulary, limited to the 
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terms for one, two, a few, and many.6 The absence of Native terms for 
different quantities was never a problem for the Wari’, since they would 
traditionally express them by showing the fingers of their hands to list 
the names of participants in a war expedition, for example. Quantities 
higher than ten, or even before reaching this number, would automati-
cally be classified as “many” (see OroAt 2013; OroNao’ 2013). On one 
occasion, Orowao Xik Waje, using her hand fingers to name her grand-
children, stopped at ten saying: “I have no more fingers.” Differently 
from some other Native peoples, the Wari’, though using their fingers 
while enumerating, do not use the names for the fingers as numbers and 
do not equate a hand or two hands with precise quantities.7 After contact 
with White people, the Wari’ had their first experience of the commod-
ity economy and quickly learned to use numbers in Portuguese, both in 
the village school and in commercial exchanges in the nearby town. The 
issue arises when, in the classrooms, they are encouraged by the lectur-
ers to speak and write down numbers in their maternal language, which, 
given the multilinguistic context in question, only they would know.
The Wari’ have been led to invent their own numerical system, then, 
since it was no longer enough for them to have learned our own and used 
it for around three decades to conduct transactions with White people 
and among themselves. Now it is necessary to translate, and demonstrate 
that their system is equivalent to ours, an idea that only makes sense 
through an alien conception of the world in which quantities are defined 
a priori and detached from the relational context in which they are em-
bedded. It was in this situation that the Wari’ found themselves poor in 
numbers.
6. See Pica et al. (2004) on the Amazonian Munduruku and Seeger (1981: 62) 
on the Syuá/Kinsêdje. For an overview in relation to South America, see 
Lévi-Strauss (1968: 277). On Australia, see Dixon (2002); Pawley (2005: 
639); Wierzbicka (2005: 641).
7. The Wari’ ask “How much?” or “How many?” through the question “Where 
does it stand (main ka xat na)”? The answer will be “like that/here.” On the 
equation between numbers and body parts, see Biersack (1982: 813) and 
Mimica (1988: 31) on the Paiela and the Iqwaye from Papua New Guin-
ea, respectively. On the opposite situation, closer to the Wari’, see Carrier 
(1981: 468) on the Ponam from Papua New Guinea. According to Lloyd 




Fazed by the lack of numbers for precise quantities beyond two, the 
Wari’ translated the number three using one of the two terms for a few 
(parik)8 while for four to ten they used a variety of different terms for 
“many,” traditionally applied to distinct kinds of objects. Hence, for ex-
ample, the term used for many things/persons became the number four, 
while the term for full, referring to a large quantity of liquid, became the 
number five. Predictably, perhaps, the translation tables diverged among 
the students—differences sometimes conventionalized as differences be-
tween the various Wari’ subgroups—and in fact the same student may 
use various terms for the same numbers on different occasions (K. Leite 
2013: 120, 154, 170; Cao OroWaje 2015).
It is not my intention to discuss here the many questions posed by the 
literature on Native numerical systems, from which we can highlight the 
polemic on the absence of numerical terms among another Amazonian 
people, the Pirahã.9 Emphasizing the fact that I disagree with any asso-
ciation made between numerical limitations and cognitive limitations, I 
shall focus on a question that appears to me insufficiently explored given 
its apparent centrality in Wari’ thought: the moral and relational charac-
ter of quantities, something already identified by Stephen Hugh-Jones 
(2012: 79; 2016) when he observes that “like Quechua numbers, the 
numbers of the Tukano (Northwest Amazonia) are also conceptualized 
in terms of social relations” (see also Carrier 1981; Lave 1988; Mimica 
1988; Urton 1997; Verran 2001 on other ethnographic contexts). This is 
the exact opposite of the mathematical acceptance found in the schools, 
grounded in the idea of a given world constituted by objective quantities 
extrinsic to subjects and their relations.10
When 1 = -1
There are various points worth highlighting in the Wari’ translations, 
which go beyond the inconsistency in the numerical equivalences 
8. The other one is pije, meaning “to be small, child” (Everett and Kern 1997: 
349).
9. See Everett (2005: 623–27) with comments from Berlin (2005: 635) and 
Levinson (2005: 637–38). See also Gordon (2004) and Frank et al. (2008).
10. For a generalization of the idea of numbers as cultural creations with a posi-
tive take on the possibility of communication between different systems, see 
Almeida (1999: 8) and Verran (2001).
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indicated above. To begin with, the “few” ceases to be contextual and 
becomes a precise number, as occurs too with the different terms used to 
designate larger quantities. The most interesting aspect, however, resides 
in the problem of oneness. The translation for the Wari’ term used for the 
number one is “alone.” Whenever someone uses the Wari’ term xika’pe, 
their primary intention is to announce a lack. A person alone evokes the 
absence of another, while dead game, when referred to using the term for 
one, indicates the absence of other game animals and thus suggests the 
hunter’s hunger or ineptitude. In this sense, a more adequate numerical 
translation of the Wari’ term for one would be any number from minus 
one to minus x.11
The attribution of a negative value to one is not exclusive to the Wari’. 
Mariana Kawall Leal Ferreira (2001), in a study of the numerical con-
cepts of the Xavante of Central Brazil, relates oneness to solitude, con-
trasting it to the positive value attributed to two and to even numbers in 
general. In her words:
By turning our attention to the mathematical philosophy of dialecti-
cal societies, what we learn, from the very beginning, is that unlike 
the Euclidian definition of a unit as “that by virtue of which each 
of the things that exist is called one,” among dialectical societies I 
would suggest the following: each of the things that exist is called 
two—maparané—a couple because it is necessarily formed by a pair 
of ones—mitsi—a lonely self. (Ferreira 2001: 91)12
Pierre Clastres (1989) generalizes this contrast in a chapter of his 
famous book Society against the state, entitled “Of the one without the 
many,” referring specifically to the Guarani. Clastres argues that the 
negative value of the one contrasts not with the many but with the two 
or double. In his words: “Evil is the One. Good is not the many, it is the 
dual, both the one and its other” (Clastres 1989: 173). Clastres attrib-
utes this valorization to the pregnancy of an anti-identificatory principle 
among the Guarani, echoing concepts developed by other Americanist 
11. Anthony Pickles (pers. comm., 2017) suggested the following mathemati-
cal translation: 2 : 1 :: x : x – (x-n).
12. D’Ambrosio (2015), in a foreword to Ferreira’s book, emphasizes precisely 
the solitary character of the unit. Amaral (pers. comm., 2017) and Fausto 
(pers. comm., 2017) observed the same association among the Ingarikó 
(Carib) of Roraima and the Parakanã (Tupi-Guarani) of Pará, respectively.
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authors to describe the region’s peoples, among them the idea of “du-
alism in perpetual disequilibrium” formulated by Claude Lévi-Strauss 
(1991).
Many years earlier, Lévy-Bruhl ([1926] 1985) had noted the inver-
sion in values attributed to quantities in his analysis of differences be-
tween “modern” and Native peoples. He suggests that while many Native 
systems ignore one and begin their numerical system with the number 
two ([1926] 1985: 192), among the moderns, informed by their mono-
theistic religions and monistic philosophies, one is the principle of good, 
order, perfection, and happiness, while two acquires the negative char-
acter of imperfection, the principle of evil, and disorder, preserved in 
diverse languages when they refer to duplicity and the double life (209).13
While quantities may still appear imbued with values in the religious 
universe, it is at school that definitive steps are taken to externalize the 
world, fully objectifying it in the sciences.14 As a nonIndigenous lecturer 
said in 2015 when presenting set theory to his Indigenous students at 
university, seeking to answer their numerous uncertainties concerning 
the criteria for set exclusion: “In the case of sets, the membership rule 
depends on the set type. In the case of numbers, there is no identity 
crisis.”
Not only did floating quantities become precise numbers: myths too 
and so-called traditional knowledge are, in intercultural teaching, made 
equivalent to science, not in the perspectivist mode of difference but in 
the relativist mode of the continuity and complementarity of knowledge, 
13. For an exception to the negativity of the one, see Mimica (1988: 46) on the 
valorisation of oneness among the Iqwaye, who see totality qua indivisibil-
ity as positive (1988: 47). In his words: “Two—or more accurately, the idea 
of twoness or dyad in opposition to oneness—is the marked and derived 
category, whereas oneness is the universal and original ontological category 
in the Iqwaye view of the cosmos.” Lloyd (pers. comm., 2017) notes a dual-
ity in Greek thought: although for them the one is not an arithmos (num-
bers will begin with two, according to Euclid’s definition of arithmos as a 
multitude composed of units), Greeks also held that one is the principle of 
good. Also see Lévi-Strauss (1968: 303, 309) on the association between 
twenty and the person (fingers and toes) in Mexico and Central America 
and its connotation of plenitude.
14. See Lowie (1947: 331) on the mystical value of determined numbers in 
Greek thought and elsewhere, and their perpetuation until the seventeenth 
century. According to Lloyd (pers. comm., 2017) there are also lots of anal-
ogous examples in China.
Science in the Forest, Science in the Past
30
indissociable from naturalist universalism (Strathern 2009). In the rela-
tivist school approach, myth becomes something in which the individual 
may believe or not, suggesting an idea of truth and self previously en-
tirely alien to the Amerindians. As one Wari’ man said to me, in Portu-
guese, while we were talking about the animal spirits that cause diseases: 
“Perhaps I’m disrespecting my culture a little, but I don’t believe so.” An-
other example was a student from the Tupari Indigenous group during a 
science class on the intercultural teacher training course. Contrasting the 
course material on the heliocentric system with the geocentric system of 
his people, he observed: “When we enter the school system we begin to 
believe that these things are true. . . . In relation to the solar system, I’m 
more inclined to believe that the Earth moves around the sun.”
Conclusion
To conclude, I wish to show that the transformation analyzed here does 
not occur solely in the linear form that, for expositional reasons, I have 
emphasized here. Although both Christianity and schooling lead to 
significant transformations, the Wari’ perspective, despite some signifi-
cant limitations, remains present, not in the form of a mixture, as in 
syncretic models, but in the form of the alternation typical of the rela-
tionship of Amazonian peoples with alterity, including the alternation 
between human, animal, or shamanic perspectives (Vilaça 2015b, 2016: 
12–21).
In school and Christian translations alike, as missionaries are already 
well aware, use of the Indigenous language is an important anticonven-
tional instrument (see Rafael 1993; Orta 2004; Durston 2007; Hanks 
2010; Vilaça 2016) and thus an enabler of alternations in perspectives 
(Wagner 1975: 52) or of invisible communication between clashing on-
tologies (see Strathern, this volume). An interesting case is the transla-
tion, made by missionaries with the help of Indigenous translators, of the 
verb to love in Portuguese (amar), which was rendered as “not-dislike,” 
the only equivalent Wari’ term. While not-dislike is indeed the same as 
love, the Wari’ term makes clear that the starting point of relations is 
enmity, related to dislike, with love as something to be constructed by 
human agency. Kin are made out of others. This registers an important 
difference between the Christian and Wari’ given worlds, which through 
translation remains present in their lived world, actualized in determined 
contexts and alternating with the positive meaning of Christian love. 
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Similarly, the translation of the number one as alone has a two-way 
effect, maintaining the moral and negative character of oneness. This 
contrasts with the positive Christian value and the amorality learned at 
school. It is worth noting too that while the Wari’ have adopted Portu-
guese numbers in their day-to-day life, they still use the word alone to 
designate the number one (Everett and Kern 1997: 347–48).
To the Wari’ experience in the alternation of perspectives we can add 
the fact that Christianity, in all its different guises, offers the peoples that 
it colonizes the figure of the devil, analogous to mythological tricksters. 
The latter destroy the conventionalizing creative process of the demi-
urges, bringing back chaos, multiplicity, and disorder. For many Chris-
tianized Native peoples, the devil has become a central component of the 
Christian experience, encompassing diverse pre-Christian practices and 
ideas, even when these acquire a negative value (see Meyer 1996, 1999, 
2008; Kopenawa and Albert 2010: 492; Mosko 2010: 230; T. Leite 2013: 
87–88). Among the Wari’, the devil at first would resubjectify animals by 
entering their bodies and making them act like humans and predators in 
the old way. As their Christian experience deepened and the missionaries 
were successfully able to pass on the divine perspective of creation, the 
devil shifted from the animal universe to the universe of relations among 
the Wari’ themselves, who began to attribute to him behaviors deemed 
immoral. Although this shift is important, in both cases the devil acts 
as a figure of destabilization, initially of the condition of humanity and 
later of brotherhood, since his agency causes the reemergence of the in-
ternal differences attributed to affinity, which people seek to eliminate in 
the Christian community (Vilaça 2011, 2015a).
Science, as we know, has its own demons, called cyborgs (Haraway 
1991) or hybrids (Latour 1993) by anthropologists. And although care-
fully purified, these are quickly recognized by Indigenous people. I recall 
a physics class for the intercultural teacher training course in 2015, when 
the lecturer was explaining the laws of action and reaction. Demonstrat-
ing with his body, he said, “if I punch a wall, it punches me back.” Re-
sponding to the laughter of the students, who were probably surprised by 
the animist aspect of physics, he asked: “Can a wall punch someone? Yes, 
if I punch it, it punches me back.” The students carried on laughing.15
15. See Latour (2004: 17) for an alternative proposal for science, which rather 
than proceeding to generalizations and unifications, aims to produce more 
connections, which in turn produce more divergences, which modify more 
and more the ingredients that make up the multiverse. Hence, this is not a 
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I would also note that, as a particle physics researcher from CERN 
(Bediaga, pers. comm., 2016) observed, physics as taught at high-schools 
derives from the eighteenth century, but quantum physics could enable a 
completely different dialogue with Indigenous ontologies. We can take, 
for example, the idea of antimatter, something that, according to scien-
tists, was present in the creation of the early universe but exists in minute 
quantities today. Would the Amerindians find it difficult to relate anti-
matter to the forces that existed in the mythic times but are not available 
on Earth today unless activated by shamans, who do the same kind of 
work as the particle accelerator in Switzerland?16 According to Ignacio 
Bediaga, from a strictly scientific point of view, our ideas about the pri-
mordial era of the universe are as good as any Indigenous theory, since 
they cannot be testified or refuted. I should add that the Amerindians 
might not agree with that, at least with respect to their own images of 
the primordial world, widely confirmed by their shamans.
And it is not just shamanism that has the potential to make connec-
tions. Various studies of Indigenous schools in Brazil show the reintro-
duction of a relational perspective in mathematical calculations like those 
performed by the Suyá/Kisêdjê and Juruna/Yudjá of the Upper Xingu 
studied by Ferreira (1997). They may include past debts in calculating 
present sums, leading to unexpected mathematical results.17 Moreover, 
mimetism and repetition as traditional forms of learning (Taussig 1993; 
Lattas 1998) flourish in the value attributed to copying school material 
on the chalkboard (Cohn 2004; Weber 2006), rather than simply read-
ing the content in books, as well as in the faithful reproduction of school 
rituals by students (Collet 2006).
Nonetheless, the diverse possibilities for constructing bridges be-
tween ontologies (Almeida 1999; Lloyd 2011, 2012, 2016, this volume) 
are explored in very different ways by Indigenous peoples, on the one 
hand, and by missionaries and teachers, on the other. The latter, imposing 
science that provides an accurate vision of the world, given that the multi-
verse is not the unified universe of the Christian Creation.
16. See the same kind of association made by Viveiros de Castro in Sztutman 
(2008: 45). On the relation between myth and quantum physics, see Lévi-
Strauss (2016: 77–78; see also 1991: 12–13).
17. See Lévi-Strauss (1968: 277–78) on the relation between these kinds of cal-
culations and myth, which he calls “aberrant [numerical] derivations,” such 
as when 5 + 2 equals 8; see Vilaça (2018). See also Viveiros de Castro (2012) 
on the geometrical and mathematical complexities of Amerindian dualism.
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their viewpoint as real and true—albeit with the distinct interpretative 
possibilities introduced by the lecturers—are rooted firmly in the natu-
ralist Christian ontology. Thus, in searching for similarities, they end up 
treating Indigenous diversity simply as layers covering the one natural 
world. The Wari’, on the other hand, seek, within limits, especially in 
their translations, to keep sight of some of the differences separating 
themselves from us, maintaining these differences as an important part 
of their relation with ourselves.18
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A Clash of Ontologies? Time, Law, and Science 
in Papua New Guinea
Marilyn Strathern
Whether in Europe or the Pacific, the present imagined in terms of fu-
ture becomings has recently engaged anthropologists interested in time. 
In Papua New Guinea (PNG) we encounter this in the aspirations of 
present-day legal scholars hoping to revitalize the future that was im-
agined at the time of independence in 1975, more than forty years ago. 
Forty years prior to that, the first Australian prospectors walked into 
the PNG Highlands, little knowing they were going to bring with them 
a “new time” and a “new law” for everyone. In fact, the locals probably 
knew it before the prospectors did. As development and educational 
projects were rolled out, enabled by official and unofficial elements of 
what seemed a self-evident judicial system, futures were promised and 
futures were imagined. From one point of view, in terms of their ideas 
about the future, the aspirations of colonizers and colonized alike could 
be construed as mutual. From another point of view, they could be con-
strued as a veritable clash of ontologies. The period following pacifica-
tion has led to many questions about intelligibility and translation; it 
also puts forward some less obvious questions about the recurrence of 
other new times before and since then. The crucial question is in what 
kind of “present” are people living? Thus, one of the temporalities at is-
sue in “new” and “old” times concerns the evolution or regeneration of 
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life and lives, and affects the ways in which societal transformation is 
conceived. An avenue of exploration encouraged by the editors prompts 
a further question about the extent to which natural science—that is, 
certain scientific precepts of naturalism—were embedded in the colo-
nizer’s law. The question enlarges the cosmological fields we might wish 
to consider, concluding with some highly speculative remarks on this 
score.
* * *
In 2010, PNG’s Constitutional and Law Reform Commission (CLRC), 
set up at about the time of the country’s independence in 1975, reopened 
an initiative begun ten years earlier with the passing of the Underlying 
Law Act (2000). That, in turn, had been a response to an aspiration of 
PNG’s founding constitution. In addition to statute law, English com-
mon law had been a principal source of judicial reasoning; Indigenous 
customs were recognized, but as points of fact, pleaded as evidence to 
inform judgments, not as justiciable points of law. The founders of the 
constitution envisaged a future where custom would itself be regarded as 
just such a source. It was twenty-five years, however, before legislation 
was on the statute books to encourage the courts to have recourse to 
“customary law,” as the Act called it, with precedence over common law. 
The lapse in time—1975 to 2000—meant that the courts had years of 
established protocols to overcome and, although they did not ignore the 
encouragement, they made little headway. The further lapse—between 
2000 and 2010—compelled the CLRC to reopen debate, through a con-
ference, journal, and seminar series. Debate was still active in 2015, one 
of the perspectives from which I write.
There seems nothing of particular remark here. The relationship be-
tween law and custom dogged “the imposition of law” (Burman and 
Harrell-Bond 1979) and its aftermath in many newly independent 
countries of the twentieth century, and delays occur for many reasons. 
More positively, one might interpret the reluctance of the courts as 
their wanting to look forward from—rather than back into—the coun-
try’s traditional past. Yet this was not the impression that a number of 
elite trainee lawyers gave the anthropologist Melissa Demian (2015: 
95–97) about their own lack of interest in customary law. She describes 
them harboring a chronic disinclination to think about custom as part 
of their work. The cause seems to have been that, far from custom be-
ing part of a past to be left behind, they had a very lively sense of its 
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contemporary force.1 The vernacular concept of custom (Neo-Melane-
sian [NM] kastom), known rather misleadingly by an adopted English 
term for past traditions, connotes the way people’s distinctive practices 
are grounded in specific places, with an emphasis on their present sa-
lience and openness to innovation. As one lawyer expostulated, “it’s 
just people’s lives” (Demian 2015: 98). Above all, kastom can acquire 
resonance as a vehicle for power, drawn from that attachment to place; 
the law students were not going to meddle in other people’s sources of 
power.
If invoking kastom is not about conserving past practices for the sake 
of tradition, no more, may we suspect, is recourse to the foundational 
constitution necessarily a backward look. What, then, makes a back-
ward look? It is a certain kind of time that keeps the past behind one, 
and keeps it in place that way. So was something else happening in the 
Papua New Guinea in 2015? I raise some questions about “models of 
time” (Robbins 2001) in order to ask whether, of all the clashes that ac-
companied the colonization of PNG, it is helpful to recognize a clash 
of ontologies.2 It may then be apposite to consider the role of scientific 
thinking in the form the clash took. Recent discussion within anthropol-
ogy provides some guidance.
Presentism
Unpredictability, indeterminacy, a heterogeneous multiplicity of tem-
poral relations: these are features that Felix Ringel (2016) sees in the 
way residents of an East German city deal with the postindustrial, 
postsocialist decay all around them. Finding the concept of culture too 
mired in its connotations of an identifiable moment that can be pinned 
down and therefore already in the past, he seeks another approach to 
1. This is not the place to engage with anthropological debate over Pacific 
Island custom in the form of kastom (Demian [2015: 93–94] offers a brief 
introduction), but one might remark that differentiations between “custom” 
and kastom often chime with Carneiro da Cunha’s (2009) distinction of 
“culture” and culture.
2. One cannot touch on the topic without some remark as to the vastness of 
the anthropological literature (e.g., Munn 1992; Scaglion 1999: 211). It 
should be clear, however, that this is not an essay “about” time; rather, it 
inquires into the making of time for the insights that they may or may not 
yield into the “clash of ontologies.”
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their predicaments. To “substitute, for the perspective from the past, 
that of the future” is to follow “informants’ strategy for dealing with 
the changes at hand” (2016: 401). This allows the ethnographer to at-
tend to relations as they exist in a field site’s present, which will hold 
a multiplicity of temporal references. “I echo my informants’ surprise,” 
Ringel (2016: 392) says, “about situations in which ‘objects’. . . take on 
unexpected temporal existence.” He declares his approach to time to 
be nonontological: temporality is defined not as a metaphysical prop-
erty of an epoch or a people; rather, temporal matters are a question 
of knowledge and politics—that is, epistemic and social phenomena.
A presentist approach thus scrutinizes how far we get analytically 
when not reading the present and its relations to the future through 
their presumed links to the past, but in their own right.  .  . [and] 
since rhythms can be disturbed, houses unexpectedly demolished and 
social relations dissolved, it is the work that goes into upholding cer-
tain temporal orders, structures, rhythms and endurances that should 
catch our attention. (Ringel 2016: 392–93)
He thus wishes to derive a methodological stance (“presentism”) 
from the need to take people as they are, always in the present, in-
cluding the past that is part of it, and the future as it is imagined. 
Itself nonontological, as an approach it presumably can deal with any 
ontology.
Ringel singles out another work that criticizes past-fixated analyses: a 
collection of essays also steered by an analytical objection to the concept 
of culture, with a similar plea that anthropologists should attend to peo-
ple’s futures and thus to the horizon of their present. This would make 
the ethnographic reference point current aspirations and imaginings. So 
while he is not uninterested in the instituted modes by which people act 
(culture in a weak sense), Will Rollason (2014b) argues that anthropolo-
gists create problems for themselves by making culture their principal 
reference point (in a strong sense), and thus inevitably evaluating present 
circumstances with reference to the past. Revealing apparently innova-
tive action to be transformations of cultural tradition can get us only 
so far; even Indigenous accounts of time and futurity are of little help 
because they will simply index the culture from which they come. After 
Hirokazu Miyazaki (2004), he defines the future “as a stance towards the 
world” (Rollason 2014b: 10), and primarily a methodological one on the 
anthropologist’s part.
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His own essay concerns a mid-twentieth-century millenarianist, Bu-
liga (from the Louisiade Archipelago), who had prophesized that once 
the colonialists had been killed, Whites would become Black and the 
Blacks would become White.3 This was exactly what Buliga accom-
plished after he had been captured; sentenced to death by the Australian 
administration, he used the White man’s method of punishment to kill 
himself by hanging. Rollason (2014a) suggests that this was a co-option 
of White state power, and constituted an enactment of the future. It was 
a future that drew on Indigenous ideas about shame and personhood, 
which understood hanging in a cell as a public act, as well as on what 
hanging as a colonial practice conveyed to people: Buliga’s actions were 
coherent in terms of local culture in a weak sense. However, Rollason 
argues that anthropologists have to transcend cultural interpretation, 
and to make that the core of analysis would be to ignore what Buliga 
was doing—acting as someone other than himself (an imaginary White 
self that was enacting the state’s sovereign violence on his Black body). 
“While the terms on which this action might be. . . comprehensible can 
be drawn from a cultural tradition, it is clear that the form of the past 
is wholly inadequate to account for this act”: there is a conflict between 
“the backwards prospecting of anthropological interpretation and the 
forward impetus of the sense of the act” (2014a: 62). Buliga’s own inter-
est, he surmises, was in self-transformation.
So might we conclude that it is not the concept of culture that is the 
problem so much as anthropology’s familiar habit of using cultural rea-
soning—which can only be derived from the past—to attach to people’s 
own visions? To put it another way, there is something about the con-
ceptions of culture and the past in these accounts that themselves need 
explaining. Ringel and Rollason both object to an anthropological pro-
pensity to find culture in the past, despite the fact that anthropologists 
often pitch themselves against other scholars in insisting on culture as 
primarily a matter of what people do, an echo of all the objections raised 
to the English language connotation of custom as past tradition. None-
theless, the general propensity endures. Arguably, it entails or reveals 
something of a disposition toward time, or rather a way of making time; 
we might even consider it of ontological import. That question is open 
at this point.
3. All place names in this essay refer to locations in Papua New Guinea, unless 
otherwise noted.
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After Pacification
It was some forty years before independence when the first Australian 
patrols entered the Mount Hagen area of the PNG Highlands. Admin-
istrative development was interrupted by the Second World War; ki-
aps (NM for patrol officers and representatives of the administration) 
reestablished control afterwards, not least through embarking on de-
velopment projects. By the early 1960s, people were familiar with cash 
cropping, medical services, and (then newly established) elected local 
government councils. Their present was full of many new things, the 
things of “now” as opposed to those of “before.” Especially in the mouths 
of local dignitaries, or big men as the vernacular has it, a significant 
marker of “now” was pacification.
A corollary of pacification was law (NM lo). The term was under-
stood to cover specific rules (such as procedures of dispute settlement); 
the kind of peaceable conduct that made someone a “man of lo” (“I was 
a fighting man but now I am old—you are all new men here, and a good 
lo has come up and now we sit down on top of it”); and a way of life 
that had transformed everything (“White men have come, lo has come 
up and the kiap shows us the road to business”) (quotations from M. 
Strathern 1972: 130–34). However, the implicit contrasts are not sim-
ply with ancestral practices. The term also discriminated between more 
recent temporal horizons (“Luluai and tultul were strong, and the kiap 
told them to beat people, but now lo has come up we can’t do this and 
people humbug”)4 with the expectation of new lo to come (“When lo 
[the future] finally comes up and our children are all at school, we shall 
be ruined. . . . [For] what will happen when lo comes and we have to buy 
everything with money?”) (1972: 134).
With what seemed a remarkable degree of accord, Hagen people had 
by the 1960s endorsed the message of the kiaps. Indeed, the superior 
killing capacity of the kiaps and their armed constabulary aside, pacifica-
tion would have had a much rougher passage had there not been general 
4. Luluai and tultul were headmen appointed by the administration. I use 
“headman” (more appropriate to colonial Africa) to refer generally to luluai 
and tultul, as well as their predecessors called bosboi. One such headman, 
Ongka, recording how he was given orders to stop fighting, said, “So I be-
gan settling cases and if anyone refused [to attend], the kiap put him in jail” 
(A. Strathern 1979: 12). Reactions to the introduced legal system may have 
been very different elsewhere in PNG (see, for example, Scaglion 1985 on 
the Abelam).
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acceptance of kiap law, the recognition that a “new time” had arrived. 
Across PNG, local men, often aspiring big men, were appointed to keep 
order, also translated as lo. However, remarkable in the Hagen case and 
elsewhere in the Highlands was the speed with which men seemingly as-
sisted the process of pacification by moving into the position of dispute-
settlers. Just as kiaps on patrol would act as magistrates, such men held 
what they also called courts (kot). With nothing less than enthusiasm, 
people took their grievances to such courts, attended them, turned up 
as witnesses, and so forth. The dispute-settlers borrowed protocols from 
official proceedings, regarded themselves as part of the judicial system, 
and above all spoke of the new lo that had come with the Australians.
The imitation of Whites that is so widely reported of “first contact” 
situations, Aparecida Vilaça (2016: 71–73) arrestingly turns into an 
understanding of translation through embodiment for the Amazonian 
Wari’. Take Andrew Lattas’s (1998) study of Kaliai cargo cults (New 
Britain) and their transformative potential; what was copied from the 
Whites, Vilaça notes, was both their body postures and etiquette and 
their bureaucratic structures. True also of Hagen, I focus on the apparent 
accord that sustained the peace for many years, despite—or because of—
the imaginative ferocity with which some appointed headmen initially 
meted out punishments. Here translation was, we might say, through 
modes of action that demonstrated effectiveness, the capacity for draw-
ing power to oneself.5
Dispute-settlers did not have at their disposal the sanctions of the 
official judicial system, apart from appealing to that system itself, and so 
drew on already existing practices, notably compensation for injury. It 
would seem that the administration’s message had gone home. Lo cap-
tured a general sense that a new time had arrived, or was on its way, so 
that one could speak of cash cropping (coffee) as following the law of 
business.6 The kiaps’ explicit vision for the future, instigated through peo-
ple listening to them and obeying the law, embraced commerce, business, 
5. I keep the term “translation” although, in the spirit of Vilaça’s analysis of 
missionary attempts to translate the words of the Bible, for the circum-
stances relevant here it might be appropriate to introduce a substantive such 
as “re-enactment” or “remediation.”
6. On the present being seen as the “time of law,” see, for example, Hirsch 
(2004) on the Fuyuge-speakers of highlands Papua, who were clear that 
White men had put law into their heads—a matter of how to behave and 
what assets to command.
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roads, hospitals, schools, and so forth. You could see what they meant in 
the trade stores cropping up along the roads on which locals labored one 
day a week. It was a promissory horizon, full of aspirations that Whites 
and indigenes alike seemed to share.
It is hard to believe now, but in that present the promises made no 
mention of independence. In the mid-1960s some kiaps even said such a 
prospect was a hundred years away. So much had to be done in terms of 
education, instilling proper practices, introducing economic goals, and so 
forth—trade stores with corrugated iron roofs were just the beginnings. 
In this context we might understand the official reaction to the unoffi-
cial courts. It was inconceivable to regard either the kot or the headmen 
as part of the judicial system. Justice was what the kiaps dispensed on 
their patrols and they often stressed the technical illegality of the courts 
(kot). A political education talk broadcast over Hagen radio in 1970 was 
explicit: “We can’t take the law into our own hands.”7 More benignly, the 
courts so-called were at best informal arenas for mediation, tolerated as 
vehicles for keeping the local peace, dealing with minor conflicts, while 
major issues—such as homicide—would automatically go to the official 
courts. In the administration’s view, Papua New Guineans were still at a 
very simple stage in their unfolding progress and much had to change. 
Hence one had to urge them on and talk about development. Above 
all, there could be no return to the past that was not a reversion to sav-
agery—that would be turning their backs on the future.
Where did Hageners’ enthusiasm for the law come from? The Aus-
tralians could envisage what was ahead—orderly classrooms, effective 
hospitals, commercial plantations. This was hardly on the Hagen hori-
zon. But what evidently loomed large in the Hagen present, and it has 
been reported time and again from Papua New Guineans’ perceptions of 
Whites, was the power the kiaps dispensed, including the effectiveness 
of their punishments. This power was a particular challenge for com-
petitively minded big men (how to access it). What the kiaps saw as 
people taking the law into their own hands, the dispute-settlers—and 
no locals really challenged them—saw as forging direct links with the 
official system, or rather with its embodiment in the persons of patrol 
7. The speech was in NM, where “we” is literally “you and I” (plural) (yumi). 
But as a former headman observed, “the kiap hears courts, has words to 
say, lays down laws, instructs people, and that is exactly what I used to do.” 
(This is not to overlook the stories of the fear that the appointed headmen 
initially instilled in the local population through their brutal methods.)
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officers, district officers, and when they had heard of them, magistrates 
and judges. Person to person. Dispute-settlers translated their mandate 
as a chain of command; they had explicitly been told by the kiaps to hear 
courts.8 The new time did not just happen—it had to be made, which is 
what they and the kiaps were (both) doing.
Enthusiasm dissolved somewhat in the 1970s. Major confronta-
tions erupted into violence, with episodes of all-out war. Two features 
of this overt violence, which in Hagen lasted for a couple of decades 
before and after independence, are germane. First, many incipient con-
flicts were throughout this period kept in check by the still flourishing 
kot, replaced after independence by the introduction of official Village 
Courts. Second, those conflicts now leading to war were in large part an 
outcome of the expansion of regional horizons, through unaccustomed 
coalitions of groups into administrative units or the inadvertent homi-
cides of vehicular traffic, encouraged by the amount of cash in the area 
and spectacular prospects of huge compensation payments.9 Needless 
to say, the administration—and growing urban elite—regarded warfare 
as “tribal fighting,” a reversion to a traditional past. One view in Hagen 
was that the resumption of warfare sprang from growing unrest over the 
official courts. Disappointingly, in their dealings with homicide, judges 
appeared to attend to petty issues (such as who dealt this or that blow), 
bypassing the crucial political implications of the causes or reasons be-
hind particular actions. In these respects, the new law had failed to bring 
what it promised.
What are we to make of that initial accord, then, when people en-
thusiastically “tried out” the law, agreeing to be pacified to see what law 
would bring? And what do we make of the very different perceptions 
of the judicial system, Australian and Hagen, on which it seemed to 
8. Kiaps would no doubt have regarded them as words put into their mouths; 
while some Hagen men appeared to be recalling specific conversations, a 
general exhortation to keep the law interpreted as a special message for dis-
pute-settlers could well be rendered linguistically in terms of direct speech.
9. Maclean (1998) suggests that pacification failed through the kiaps’ mis-
reading of the convertibility of warfare, talk, and gift exchange (see be-
low), and thus of the convertibility of offences into peaceful compensation 
procedures; quoted in Demian (2016: 25). Demian gives an accomplished 
reprise of this situation, and underlines the kiaps’ own mimetic experiment 
in encouraging compensation, “doing what they thought Highlanders were 
doing” (2016: 26).
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be based? We can understand these different perceptions as a clash of 
cultures or a clash of social systems, except that that the encounters that 
took place in Hagen at pacification did not simply contain many accom-
modations, they also generated seemingly mutual aspirations for peace 
and prosperity. And for all the violence that followed, and the subtler 
forms of attack at district or (later) provincial level through bribery, mis-
information, and so forth, there was no resistance to the government 
as such.10 Nor was kastom objectified as an entity around which to take 
forceful action (as in some parts of Papua New Guinea). Yet we witness 
a divergence: where the kiaps thought the dispute-settlers were usurping 
the law, the latter thought they were following it. When Hageners did 
indeed take the law into their own hands, bypassing the official courts 
through violent reprisals for violent acts, kiaps saw a reversion to primi-
tive custom.
This could be taken as an obvious example of cultures being mixed 
bags of diverse possibilities or of social systems endorsing values dif-
ferentially played out. Some things clash, and some things don’t, a con-
clusion similar to one that, from the perspective of 2015, has been long 
voiced by the PNG judiciary: dealing with customary law is a matter 
of deciding which customs are suitable for a modern legal system and 
which are not. In any event, people are bound to see past one another. 
Meanwhile, life goes on. But suppose we were as interested in the mutual 
understandings as the misunderstandings. Can we in this case account 
for the accord as well as the disruption of it? I think we can, provided we 
see the apparent similarities as well as the differences as the outcomes of 
a deep divergence. In many respects the divergence was simply too radi-
cal to articulate.
A Clash of Ontologies?
It is no surprise that in the context of this volume, one might want to 
ask whether such a divergence had ontological import. Perhaps what 
10. People tried out alternative routes to power—for example, sporadic cargo 
cult–like activity—but that did not involve attacks on government instal-
lations, though the Australians might see them as attacks on their insti-
tutions. “Power” here is not an analytic: it refers to an Indigenous notion 
entailing both strength and the capacity to have influence or effect on all 
kinds of others.
A Clash of Ontologies?
53
differentiates an ontological clash from a cultural clash lies in the nature 
of the evidence for it. It is not necessarily visible (Vilaça 2016: 118–20), 
either to those involved or to the anthropologist, whose account of on-
tological mismatch is likely to be at a tangent to overt perceptions of 
conflict. Or at least ontology cannot be visible in the way culture is (or 
else it is “culture”!). Here, I recall Manuela Carneiro da Cunha’s (2009) 
description of how anthropologists move between two senses of culture. 
While they might think they are talking about culture as the coherence 
of an internal logic (Rollason’s culture in a weak sense), to imagine a 
clash of cultures is to endorse an externalized, interethnic logic (invok-
ing marked “cultures”). Ontological divergence is not going to look like a 
cultural—or indeed social—clash, where the clash is obvious. It may not 
even look like a “clash” at all.
Consider the agreements and disagreements of the 1960s. Taking the 
vantage point of people—Hageners and Australians alike—acting from 
the horizon of the present, I suggest that their presentism, so to speak, 
implies different approaches to the sequencing of events. The kiaps, for 
example, seem to have been acting out some specific assumptions about 
time.
In Ringel’s East German city, Hoyerswerda, anything can change (it 
is what endures that should catch our attention, he says). One way peo-
ple deal with unpredictability lies in the idea that they have been living 
through successive epochs, and could do so again. Not far behind all 
the smaller untoward events that shake up the contours of the present 
horizon lie the upheavals of larger epochal changes, notably de-indus-
trialization and the vanishing of socialism, veritable revolutions (not 
Ringel’s word). By diverting change along new paths, revolutions are at 
once interruptions in the ever-changing flow of events and enhanced 
moments of them. Indeed, I would see such moments, registered as radi-
cal, catastrophic, or whatever, being precipitated by assumptions about 
time that have been typified as “evolutionary” (McDowell 1985: 28, after 
Gellner 1964). This is not quite the paradox it seems. In this typification, 
the “Western worldview” of history and change is a linear, ever-flowing 
progression from past to present. Every temporal horizon is an accumu-
lation of moments that are nonrepeatable: the past is from where the 
present has come, and is kept in its place behind it. Revolutions redefine 
the course of events, but do not compromise that inexorable forward 
movement—in fact, they draw attention to it.
When kiaps first came into the PNG Highlands, they must have 
thought they were revolutionaries of a kind. That was not their language; 
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government officers, by contrast with missionaries and gold prospectors, 
might have said they were on a mission of modernization. Nonethe-
less, the Australians brought technical marvels with them—iconically, 
the gramophone—and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they were 
showing these off as achievements. At the least they expected such things 
would be greeted with amazement or wonder. Of course the locals did 
not appreciate the long history of technical development that lay behind 
them, the evolution of civilization itself, which was part of their power 
in the Australians’ eyes. But they may readily have ceded that a new time 
had come.
Such an “evolutionary” perception of time’s flow was part of Ernest 
Gellner’s (1964: 42) understanding of what he called a “neo-episodic” 
theory of change or progress. The latter allowed for abrupt transitions 
interspersed with relatively homogeneous periods, although I infer that 
time as such did not change direction. A strictly “episodic” theory of 
change, by contrast (and also my inference), was focused on the abrupt-
ness of a before/after transition that did not require a notion of time 
flowing forward. These contrasts are open to skepticism (see, for exam-
ple, Munn 1992: 112; Robbins 2001: 547n3). In any event they are not 
to be confused with that drawn between linear and cyclical “time,” which 
enjoys the status of a dichotomy in some anthropological accounts, even 
distinguishing whole societies (Munn 1992). If evolutionary or linear 
history encompasses the cyclical return of similar moments, as in the 
year’s seasons or the recurrence of religious festivals, each commemora-
tion proceeding cumulatively, an episodic present may also have cyclic 
rhythms (Iteanu 1999; Scaglion 1999). Like André Iteanu and Richard 
Scaglion, and without entering into a broader debate on ideas of change, 
I stay with Nancy McDowell’s adoption of Gellner’s nomenclature (but 
specifically not of his intentions) of the evolutionary and episodic to 
characterize distinctive ways of being in the present. What is at issue in 
episodic presentism is not so much a sequencing of events “in time,” as 
we shall see, as the effect of people’s actions upon one another.
Suppose time were not ever-flowing. McDowell could only make 
sense of what people at Bun in the East Sepik told her about the present 
through appreciating that past and present were radically cut off from 
each other. For a moment this emphasis on the instituting break seems 
to recall the revolutionary times just noted. However, either side of the 
Bun boundary between past and present things are changeless. They are 
as they are, or as they had been: steady states recovering their equilib-
rium after rupture by catastrophic events (Scaglion 1999: 212). Which 
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forms of life are attributed to “now” or which to “then” is a matter of 
emphasis, but each has its own character. Change itself has to be “total, 
drastic and radical” (McDowell 1985: 33); this does not mean things 
cannot change again. At Bun, the division between before and after the 
arrival of the White Australians was taken up in other formulations—
indeed, the then and now (before and after) paradigm could be repeated 
on any scale. McDowell had in mind stories about earlier ruptures be-
tween present ways of doing things and how people existed before that 
came into being. What this leaves is a question mark over the idea of a 
future. After all, if the past is radically cut off, does it even make sense to 
talk of a future? Where the present is not tethered to an earlier epoch, 
then is there nothing ahead but a flat horizon of the ever-present?
Episodic presentism implies that how we are now entails everything 
about ourselves that is now. Yet, as Joel Robbins (2001) has pointed out, 
an analytical emphasis on a radical cut between epochs fails to account 
for the fact that people may understand themselves as at once exist-
ing in an entirely different epoch yet carry on with their lives much as 
before. This applies particularly to millenarian movements, and here is 
one answer to how the future may be imagined—as another break. It 
too will be a break with the present. Concomitantly, that break may be 
anticipated, in which case the promise of the future may have already 
changed everything in the present. Robbins describes how the Urapmin 
(Telefomin) undergo episodes of intense activity, working to bring such 
a promise about, while in-between ordinary life proceeds as usual. This is 
not a paradox. In English parlance, ordinary life sounds like continuity 
rather than change, but here the point is that the incisive change (the 
new horizon of future promise) is already in place.
Everyday life in Urapmin is marked by a millenarianism that forces 
Urapmin to keep one eye on the coming apocalypse and another on 
what they call “things of the ground.” (Robbins 2001: 533)
Robbins’s trenchant phrase “everyday millenarianism” captures this rou-
tinization of radical breaks as a part of life. Anthony Pickles (2014: 102–
3) uses it to great effect, for example, in describing the serial or epochal 
nature of the anticipation put into small scale transactions in Highlands 
Goroka.
The administration’s old-new / before-after exhortations will have 
seemed eminently familiar to a 1960s Hagen. The exhortations pointed 
to a radical change to come. Here kiaps, Hagen men and women, and 
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the anthropologist with analytical interests at heart, can all concur: what 
had already radically changed was the horizon of present possibilities. 
In truth, a sense of cataclysmic change did not need to rest on a total-
ized image of a world new in every aspect. Change was evident in those 
aspects of the present day that seemed crucial diagnostics of the new 
time.11 In the Louisiade Islands, Buliga took the crux to be an eventual 
reversal of Black and White power relations; in the Highlands, Hagen 
men (including dispute-settlers) saw new grounds for competition as 
well as new possibilities for wealth, transforming them in terms of the 
power they could exert over their compatriots.12
Without prejudging whether time or history is the common ground 
(“time” and “history” seem to me already implying an evolutionary mod-
el), I turn to the methodological concept of presentism.13 Perhaps we can 
say that the Australians and Papua New Guineans were not living in 
the same present. Robbins’s everyday millenarianism opens up a further 
possibility, as a point of method, for showing an ontological signification 
in the way people exist in the present, and the beginnings of another an-
swer to the question of where the future is. The possibility lies in the fact 
that both kinds of presentism are necessarily supported by, or embedded 
in, the ordinary occurrences of everyday life.
11. Many so-called origin myths have no problem about imagining a world 
very like the present but before the present has in fact been made in this 
or that vital aspect—so an otherwise ordinary pre-world is marred by some 
not yet instituted practice (such as cooking food / having sexual intercourse 
via the genitals / not recognizing wealth objects).
12. Between the two cases one would remark on the much longer period of 
colonization of the Louisiades. Nonetheless, there are parallels. Apparently 
Buliga constructed a bureaucracy, with a hierarchy of officers from king to 
motor driver, to step into the vacuum when the White expatriate popula-
tion fled at the incursion of the Japanese in January 1942 and “Government 
abruptly ceased” (Rollason 2014a: 49). Blacks took the place of Whites. 
Government resumed in November 1942; Whites regarded these activities 
as an “uprising,” and the subsequent “murder” of a kiap and others [to bring 
the future more quickly forward?] a reversion to savagery.
13. Munn’s (1992: 116) “notion of ‘temporalization’ views time as a symbolic 
process continually being produced in everyday practices.” Her formula im-
plies that some practices may be more emphatically temporalized—that is, 
more evidently “make time”—than others.
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The Routinization of an Evolutionary Present
Divergence between evolutionary and episodic presents shows no more 
clearly than in their everyday supports, in those perceptions of the world 
that keep certain ideas in place. I remark briefly on where we might find 
such supports in the evolutionary case before dilating rather more fully 
apropos the episodic.
Evolutionary flow entails a world in development. The present dis-
patches the past insofar as particular events can never be repeated; yet, 
given that this is a continuous process, the effects of the past are also 
ever-present. They may provide a measure of distance from things to be 
forgotten and discarded, or recovered and cherished, but above all the 
past is precursor to the present. Everyday ideas that uphold an evolu-
tionary view include the logic of cause and effect, the evidence of growth 
and decay, and people’s need for training, socialization, and education, 
along with other institutional practices, all of which rely on the passage 
of time before things are mature, ready, offer a return on investment, 
and so forth. Such ideas support one another, and in this are as much 
a part of the legal system as it was introduced in PNG as are explicit 
theories about judicial process. Legal development entails the time-lapse 
of growth. So things had to be taken step by step—until, that is, inde-
pendence suddenly became a possibility and in a handful of years all was 
abruptly changed. Then, after everything was changed, it slowed down 
again.
Indeed, from the outset in the Highlands, no sooner had the Austral-
ians arrived and set about reforming political and economic life, all parts 
of legal development, knowing nothing would ever be the same again, 
than they backtracked [my phrase]. They might still go on talking (as 
they were in the 1960s) about the benefits that planting cash crops or 
penning pigs or “hearing the law” would bring—but they did not mean 
immediately. It would take years to develop the place and decades before 
people were ready for independence. Time had to work in its own slow 
way. So much was required for societal transformation, and cash crops 
were only the beginning. The current urgency was simply about getting 
started—sowing the seed, one might say. It would take time before the 
fruits of this preparatory work would appear. Although the relevant 
know-how, equipment, and materials could be imported at one go, it 
would be long before returns were evident. Coffee trees, the main High-
lands cash crop, had their own maturation cycle, requiring attention at 
every stage. Then there had to be an infrastructure to turn the crop into 
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a commercial enterprise: labor, trucks, processing plants, export markets, 
all long before fertilizers or insecticides were on the horizon, or local 
consumers for that matter. This was another mode of evolutionary revo-
lution: a small change with momentous consequences.
I am assuming that these supports entail a degree of scientific knowl-
edge, even if it is not registered as such; in other words, popular under-
standings about the processes of growth and generation, about time and 
development, are tantamount to a kind of “embedded science.” This is 
not to deny occasions when the popular and the scientific, marked as 
“scientific,” appear to clash, but not to deny either the place of scientific 
thinking in the everyday.14 As for science in the marked sense, I offer 
two observations about the way it constantly appears to break with the 
past.
First, McDowell compares Gellner’s typology with Thomas Kuhn’s 
argument (in her words) that scientists “view their own history in an 
evolutionary fashion, complete with progress, advancement, discovery-
building-upon-discovery,” whereas frequently “science changes radically 
and in revolutionary ways with the complete substitution of one para-
digm or conceptual framework for another” (McDowell 1985: 29). There 
is no need to flag the controversy this generated. But perhaps we can take 
what McDowell calls Kuhn’s neo-episodic view as an example of “every-
day revolutionism.” Science forever pushes at its own barriers: this is so 
ordinary and taken for granted that it is no wonder that Kuhn’s seeming 
denial of a flow of events attracted criticism. The image of scientific de-
velopment as discovery-building-upon-discovery implies the perpetual 
change to be found in evolutionary thinking, not stopped through revo-
lutionary paradigms but diverted by them along new channels.
Second, an illuminating example of science’s ability to mobilize the 
cause-and-effect sequences bound up in time’s flow alongside discon-
tinuous leaps into new frameworks comes from Sarah Franklin’s (2013) 
history of embryo research. Practitioners are aware that each juncture in 
their research is but a staging post in a sequence constantly faced with 
an unknown future (often summoned through their unknown ethical 
implications). Thus, in vitro fertilization (IVF) in mice led to various ap-
plications, including human clinical ones; but the platform it provided 
14. I take science in the English sense of natural science; the epithet natural is 
not inappropriate more generally, since science based on “the continuity of 
the physicality of the entities of the world” (Descola [2005] 2013: 173) is a 
diagnostic practice of naturalism as a “modern ontology.”
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in the 1980s became a different platform for 1990s developments (cell 
reprogramming), and a decade on emerged in further cellular tools (in-
duced pluripotent stem cells). “IVF has continued to undergo a rapid 
evolution as a technological platform, yielding newer mechanisms to fa-
cilitate human reproduction. . . as well as new means of harnessing the 
regenerative properties of embryos” (2013: 37). This repeats the truism 
that every invention depends on previous inventions (human embryonic 
stem cell research would have been impossible without IVF). Routine! 
And that is the point: the everyday revolution of forever recapacitated 
innovation.
Indeed there is a local language for an important aspect of (re)capaci-
tation—translational research.15 If “new cellular models generate new ap-
plications, and vice versa” (Franklin 2013: 55), the ethos of translation 
works these up, substance and technique alike, to make them newly re-
productive (translational all over again). This workaday temporalization 
creates evolutionary time: being in the present is a matter of witnessing 
the latest evolution of the IVF platform. Franklin observes how the lan-
guage of future-oriented discovery co-opts historic frontier narratives 
of boundaries already crossed. Her account is significant insofar as this 
view of forward development is heightened by the material on which the 
scientists in question are working: embryonic cells with their intrinsic 
capacity for growth. Organic growth works as a reference point for other 
ways in which the findings of science might “grow” and thus become 
newly “reproductive” (her metaphor) through translation. Alongside all 
the new platforms developed for further innovation, in the light of re-
cent advances it is possible to go back to the embryo itself with its own 
generative potential, to harness that all over again. We might say that it 
is a version of this ordinary, commonsensical going-back, accommodated 
as it is within a linear, evolutionary time frame, that we encounter in the 
episodic presentism of the Papuan New Guinean sort. But there it works 
as a cosmic driver.16
15. In medical jargon, translational refers to the process of “embodying” knowl-
edge in a technical procedure—for example, through turning scientific 
findings into applications for clinical practice (not that this “linear” narra-
tive captures the complexity of the issues [Latimer 2013: 47]).
16. There is no temporal contradiction here: new technologies create new val-
ues; for one account of the (re)capacitation of “resources,” see Weszkalnys 
(2014).
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The Routinization of an Episodic Present
There are many ways of being in an evolutionary present, and that is no 
less true of the episodic. I turn specific attention to what might count as 
a Melanesian counterpart to bioscience. One of the great innovations of 
all time was plant domestication, based as it must have been on experi-
ment.17 Needless to say, it is only with the development of “science” that 
Euro-Americans might retrospectively wish to fold domestication into 
that canon: an informal science, if you like, stretched over a long period, 
trial and error more likely than deliberate strategizing and not necessar-
ily encapsulated as “knowledge.” (Indeed there is every reason to think 
it was encapsulated into practices of procreative kinship.) Nonetheless, 
cultivation is a prime arena in which people continued until very recently 
to innovate (and many still do), above all in constantly looking for new 
plant varieties.18 Despite the significance that the time-lapse of growth 
plays in an evolutionary present, I argue that in, say, mid-twentieth-cen-
tury Papua New Guinea, cultivation practices have supported not an 
evolutionary but an episodic sense of the present.
One might recall Jared Diamond’s rehearsal of a question posed to 
him in 1972 by Yali, a so-called cargo cult leader from the PNG Low-
lands. “Why is it that you White people developed so much cargo and 
brought it to New Guinea, but we Black people had little cargo19 of our 
17. The “humanization” or “personification” of plants might be closer than “do-
mestication” (Carneiro da Cunha, this volume). Across Papua New Guinea, 
relationships with plants are held to require devotion, care, and coaxing 
to grow (e.g., Scaglion 1999; Crook 2007; Coupaye 2013; Panoff 2018). 
Solicitude may be needed to keep plants straying from the gardener’s plot.
18. To take up Carneiro da Cunha’s concern about stepping outside the forest, 
over the centuries, cultivation would have variously taken place under forest 
cover and in the anthropogenic grassland that intensive cultivation created 
in certain areas. In the 1960s, Hageners made new gardens in both forest 
and fallow gardenland. Apart from planting quick-growing tree species for 
fallow cover in old gardens, elsewhere in PNG are reports of other forms 
of tree-planting to support the nourishment of crops (Damon 2017; Panoff 
2018).
19. Goods and material things, in common Australian/European-American 
understanding, famously turned around by Wagner’s (1975: 32–34) address 
to Yali’s predicament, as an interpretive counterpart to the notion of “cul-
ture.” In the quotation, one suspects “develop” was put into Yali’s mouth 
through translation. [I use Lowlands as a literary gloss here; cargo cults 
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own” (Diamond [1997] 1999: 14)? Euro-Americans very quickly turn 
the question into an evolutionary one: “Why haven’t other people devel-
oped like us?” Diamond’s answer provides an evolutionary argument in 
another tenor; the differences Yali saw are not a matter of basic endow-
ment (as implied in the first evolutionary response) but of contingencies 
of a historical or environmental kind that, through long chains of cause 
and effect, have bestowed advantages on which people have built.20 In 
either case, “time”—it goes without saying—keeps flowing. Yali was also 
looking for the source of difference, although one conceived as a differ-
ence of power, and in these terms PNG millenarianists also frequently 
turned to the past. Crucially, however, this was a past on which they 
could draw, repossessing what their ancestors had owned or laid down 
but that had failed to make it into the present. There were numerous 
stories about some ancestral moment at which the destinies of Whites 
and Blacks had diverged or—a response widespread in the Highlands 
where overt millenarianism occurred only sporadically—reports of the 
first Whites being greeted as returned ancestors. I take these as signs of 
an episodic mode of presentism. Yet another way of being in an episodic 
present was evinced by the Hagen dispute-settlers.
Dispute-“settler” was always a bit of a misnomer. It was not just that 
disputes were never finished, or were part of the ups and downs of social 
life (Tuzin 1974: 318). Rather, specifically for Hagen, the more disputes 
were “settled,” and especially through wealth transactions, the more they 
erupted (M. Strathern 1985). Before the Australian regime, I doubt that 
“social order” was a default position of people’s interaction, or that they 
had an interest in nonviolent action for its own sake. People did in-
deed peaceably terminate conflicts, and one Indigenous mechanism by 
which this was accomplished, compensation payment, gives us a clue 
as to their assumptions. The prospect of payment, compensating an ag-
grieved person through gifting, was basically a tool of conversion insofar 
as it enabled people to move from one state to another, from one kind of 
act or value to another. From war to wealth exchange. But then violent 
reprisals were conversions too, switching someone’s state of mind from a 
were most active in coastal areas and their hinterlands colonized in the late 
nineteenth / early twentieth century.]
20. Errington and Gewertz (2004: 25) argue that Diamond failed to grasp the 
fact that Papua New Guinean questions about cargo were not questions 
about White men’s things as such, but about the nature of colonial relation-
ships between Whites and Blacks, and the manifest inequality they enacted.
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sense of grievance or injury into the satisfaction of revenge; any interac-
tion could carry the possibility of grievance, and wealth exchanges might 
lead to war. From wealth exchange to war. And every episode of value 
conversion reinforced the practice. We saw, over a long period, the social 
oscillation from the ever-present threat of war to an interim suspension 
of all hostilities after pacification to the warfare that broke out in some 
places in the 1970s.
This contributed to the routine rhythms of an episodic life. At its 
extreme, every act, regardless of scale, implies that a previous one is con-
verted into something else. However, we need to account for the breaks 
that an episodic present assumes as well as for how both the past, and the 
break with the past, can be recalled. I suggest some ways in which these 
may be embedded in everyday apprehensions of existence.
Past acts are routinely brought into the present as the “root” (in 
Hagen idiom) of a current state of the affairs. In this sense we may speak 
of cause and effect. As I understand Hagen reasoning in the 1960s, such 
notions (of cause and effect) do not create time as an on-going flow 
where everything has an antecedent, and where continuity, including 
continuous change, is presumed “over time” until it is diverted. To the 
contrary, if time does not move continuously in the first place, there 
can be no discontinuity, and in the episodic view, no obsession with the 
static as opposed to the moving. A previous epoch is only changeless 
until it changes; indeed, we should presume that its present is similar 
to today’s present, with its horizon open to innovation. If we wish to 
imagine the division between epochs or episodes as a division between 
“past” and “present,” that division is there in the very idea that certain 
features of the past have forward or future effects. Conversely, present 
flourishing requires such recourse to the past. This will become clearer 
if we qualify the abstract concepts of past-present-future with the fact 
that what is invariably being recalled or anticipated are the actions of 
persons. There is nothing predictable about effects of actions. The spon-
taneous self-evidence of the natural, as Philippe Descola ([2005] 2013: 
199) calls it, including the way in which the divisions of the world pre-
sent themselves, has no place here. Rather, only someone’s reenactment 
of a previous action, whether of themselves or someone else, can show 
an act’s forward effects. This entails a constant need to work on what has 
happened, whether to encourage or avoid such outcomes (Munn 1990: 
5; Hirsch 2004: 20). In old Hagen, this was true of episodic cult perfor-
mances with their message of rejuvenation. What on an ordinary basis 
was hoped from the loyalty of their ancestors, who oversaw the fertility 
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of people and their gardens, from time to time demanded the special 
attention of certain spirit beings. These beings would bring everything 
back to the state of plenitude that had been brought into existence by 
previous performances. The climax of such a dramatic intervention was 
invariably followed by a period of decline until the cult returned (for 
Orokaiva, see Iteanu 1999: 272).
Recovering a reproductive action in the past to create a new time in 
the present brings me to a central set of supports that arguably sustain 
an episodic tenor to life. These are specifically supports for thinking how 
the “new times”—that is, events with regenerative effects—are routinely 
recovered from the past. They are of a quintessentially everyday nature. 
Each demands someone’s deliberate action.
Ira Bashkow’s (2006) account of the “meaning” of Whitemen to the 
Papua New Guinean Orokaiva (coastal Binandere) has an extensive dis-
course on Orokaivan opinion about Whitemen’s food by contrast with 
their own. Above all, for things to grow and increase in beauty, they must 
be hidden. This applies to people who undergo critical periods of seclu-
sion as well as to plants. Growth takes place out of sight, and Bashkow 
(2006: 125) makes an explicit contrast between wheat, rice, and corn, 
which “ripen in the open air,” and Orokaivans’ taro, yam, and sweet po-
tato, “which grow unseen underground.” It is underground that crops 
grow full and plump, just as girls emerge from their seclusion fat and 
bright. What is brought into the open, then, is spectacular: the moment 
that people see the results of their work, both magical and otherwise.21 
Conversely, growth is a focus of concern, even anxiety, and huge atten-
tion may be paid to ensuring that the food will grow, checking the parts 
of the plant that are above ground for tell-tale signs. Nonetheless, the 
relationship between what is above ground and below is indeterminate; 
the gardener cannot check the ripening crop itself as the cereal farmer 
does.22 For all the signs, nothing is known until the moment the tuber 
21. For the Orokaiva (and elsewhere) food seems more a matter of visible form 
(its form, the form it will produce [in the eater]) than nourishment. We 
may suppose that people may be surprised by what they see, as with all 
revelations, but not by the event itself.
22. It depends a bit on the crop. Thus, the growth of yams is bipolar—first 
throwing out shoots that gather nutrients above ground and then storing 
the nutrients underground, in the tuber. There are indicators, then, of what 
is happening underground, but no direct witness. Although we may gen-
eralize the description across several crops, including the sweet potato that 
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(yam) or corm (taro) is dug out. Here we have, so to speak, a routine 
enactment of a before and after, then and now.
There is nothing predictable or natural about growth, no nature to as-
sist through fertilizers, and no seed that will automatically develop as the 
child or fruit of a parent plant when provided with the right conditions.23 
But where does past action come into it? Let me speculate, with some 
aspects of PNG cultivation practices in mind, and turn the negative 
characterization into a positive one by enlarging the cosmological field.
The gardens that the Australian colonials encountered in Hagen were 
planted with similar root crops—taro, yam, sweet potato—along with 
sugar cane and banana. Except sweet potato, these were being cultivated 
there seven thousand years ago (Golson et al. 2017). The beginnings of 
this activity were not much later than the domestication of seed crops in 
China and the Middle East. Diamond’s account of the first steps toward 
population intensity was focused on the advantages afforded by cereals. 
While agriculture arose in many parts of the world, he observed, Euro-
pean and Asian grains were easier to store, and richer in protein than 
tropical bananas or root crops, which require the repetitive (ever-present) 
propagation of plant material. The domestication of certain varieties ap-
pears to have originated in Papua New Guinea. What did domestica-
tion entail? Prehistoric plant selection encouraged starch content, which 
worked, for example, in favor of certain sterile cultivars (Denham 2017: 
42). Whereas the conventional story about the origins of agriculture is 
based on the exploitation of grasses with seeds, among the domesticates 
found in Papua New Guinea, seeds were never the focus of propagation; 
in the case of bananas, it was seemingly bred out of them.
Although today Hagen people tie up bananas and sugarcane as they 
ripen, so they are covered in protective wrapping, unlike root crops, they 
do not grow underground. But they share with root crops the capacity 
has long dominated horticulture in Hagen, I focus on yam and taro, and to a 
lesser extent on banana. In many areas of PNG, yam and taro are subject to 
considerable ritual attention, and in the 1960s Highlands they were often 
treated as luxury foods.
23. Needless to add, for cereal growers the conditions are important, and will be 
monitored and held responsible for variations in crop yield. But growth as 
such is not a problem in the evolutionary view, insofar as the outcome is a 
product of the original (whether for instance it is of “good” or “bad” stock). 
Growth is an overt and much remarked upon problem in episodic manage-
ment.
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for vegetative regeneration, which means that offshoots are the principal 
planting material. Shoots are cut from a parent plant. However, any easy 
metaphorization of what is “parent” and what is “child” does not exhaust 
the description of yam and taro regeneration. Because of their sexual 
models of reproduction, Euro-Americans regard various kinds of vegeta-
tive propagation as “asexual,” a characterization that obscures the pro-
creative process. Vegetative propagation requires separating generative 
matter from what is consumed, often from the very same body, although 
sometimes—as in the case of small yams—separating those tubers to be 
planted from those to be eaten. In any event, new potential for growth 
is detached from what in being harvested has stopped growing. This se-
quence challenges how Euro-Americans might think of parent and child 
as old and new life. It is when an individual taro or yam is cut that the 
new parent emerges: it begins as the severed or separated fragment. Only 
after it is cut does the replanted corm or piece of tuber yield up the sub-
stance that will feed the new shoots soon to be growing above ground, 
before it itself shrivels and dies.
Let us pause for a moment, then, on how people propagate these 
crops. Very frequently it involves them cutting a tuber into pieces or 
chopping the tops off tubers or corms that are then pushed into the 
ground. Abelam speak of yam fragments as “mother” or “placenta” that 
will give birth to and nurture new tubers—that is, the mother is the part 
broken off to be planted (Coupaye 2013).24 Bananas and sugar cane are 
similarly cloned through cutting. It is necessary to slice through the old 
corm or base of a banana that has fruited in order to detach its already 
growing suckers; however, the sucker must be detached with its own 
growing point, a section of the corm, still intact.
24. Similarly, the Highlands Wola call the parent taro corm, from which suck-
ers sprout, the “mother” (Sillitoe 1983: 37). Abelam yam setts, the material 
that is replanted, may come either from a fragment of yam (its head or 
base), or from a whole tuber. In the case of taro, when its head is planted, 
that and the attached stem die back to develop into a taro with newly grow-
ing stem and leaves; however, offshoots growing from the corm may, if they 
are not bitter, also be cut and planted (e.g., in Wola). In addition, estab-
lished parent corms may grow lateral (rhizomic) cormels that send up their 
own leaves. A taro sett may thus be either a rhizomic offset or the bottom 
piece of a stem (the top of the corm), but in either case the stalk—and the 
planted material underground—rots away once new shoots emerge from 
its center; for Orokaiva, for example, see Iteanu (1999: 269, 273; 1990) and 
Bashkow (2006: 176).
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Do we conclude that growth and nongrowth are not just held in a 
temporal relationship but that regeneration itself depends upon one gen-
eration being severed from another? For Trobriand Islanders, yams are 
killed when they are harvested (Mosko 2009: 687). The plant that was a 
source of growth now itself ceases to grow. Of course, cereal seeds replace 
their parent plant, we might say, just as a new yam replaces the old one 
that gives it substance before dying. But there is nothing in the develop-
mental cereal cycle of the radical change that affects the mature tuber or 
corm. In the case of yam and taro, it is not just those that are eaten but 
those kept for replanting that are killed—precisely by being planted. An 
already grown taro corm is moved from a growing to nongrowing state, 
for pushed back into the ground is its own capacity for growth, which 
is then consumed by another: the taro that grows from it is a “new” taro. 
What is seen are shoots springing above ground; what emerges from the 
ground—into the present—is the present taro, as fully formed as its par-
ent. Each fresh planting recapitulates that movement. And in the case of 
any particular plant, each fresh planting potentially recalls the regenera-
tive capacity of the parent’s parent, a rehearsal of what had previously 
produced the corm whose larger part is now eaten.
In this context, “killing” is stopping growth (in number, size). It is not 
the obliteration of the identity of the plant. On the contrary, it would seem 
that people stress what botanists and geneticists (classically, Haudricourt 
1964) contrast with the reproduction of plants through seeds (where each 
is a new individual)—namely, that what comes out of the ground as a 
new tuber or corm is another piece of the same plant as the parental and 
grandparental one. Abelam gardeners are conscious of the generations of 
yams (that is, of yam-growing) that link them to their ancestors: “Yams 
replace yams, and people replace people” (Scaglion 1999: 222).
Where is the Future?
The apparent concord between some of the aspirations of colonizers and 
(some of the) colonized might be taken as showing a degree of under-
standing between them, a mutual intelligibility between their outlooks. 
On the other hand, one might wish to take more information into ac-
count and consider some of the entailments of presentism in each case. 
Perhaps an emphasis on the everyday routinization of people’s outlooks 
has put a little information in our way. It does not rest on an argument 
about intelligibility.
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A diagnostic of such entailments can be framed in terms of a ques-
tion: Where is the future? Do we arrive at the same answer in each case? 
Hoyerswerda people make all kinds of plans to ensure that the forms of 
living they value in the present will endure “into” the future, or rather 
give future a form by “giving particular forms a future” (Ringel 2014: 67). 
This includes what they see as coming from the past, but the uncertainty 
of that future guarantees a distinctive place for it in the as-yet unrealized 
unknown. That unrealized unknown is not the past.25 In old Hagen, to 
the contrary, one might say that the past can sometimes be exactly where 
the future is, noting that the answer makes sense of a future envisaged in 
generative terms—the regenerative success of the past can be drawn into 
the present, thus comprising moments to which one can return. But, as 
others have observed, referring to past and future in this way introduces 
the kind of abstractions pervasive in (not necessarily exclusive to) a natu-
ralist cosmology that temporalizes relations between events.
If it is useful to conceive of a Hagen presentism, it is locally imagined 
as relations between persons. The horizon people are recovering is the 
horizon of their ancestors, present with its own future potential, which 
people’s present-day lives embody. In other words, they are the cuttings 
or offshoots of that previous promise, and they bring that potential into 
their present so they, too, will be the regenerators of a new future. The 
taro that had grown before grows again. People’s efforts are directed less 
to sustaining continuity, or embracing discontinuity, than to bringing 
about “new” presents. The affirmation of that possibility lies in the break 
or cut between previous (old) and present (new) acts. And if what is be-
ing recalled or anticipated are the actions of persons, it also seems that 
relations of cause and effect are not being temporalized, or at least not in 
an evolutionary mode as the inevitable outcome of sequence. Cause and 
effect inhere in what people do, and in effect, what they do to one an-
other. That is, it is a matter of how people’s actions will have turned out 
to bear on other people’s actions in the (equally unrealized, unknown) 
future. Provoking or eliciting such reactions is perhaps tantamount to 
temporalization in an episodic mode.
25. In this view, the horizon of the unknown is always changing, the future 
continuously turning into the past, the past being (by contrast) what did 
actually happen. This past is conceived as a “natural” state of affairs upon 
which diverse “cultural” inscriptions are made, so the past is unknown only 
in the sense of being (selectively) forgotten contested, rewritten, and so 
forth.
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My references to Papua New Guinea have been mainly focused on 
the period following pacification in the Highlands. I turn to that period 
again to bring from it something to today’s present. Consider the appeals 
to the national constitution: Are those lawyers and legal scholars striv-
ing to activate underlying law not returning to the regenerative moment 
that has led to the present day? If so, we might be mistaken in reading 
the appeals as an attempt to recover the past either for its own sake 
(“tradition”) or to legitimate present-day actions (“ideology”). Rather, 
that return surely renews the productive differentiation effected in the 
nation’s self-definition vis-à-vis its colonial history: the need to encour-
age new formulations of the underlying law are more like an effort to 
separate once more the postcolonial legal system from that of its colonial 
predecessors. If we focus instead on the persons involved, the return is 
being made by the potential evidence of that action’s success (its off-
shoots, today’s people). The return is at once a validation of the genera-
tive power of their own sources of existence, the cut with colonization 
that made them anew, and holds out the possibility that in recovering 
the very separation that led to themselves, they will make Papua New 
Guinean independence work all over again.
A Clash of Ontologies?—Again
If there was a clash between those Australians and PNG Highlanders, 
what was the role of scientific thinking in its ontological import? An 
answer applicable to both is in terms of the science embedded in ap-
proaches to change, literally and metaphorically referring to the unfold-
ing of life processes in which persons had a cultivating role.
The material on which I draw is far from the fine-grained analysis of 
verbal and exegetical translations that Vilaça (2016) provides, and what 
goes on in dedicated teaching contexts (missionization, schools). My ad-
dress is to a broader “educational” milieu, where a colonial administra-
tion felt it had a development mission. Here, there were innumerable 
“first contact” misunderstandings, about what the new time meant and 
what it indicated of the future—about new wealth, institutions, oppor-
tunities, and so forth—and there was much frustration and disappoint-
ment. Yet it seems that there was enough in the way each party ap-
peared to the other for misunderstandings to be accommodated, within 
what people seemingly agreed about, along the lines that Lloyd (2007, 
2012) has suggested in terms of “good enough” comprehension. (Rapid 
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pacification simply would not have happened otherwise.) However, the 
very similarity in the aspirations that seemingly drove Australians and 
Highlanders alike tells us something significant: they (the aspirations) 
did not have to rest on mutual intelligibility of outlook. Concomitantly, 
there may indeed have been a clash, deeply and radically so, but it did 
not necessarily show itself.
In a nutshell, I suggest that we do not require the idea of a “clash” 
as overt conflict or ethnic distance in order to talk of a clash of on-
tologies. Let me build on two of G. E. R. Lloyd’s own observations in 
order to clarify this position. “If ontologies do indeed differ radically. . . 
how is any mutual understanding between them possible” (Lloyd 2007: 
147; emphasis removed)? This was a remark addressed to the relation 
between ethnographer and informant, among others. Thus, “successful 
communication between ethnographer and informant even in the mat-
ter of ontologies is strong evidence against any conclusion to the effect 
that mutual incomprehensibility reigns across the board” (Lloyd 2012: 
113). The implication is that ontological outlooks have to be similar in 
some degree, entailing some mutuality of comprehension, for there to 
be communication. But I derive another conclusion from them; namely, 
that the relationship of similarity and dissimilarity to the capacity to 
interact is, at the least, multidimensional. Degree of comprehension—
and thus degree of divergence—is not a predictor of the success of 
interchanges.
To talk of similarity or dissimilarity “between” ontologies is to treat 
them as though they were cultures. (And especially cultures in the strong 
sense. There are as many usages of the concept among anthropologists as 
Lloyd would find in any ancient debate; however, for the sake of argu-
ment I keep with the term as it has been critiqued earlier in the essay.) I 
follow Bruce Kapferer’s (2014) response to Descola, which emphases the 
multiplicity of different—meaning diverse—ontologies as they emerge 
under specific, situated social circumstances across numerous spaces of 
social activity.26 The phrase I would use is that they are like gathered fields. 
I mean to suggest not a gathering of beings or entities but the manner in 
which a point of view gathers to itself all its supports, reasons, conditions 
of existence—its own ecology—regardless of the role such elements may 
play in other fields. This was illustrated through two distinct enactments 
26. Thus he talks of “the situated nature of ontology [such] that the logics rela-
tive to the formation of the person or of being in practice are constituted 
through practice and are context dependent” (Kapferer 2014: 396).
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of presentism: the distinctiveness of each is a property these fields have 
quite apart from the similarities and dissimilarities the observer sees. In 
other words, anthropologists might take back the delegation that Gildas 
Salmon (2017) finds in so much scholarly procedure (imputing a mode 
of enquiry to what is under study), and allow themselves to designate 
just such similarities and dissimilarities between ontological scenarios 
without imputing to those scenarios the idea that any such determina-
tion affects how they work.
The phrase “gathered field” only makes sense in the context of these 
arguments about culture and the clash of ontologies. Everything people 
see around them can be gathered together in a manner coherent within 
a specific situation, which relays back to them that this is the way the 
world is. That’s all. It keeps its own scale, as always, the way things are. 
The point is that, at any given point, everything conspires to produce 
this gathering together. With the broad brush used here, if you think, 
feel, or act in evolutionary terms apropos events, processes of growth, or 
whatever, certain moments reinforce an evolutionary approach; if you 
think, feel, or act episodically, the same moments reinforce an episodic 
approach.
There is nothing static here, no impediment to change, no need to 
avoid contradiction, for the field simply exists in the supports that keep 
it there. Hence seemingly similar events can nonetheless be gathered 
into distinctive and specific fields. Equally, each may gather up things 
strange and bizarrely “different” from another’s perspective, so much so 
they can stand out as contrasts. Yet it is not that difference that specifies 
its ontological import: that lies in the gathering up, the echo-chamber 
effect by which the world plays back to people what they apprehend 
about it through the supports it gives to their ideas.
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chapter four
Mathematical Traditions in Ancient Greece 
and Rome
Serafina Cuomo
In his dialogue Republic, the fourth-century BCE Athenian philosopher 
Plato laid the foundations for the idea of two cultures in ancient Greek 
mathematics. While discussing how best to educate the future leaders of 
the ideal state, Socrates says:
It would be appropriate. . . to legislate this subject for those who are 
going to share in the highest offices in the city and to persuade them 
to turn to calculation and take it up, not as laymen do, but staying with 
it until they reach the study of the natures of the numbers by means 
of understanding itself, not like tradesmen and retailers, for the sake of 
buying and selling, but for the sake of war and for ease in turning 
the soul around, away from becoming and towards truth and being. 
(Plato, Republic 525b–527a, Loeb trans.; italics mine)
Possibly drawing on Pythagorean ideas, Plato set up a contrast on 
more than one level. Different ways of doing mathematics corresponded 
to different expertise, purpose, and people. Indeed, in another dialogue, 
the Philebus, Plato has Socrates ask: “Are there not two kinds of arithme-
tic, that of the many (oi polloi) and that of philosophers” (Plato, Philebus 
56d, modified Loeb trans.)?
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The term hoi polloi used here implies that one of the essential features 
of the philosophers’ arithmetic is its segregated, elitist character.
Fast forward a few centuries. Around 45 CE, the temporarily exiled 
Roman senator and translator of Plato’s Republic Marcus Tullius Cicero 
wrote:
With the Greeks, geometry was regarded with the utmost respect, 
and consequently none were held in greater honour than mathemati-
cians, but we Romans have restricted this art to the practical purposes 
of measuring and reckoning. (Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes I.2, 
Loeb trans.)1
Mathematics is only one of the ways in which Greeks and Romans 
differ, according to Cicero, but his characterization has remained espe-
cially influential, shifting Plato’s dichotomy toward a distinction on the 
basis of “national” or “cultural” identity. To simplify a long and compli-
cated story, Plato and Cicero are significant milestones in the genealogy 
of the idea that there were two mathematical cultures, or traditions, in 
classical antiquity: one theoretical, the other practical; one aimed at gen-
eral truths, the other at solutions to specific problems; one achieving per-
suasion through rigorous logical proof, the other didactic and “algorith-
mic”; one interested only in knowledge, the other open to applications.
Prima facie, the idea of two mathematical traditions appears to be 
supported by the textual evidence. There is a relatively well-defined 
group of texts, explicitly and intertextually linked with each other, which 
has often been identified as “mainstream” Greek mathematics: Euclid’s 
Elements, most of Archimedes’s treatises, Apollonius’s Conics, and so on. 
This tradition operates for the most part within an axiomatico-deductive 
demonstrative framework, which means that both its theorems and its 
problems are formulated in general and abstract terms. On the other 
hand, there is a sprawling tradition of texts in Greek, arguably some-
times intertextually linked with texts in cuneiform languages, in ancient 
Egyptian languages, in Latin, and possibly in Arabic, which has been 
identified as “folk” or “practical” mathematics, and consists of procedures 
for solutions carried out on specific instances of a problem. It bears no 
authenticated authorial identification, although some of it goes under 
the umbrella of pseudo-Heronian tradition (Høyrup 1997).
1. Similar sentiments appear in Horace, Epistulae II 3.323–332.
Mathematics in Ancient Greece and Rome
77
Let us look at one example: the equivalence between the square on 
the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle, and the sum of the squares on 
its cathetes. Today this equivalence (let’s call it P) is known as the theo-
rem of Pythagoras, even though the attribution to Pythagoras, alleged 
to have lived in the sixth century BCE, is not found in our sources until 
much later. Euclid’s Elements, originally compiled around the early third 
century BCE, contains P in the following form:
In right-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the right 
angle is equal to the squares on the sides surrounding the right angle.
Let ABC be a right-angled triangle having the angle at BAC 
right. I say that the square on BC is equal to the squares on BA and 
AC.
For let a square, the BDEC, be described on BC; on BA and AC 
the squares GB and HC, and the AL have been drawn through A par-
allel to either BD or CE, and let AD and FC have been joined. And 
because each of the angles at BAC and BAG are right, two straight 
lines AC and AG, not lying on the same side, make the adjacent an-
gles with a random straight line BA and a point A on it, equal to two 
right angles. Therefore CA is on a straight line with AG. Because 
of these things then also the BA is on a straight line with AH. And 
because the angle at DBC is equal to the angle at FBA, for both are 
right angles, let the angle at ABC be added in common. Therefore the 
whole angle at DBA is equal to the whole angle at FBC. And because 
DB is equal to BC, ZB to BA, and the two DB, BA to the two FB, 
BC, respectively, and the angle at DBA is equal to the angle at FBC, 
therefore the basis AD is equal to the basis FC, and the triangle ABD 
is equal to the triangle FBC. And the parallelogram BL is double the 
triangle ABD, for they have the same basis BD and are between the 
same parallels BD, AL. The square GB is double the triangle FBC, for 
again they have the same basis FB and are between the same parallels 
FB, GC. Therefore the parallelogram BL is also equal to the square 
GB. Similarly the AE, BK being joined, it will be proved that the 
parallelogram CL is also equal to the square HC. Therefore the whole 
square BDEC is equal to the two squares GB, HC. And the square 
BDEC is described on BC, while the squares GB, HC on BA, AC.
Therefore the square on the side BC is equal to the squares on the 
sides BA, AC. Therefore in right-angled triangles the square on the 
side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares on the sides 
surrounding the right angle. As it was necessary to prove. (Euclid, 
Elements I.47; my translation)
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Figure 1. Diagram for Euclid, Elements I.47, the so-called theorem of 
Pythagoras.
Euclid’s formulation can be taken as emblematic of the “theoretical” 
tradition: it is axiomatico-deductive in that it starts with a general state-
ment, and then proceeds logically from undemonstrated premises and 
from statements that have been proved earlier in the Elements, to conclu-
sions that, provided the reader has agreed with the initial premises and 
with the “rules of the game,” are logically necessary. Characteristically, it 
deploys a lettered diagram.2
2. The locus classicus on lettered diagrams is Netz (1999). For the deductive 
structure of the Elements, see Mueller (1981).
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Now consider the following text, dating to the second century CE:
Let there be a right-angled triangle with the vertical side 3 feet long, 
the hypotenuse 5, find the basis.
We will find it like this.
The 5 multiplied by itself makes 25. And the 3 multiplied by itself 
makes 9. And from the 25 take away the 9, the remainder is 16. Its 
root is 4. It will be the basis: 4. Similarly too we will find with other 
numbers. (P Geneva III 124 verso; my translation)
This text also sets off from a(n implicit) statement of/that P, but is 
organized very differently from the passage in the Elements: P becomes 
a means to solving a problem rather than the focus of a proof; the text 
deals with a particular case and specific measurements; it appeals directly 
to the reader, taking them through a sequence of steps and calculations 
(a sequence sometimes referred to in modern scholarship as an “algo-
rithm”), and it uses, as visible in Figure 1, a numbered diagram, where 
the key geometrical objects of the problem are marked by a number 
expressing their length or area.
These differences are what gives substance to the idea of two cultures 
of Greek mathematics. Most recently, Markus Asper has described them 
as follows:
1. General mathematical knowledge emerged from practical math-
ematical knowledge.3 In Asper’s words, “To think of [practical math-
ematics, ndr] as “subscientific” makes sense, as long as one remembers 
that our understanding of what science is has been heavily influenced 
by Greek theoretical mathematics. The “sub” here should be taken lit-
erally: ancient practical mathematical traditions were certainly all-
pervasive in ancient Greece, on top of which theoretical mathematics 
suddenly emerged, like a float on a river’s surface—brightly colored 
and highly visible, but tiny in size”(Asper 2009: 114; italics in origi-
nal). This claim has some corollaries:
a) There is a sense in which, even though “it is doubtful whether 
the notion of an abstract rule was present behind all the actual 
3. Asper: “Manipulating pebbles on an abacus can lead to the discovery of 
general arithmetical knowledge” (2009: 108); “These two cases show how 
specialized, practical knowledge could become abstract and move beyond 
the circle of specialists” (2009: 109).
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procedures” of practical mathematics (Asper 2009: 113), the re-
iteration of procedures and the accumulation of cases led toward 
understanding at a general and abstract level;4
b) The emergence of the theoretical tradition from the substratum 
of the practical tradition is a case of Bourdieu-type social distinc-
tion (Asper 2009: 123–25). The theoretical tradition was a sort of 
closed club, almost a “game” played by a small group, who set their 
way of doing mathematics, and consequently themselves, in con-
trast to the larger groups engaged in practical mathematics. The 
crucial context for this Bourdieu-type social-distinction opera-
tion is, in Asper’s view, classical Athens (fifth and fourth centuries 
BCE). On this view, the Plato we have cited at the beginning is, as 
it were, channeling the Zeitgeist, rather than creating ex novo the 
notion of a mathematics of the kaloi kagathoi (“the fine and the 
good”) and one of hoi polloi.
2. By contrast with the theoretical tradition, which thus has an inception 
point, the practical tradition is presented as essentially ahistorical: its 
roots go deep within Egyptian and Mesopotamian mathematics and, 
looking forward, it continues within Arabic mathematics. Despite 
some qualifications, the terminology used by Asper (and others) to 
refer to the persistence and stability of the practical tradition implies 
that it remained to a large extent unchanged.5
3. The people active within either culture were socially distinct (this 
as a result but also a precondition of 1b, above). In particular, math-
ematicians within the practical tradition, and possibly including a 
4. Asper: “The numbered diagram is meant to ‘ensure that the reader un-
derstands the actual procedure and, thereby, the abstract method” (2009: 
119, 122; in particular 110); “Strangely, the method itself is never ex-
plained in general terms, nor is its effectiveness proved. .  .  . Obviously, 
the reader is meant to understand the abstract method by repeatedly 
dealing with actual, varied cases. The leap, however, from the actual case 
to the abstract method is never mentioned in these texts. Learning a 
general method is achieved in these texts by repeatedly performing a 
procedure, understanding its effectiveness and memorizing the steps by 
repetition” (2009: 111).
5. Asper: “Long and remarkably stable tradition. . . (but, admittedly, may have 
changed along the way),” Babylonian scribes “must have used essentially the 
same accounting board,” “the tradition resurfaces” (2009: 109; see also 112). 
Asper cites Høyrup, probably the most influential “continuist” regarding 
the practical tradition’s expanse across time and space.
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greater portion of “foreigners” or “migrants,” “must have been of a 
rather low social level” (Asper 2009: 114), whereas the theoretical 
mathematicians were “at home in the upper circles of Athenian so-
ciety” (123).
4. The language of both traditions was highly standardized and remote 
from oral discourse (Asper 2009: 119–20). Nonetheless, the texts of 
the practical tradition were accompanied by oral, personal explana-
tion—they presupposed a teacher and a “live” situation. By contrast, 
the texts of the theoretical tradition are seen by Asper as autono-
mous—that is, constructed in such a way that they could, and still 
can, be understood on their own (Asper 2009: 126).
Asper’s idea of distinction is an interesting twist on G. E. R. Lloyd’s 
examination of competitive social practices in classical Athens and an-
tiquity more generally (e.g., Lloyd 1987), but not everything in his pic-
ture, albeit sophisticated and nuanced, is equally convincing. He probably 
overemphasizes the extent to which the language of practical mathemat-
ics was standardized, and there are other issues that I shall raise below.6 
Let’s assume for the moment, however, that Asper’s two-cultures model 
is correct, and apply it to our example.
It would go something like this: At some point in the very remote 
past, somewhere or in more than one place, somehow—possibly through 
repeated experience on concrete cases—people became aware of P. Since 
then, they have been both applying P in everyday measurement situa-
tions, and teaching P through specific examples to the next generations, 
presumably so that they are equipped in their turn to solve measurement 
problems. At a certain point, possibly in classical Athens, having honed 
their demonstrative skills through the exercise of competitive rhetoric, a 
small group formulates P in a general form, and constructs a proof of it. 
A discourse is thus created for the purposes of social distinction, accord-
ing to which the general formulation of P is the only true knowledge of 
P, and people who can participate in the language in which the proof is 
formulated are the only true mathematicians. The majority of mathema-
ticians outside this small elite continue to do their thing, same as it ever 
6. Linguistic analyses of this type are not unproblematic: for instance, they 
define “standardization” by contrast with what they refer to as “oral dis-
course,” and yet in a context like that of the classical or Hellenistic Greek 
world, where our knowledge of oral discourse ultimately derives from writ-
ten texts.
Science in the Forest, Science in the Past
82
was, but find themselves operating within a practice that is now distinct 
from, and construed as incompatible with, the first one.
This could be described as a clash of ontologies, in line with the 
theme of this volume, but, crucially, Asper highlights the fact that de-
spite social differences there was a shared cultural substratum, and that 
the clashing ontologies have been constructed rather than simply be-
ing there or “emerging.” Even so, once the distinction has been made 
and become successful, thanks to favorable historical circumstances, 
such as the need of Hellenistic monarchs for cultural legitimation 
(which led, for instance, to the compilation of Euclid’s Elements, and 
to the patronage of Archimedes by the kings of Syracuse), the two 
cultures appear, both to ancient observers and to future generations, 
hypostasized, clearly distinct in status and cultural capital. In other 
words, what were in origin epistemic constructs can become ontolo-
gies at a later stage, in a successful example of what Bruno Latour 
and Steve Woolgar described as an “inscription”: a process whereby 
an epistemic construction becomes the scientific truth, and the scaf-
folding of its initial construction is dismantled and erased (Latour and 
Woolgar 1979).
Asper’s picture is, as I said, sophisticated and, for several aspects, per-
suasive. Nonetheless, there are some threads left hanging.
I. Despite the recurrence and persistence of certain features, the prac-
tical tradition is arguably as subject to change and as context-de-
pendent as any other cultural and mathematical practice. To adapt 
Angela Carter’s (1990) words about fairy tales, “Who first invented 
meatballs? In what country? Is there a definitive recipe for potato 
soup? Think in terms of the domestic arts. ‘This is how I make po-
tato soup’”; there is no mathematical Potato Soup of the Folk, nor 
any solution to the problem of measuring a field that has simply 
been passed down the generations. Even if we encounter the same 
problem about right-angled triangles, with the same set of num-
bers, in different cultural contexts, that may be how a particular 
person or group “made potato soup”—we should question whether 
it is legitimate to erase its specificity and just label it as “yet another 
instantiation of potato soup.” The latter of which is also a very Pla-
tonic thing to do.
II. Several of the authors in the theoretical tradition also contributed 
to the practical tradition by engaging—for instance, in the problem 
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of measuring the circle and producing numerical values for the ra-
tio between circumference and radius.7 Indeed,
III. Some mathematical texts or authors from antiquity are hard to 
classify—for instance, Diophantus or Ptolemy, or Archimedes’s 
Sand-Reckoner. In fact, many treatises on astronomy, optics, or har-
monics may be difficult to unambiguously ascribe to one tradition 
to the exclusion of the other. This would seem to imply that some 
mathematicians—most mathematicians?—were active in both tra-
ditions, and that Asper’s social differentiation as described at point 
3 (above) needs revising. Arguably, this went both ways—not only 
were theoretical mathematicians occasionally “slumming it” in the 
practical tradition but also practical mathematicians may have been 
aware of the texts and practices of the theoretical tradition.
IV. While it is true that the practical tradition is mostly transmitted 
through papyrus and the theoretical tradition mostly through man-
uscript (Asper 2009: 109–10), there is theoretical mathematics on 
papyrus or ostrakon (specifically, material that has been identified 
as Euclidean).8 Equally, there is practical mathematics transmitted 
through manuscripts—for instance, the Corpus Agrimensorum Ro-
manorum or, as mentioned, the so-called pseudo-Heronian materi-
al. In the rare cases where such information is available, the archae-
ological context for “practical” mathematics (including arithmetical 
tables) does not seem significantly different from the archaeological 
context of material that one might expect to be associated with the 
culture or status of theoretical mathematics, such as classical Greek 
literature, or official documents denoting an elevated place in so-
ciety.9 Also, we find Greek and “Egyptian” material (meaning both 
material in demotic, and material pertaining to “Egyptian culture,” 
such as temple texts) in the same archaeological context. In other 
words, the differentiation of theoretical mathematics and practical 
mathematics along lines of social status or cultural identity is not 
borne out by evidence external to our interpretation of the text.
V. There is the small matter of Hero of Alexandria’s Metrica, to which 
we now turn.
7. For example, Archimedes, Measurement of the circle 3; see also other authors 
in Eutocius’s commentary on Archimedes’s treatise.
8. The most complete list is still in Fowler (1999).
9. See Cuomo (forthcoming) with further references.
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Written around the second half of the first century CE, the Met-
rica’s potential to revolutionize our picture of ancient Greek and Roman 
mathematics has yet to be fully realized. Here is a representative passage:
Let there be a right-angled triangle ABC, having the right angle in 
correspondence of B and let the AB be of 3 units, while BC is of 4 
units. To find the area of the triangle and the hypotenuse.
Let the ABCD be completed. Because the area of the rectangular 
parallelogram ABCD, as was proved above, is 12, the triangle ABC 
is half of the parallelogram ABCD, therefore the area of the triangle 
ABC will be six. And because the angle at ABC is right, and the 
squares on AB, BC are equal to the square on AC, and the squares on 
AB, BC are of 25 units, and the square on AC therefore will be of 25 
units. Therefore that side, the AC, is of 5 units.
The method is this. Having multiplied the 3 by the 4, take their 
half. It makes 6. Of these the area of the triangle. And the hypot-
enuse: having multiplied the 3 by themselves and similarly having 
multiplied the 4 by themselves, put them together. And they make 
25. And having taken the root of these, have the hypotenuse of the 
triangle. (Hero, Metrica I.2; my translation)
Figure 2. Diagram for Hero, Metrica I.2 (author’s drawing).
The Metrica’s special position in the history of Greek mathematics 
lies in its approach: measurement is tackled both as a general problem, 
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solved via a proof applicable to all geometrical objects of a certain type, 
and as a specific problem, solved by measuring a particular geometrical 
object of that type.
Historians of mathematics used to be dismissive. Van der Waerden 
thought that it was a very childish little book. . . . Nothing but nu-
merical examples, without proofs. Just like a cuneiform text.   .  .  . 
There is no doubt in my mind that similar cookbooks have always 
existed.  .  .  . Occasionally something is added, sometimes found by 
a real mathematician. . . but usually the source is anonymous. Some 
of the numerical examples in Heron are already found in cuneiform 
texts.   .  .  . It is next to impossible to prove their dependence or to 
trace the road along which they were transmitted. And, after all, it is 
not very important. It is mankind’s really great thoughts that are of 
importance, not their dilution in popularizations and in collections 
of problems with solutions. Let us rejoice in the masterworks of Ar-
chimedes and of Apollonius and not mourn the loss of numberless 
little arithmetic books after the manner of Heron. (van der Waerden 
1954: 277–78)
The idea that the Metrica has something non-Greek (“cuneiform”) 
about it was echoed by Otto Neugebauer in The Exact Sciences in Antiquity:
As a particularly drastic example might be mentioned the elementary 
geometry represented in the Hellenistic period in writings which go 
under the name of Heron of Alexandria (second half of the first cen-
tury AD). These treatises on geometry were sometimes considered to 
be signs of the decline of Greek mathematics, and this would indeed 
be the case if one had to consider them as the descendants of the 
works of Archimedes or Apollonius. But such a comparison is un-
just. In view of our recently gained knowledge of Babylonian texts, 
Heron’s geometry must be considered merely a Hellenistic form of a 
general oriental tradition. (Neugebauer 1957: 146)
More recently, the characterization has shifted to what we could call 
“hybridity”: Metrica has been called a blend (Fowler 1999: 9), a combina-
tion of elements from several traditions (Tybjerg 2004: 31, 35), a mélange 
of subgenres, linked to an “algorithmic” approach.10 Toward the conclusion 
10. Acerbi and Vitrac (2014: 41, 58), are also careful to point out that the 
Metrica is not unique, but that it has obvious similarities with other 
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of a nuanced analysis of Hero’s metrological work, which eschews strong 
commitment to the “hybridity” thesis, Vitrac nonetheless suggests:
Quoi qu’il en soit, les Métriques ne relèvent d’aucun des deux registres 
que nous avons distingués, puisque leur finalité manifeste est précisé-
ment d’articuler les démarches métrologiques de type algorithmique 
et les résultats de la géométrie démonstrative pour valider les premi-
ères à l’aide des seconds, et ce, selon différentes modalités. (Vitrac 
2011: 14)11
The implication here appears to be that demonstrative geometry 
is viewed as epistemologically superior to metrology, and thus able, in 
Hero’s project, to validate it.12 I find Karin Tybjerg’s analysis to be bet-
ter balanced: “In general, the techniques employed by Hero show that 
it is not possible to maintain the notion that Euclidean-Archimedean 
geometry was sealed off from the traditions of professional problems and 
calculation techniques” (Tybjerg 2004: 34–35).
The debate around the the role of Hero’s Metrica vis-à-vis the “two 
cultures” of Greek mathematics is meaningful because it reveals underly-
ing assumptions, not only in the use of labels like “Greek” or “Oriental” 
and the respective values they are made to carry but also in the attempt 
at a resolution of what is perceived as its singular cultural identity. The 
existence itself of Hero’s Metrica is a potential threat to the idea of two 
cultures, because rather than bridging them (Asper 2009: 127), it may be 
taken to collapse them. Conversely, Hero’s Metrica may demand a more 
complex vocabulary of identity, a model other than a binary one.
With that in mind, I would like to explore the potential fruitfulness of 
a couple of ideas borrowed from anthropology and linguistics: the notion 
of situation-specificity, or situated learning, as advanced by Jean Lave, 
algorithmic—and specifically metrological—texts, both from the Graeco-
Roman tradition and from other mathematical traditions. Their metrologi-
cal tradition is basically congruent with what Asper terms the “practical 
tradition.”
11. “Be that as it may, the Metrics do not belong to either of the two registers 
we have distinguished, since their obvious purpose is precisely to articulate 
metrological approaches of the algorithmic type and the results of demon-
strative geometry in order to validate the former with the help of the latter, 
and this according to different modalities.”
12. Similar criticism appears in Tybjerg (2004: 39).
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both as sole author and in joint authorship with Etienne Wenger (Lave 
1986, 1988; Lave and Wenger 1991); and the notion of code-switching, 
which is primarily a linguistic notion, but has fruitfully been applied 
to issues of cultural identity and imperialism, both metaphorically and 
more literally, given that language was crucial for the articulation of 
identity in ancient Greece and Rome.13 I will also try to apply some in-
sights about identity and free spaces articulated by Kostas Vlassopoulos 
(Vlassopoulos 2007, 2009, with references to earlier bibliography).
Let’s start with situation-specificity. This is not an entirely new con-
cept for historians of science, but in Lave’s work it stems from observa-
tions about mathematical practice, which makes it particularly helpful, 
and arguably relevant, for our historical case.14
In observations of the mathematical behavior of late twentieth-cen-
tury Californians, Lave found that people who appeared to be math-
ematically incompetent (or not very proficient) in a school context, 
proved to be mathematically proficient when asked to deploy the same 
mathematical knowledge (same in the sense that P is the same across 
our two previous examples) in a different, nonschool context, such as the 
supermarket or the home. Lave’s supermarket “experiments” were in the 
vein of similar research conducted in different countries and situations, 
from tailors in Liberia to street kids selling goods at the market in Bra-
zil.15 In Lave’s own words: “The same people differ in their arithmetic ac-
tivities in different settings in ways that challege theoretical boundaries 
between activity and its settings, between cognitive, bodily, and social 
forms of activity, between information and value, between problems and 
solutions” (Lave 1988: 3).
Given that school proficiency, or the lack thereof, can often be 
mapped onto class, gender, and race, and given that the observations 
about the situatedness of mathematical knowledge have almost always 
involved participants who are in some way disadvantaged in comparison 
to the stereotypically mathematically proficient White middle-class, col-
lege-educated man, situation-specificity can be deployed as a powerful 
13. I have drawn extensively on the following: Heller (1995); Webster (2001); 
Cooley (2002); Adams (2003); Gardner-Chloros (2005); Wallace-Hadrill 
(2008).
14. For example, Chemla (2012) is very much in tune with it (without explicitly 
using the concept).
15. Examples include Ginsburg, Posner, and Russell (1981); Carraher, Carra-
her, and Schliemann (1985); Lave (1986). 
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political statement, even if Lave’s account itself is not overtly political. 
Western-style school mathematics, or the “theoretical tradition,” or 
“mental arithmetic” as opposed to, say, finger calculation, are only some 
among many possible mathematical “situations.” They just happen, for 
historical reasons that are often as well known as they are ultimately 
ignored, to have become institutionalized, to the point where they stand 
in for “numeracy” or “mathematical knowledge” or “calculating skill” tout 
court, respectively (Harouni 2015).
The advantage, in my view, of using the notion of “situation” instead 
of “tradition,” “culture,” and even “ontology,” is that “situations” are finer 
grained and more flexible, and also better suited to exploring use and 
practice, rather than “systems” ( Johnstone 2011); action rather than the-
ory. Moreover, “situations” make more room for unauthorized agency 
and interaction, can be similar across time and space, but are also histori-
cally localized, and they can be characterized in terms of issues of access 
and power (which suits both Lloyd’s competitive context, and Asper’s 
context of social distinction).
Next, consider the idea of code-switching, or a speaker’s ability to 
alternate between two or more languages, depending on situation and 
context. It has long been recognized that language was key to articulat-
ing cultural identity in antiquity. At the same time, bilingualism and 
code-switching have become useful metaphors to talk about cultural 
identities in antiquity. A passage in the Dissoi Logoi, in the context of 
debating the question whether one can teach and learn wisdom and vir-
tue, states:
And if someone is not convinced that we learn our words, but rather 
that we are born knowing them, let him gain knowledge from this: if 
someone sends a child to Persia as soon as the child is born and has 
it brought up there without ever hearing Greek sounds, the child will 
speak Persian. If someone brings the child from Persia to Greece, the 
child will speak Greek. That is how we learn words, and we do not 
know who it was who taught us. (Dissoi Logoi 6.12, Loeb trans.)
The facts that language crops up in the discussion, and that a discus-
sion about virtue implicates the difference between Greek and barbar-
ian, are significant here. Examples could multiply: the notion of paid-
eia, literary education, often seen as the dominant cultural paradigm 
of the elite in the Roman period, rested on strong competence in the 
Greek language, and is a very good example of the fact that, in Lave 
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and Wenger’s words, “learning involves the construction of identities” 
(Lave and Wenger 1991: 53). It is also well known that code-switching 
in antiquity could be about “the expression of different types of identity” 
(Adams 2003: 302; cf. also 356–82, 413–15).
All this suits Metrica rather well. The text has been seen as an instan-
tiation of hybridity, but the problem with that term is its passivity. To 
talk in terms of code-switching, which is a more agent-centered concept, 
does more justice to Hero’s very deliberate (“marked,” in linguistic terms) 
combination of the reference frame of axiomatico-deductive mathemat-
ics, and of calculations.16 The ability to speak more than one language 
may still leave space for a distinction between “mother tongue” and oth-
ers, including pidgin languages, which are recognizably “acquired,” and 
creolization (which could be another way to describe Metrica), but the 
main point is not competence—rather, it is the fact that agents switch 
linguistic codes and indeed cultural identities, according to the context 
of performance and communication (the situation).17
Situation-specificity thus creates a plausible framework for the 
switching of codes, and supports the possibility that Metrica may not 
have been such a rare beast—perhaps multilingualism, mathematically 
speaking, was not as exotic as we might think. Together, these two no-
tions approximate a better model than the two cultures, for understand-
ing mathematicians who “crossed boundaries” in either direction. Rather, 
the new model dissolves the idea of crossing boundaries, thus making 
sense of the fact that, as I mentioned above, whenever we are able to 
reconstruct a more localized context for mathematical knowledge, we are 
faced with “multilingualism.”
16. See Tybjerg (2004) for a nuanced analysis.
17. I do not find the notion of linguistic incompetence as a reason for code-
switching (see Adams 2003: 305–8) useful in this context, for two reasons. 
First, code-switching is here a way of talking about cultural identity, so 
that the equivalent of incompetence would be the lack of authority in self-
definition, which I reject. Second, I take Lave and Wenger’s (1991) notion 
of legitimate peripheral participation as a useful model of learning. On that 
model, and particularly if code-switching is a way of talking about knowl-
edge practices, participation is always legitimate, and competence or lack 
of competence are therefore not useful concepts. As well put by Gardner-
Chloros (2005: 18): “Code-switchers upset the notion of performance er-
rors by contravening and rewriting the expected rules.”
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Similarly to situation-specificity, there are underlying political conno-
tations to code-switching. For a long time, this way of “mixing things up” 
was associated with incompetence, displacement, and subordination—a 
linguistic phenomenon associated with the immigrant, the insufficiently 
educated, and the geographically marginal. And yet, the prime example 
of code-switching in classical antiquity is the member of the elite but 
also homo novus Cicero, whose usage of Greek represents very complex 
code-switching (Adams 2003: passim). Even today, according to Penel-
ope Gardner-Chloros, the perception of code-switching, even on the 
part of many of the code-switchers themselves, can be one of laziness, 
surprise, and embarrassment, although she notes that “approval of CS 
tends to coincide with a laid-back attitude towards authority” (Gardner-
Chloros 2005: 14–15).
Moreover, and briefly, the idea of cultural identity has been problem-
atized by Vlassopoulos in a way that is relevant to our purposes. While 
acknowledging the existence of discourses advocating strong cultural 
identity differences (Greek v. barbarian, Athenian v. non-Athenian, slave 
v. free), Vlassopoulos draws on abundant ancient evidence to make the 
point, specific to classical Athens in his work but in my view easily ex-
tendable to other ancient contexts, that identities were confused, confus-
ing, and subject to continuous negotiation and renegotiation. He points 
out that, despite a rhetoric of separation and distinction, there were 
many communal “free spaces” (the agora, the ergasterion [workshop, ndr], 
the household, the harbor, the ship) where people from across alleged 
cultural boundaries met, interacted, and communicated. As Vlassopou-
los points out, at least in some cases those free spaces must have involved 
literal as well as metaphorical multilingualism and code-switching 
(Vlassopoulos 2007, 2009).
Thus, the notion of “tradition” or “culture” seems compatible with 
a scenario where cultural identity is relatively unproblematic, and as 
such susceptible to relatively easy identification (e.g., a certain piece 
of mathematics looks unmistakably Greek or, conversely, non-Greek), 
subject to, at most, “mixing.” However, more recent and self-reflective 
discourses, such as Vlassopoulos’s, take it that cultural identity is al-
ways a construct, and therefore always problematic; that identification 
could be, and was, contested, thus raising the question of whom should 
be qualified to assign or deny a certain cultural identity attribution or 
label, particularly if we accept that it is possible for an individual to 
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activate or switch different identities at will, without asking for external 
authorization.18
In conclusion, what are the consequences of applying situation-spec-
ificity, code-switching, and “free-space” cultural identity—in preference 
to “tradition” or “culture,” in the sense in which they have been used in 
the relevant literature—to the study of mathematical practices in an-
cient Greek and Roman world? First of all, “theoretical” and “practical” 
turn out to be not different cultures or different traditions but different 
situations. It is no longer enough to populate mathematical practices 
with just minds at work, seen through the lens of texts. Situated learning 
requires that we get a better sense of the “nexus of relations between the 
mind at work and the world in which it works.”19 That is compatible with 
Asper’s idea of a shared original substratum, but it also allows for people 
unproblematically to participate in more than one situation, and it does 
not map social status or institutional status onto a certain way of doing 
mathematics, while leaving open the possibility of mapping social or 
institutional status in terms of the specific situation to which that person 
would have had access. It leaves us open to the possibility of situations 
that mix things up a little, or a lot.
Situation-specificity is conducive to greater symmetry. The situation-
specificity of theoretical mathematics is not essentially different from the 
situation-specificity of practical mathematics. Consequently, they both 
have a history, and the abstract, general quality of theoretical mathemat-
ics does not rest on ontological grounds. Ontologies are a feature of situ-
ations, but not the only feature. Indeed,
a theory of situated activity challenges the very meaning of abstrac-
tion and/or generalization.  .  .  . An important point about such se-
questering when it is institutionalized is that it encourages a folk 
epistemology of dichotomies, for instance, between “abstract” and 
“concrete” knowledge. These categories do not reside in the world as 
18. For a modern but relevant parallel, witness the recent discussions around 
LGBT, trans- and cis-gender, and gender identity.
19. Lave: “These studies converge towards a view that math ‘activity’ (to pro-
pose a term for a distributed form of cognition) takes form differently in 
different situations. The specificity of arithmetic practice wthin a situation, 
and discontinuities between situations, constitute a provisional basis for 
pursuing explanations of cognition as a nexus of relations between the mind 
at work and the world in which it works” (1988: 1).
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distinct forms of knowledge, nor do they reflect some putative hierar-
chy of forms of knowledge among practitioners. Rather, they derive 
from the nature of the new practice generated by sequestration. Ab-
straction in this sense stems from the disconnectedness of a particular 
cultural practice. Participation in that practice is neither more nor 
less abstract or concrete, experiential or cerebral, than in any other. 
(Lave and Wenger 1991: 37; see also 33–34, 104)
Second, even though the practices we are discussing are largely tex-
tual, shifting the focus to situation-specificity and to code-switching
emphasizes the inherently socially negotiated character of meaning 
and the interested, concerned character of the thought and action of 
persons-in-activity. This view also claims that learning, thinking, and 
knowing are relations among people in activity in, with, and arising 
from the socially and culturally structured world. (Lave and Wenger 
1991: 50–51)
I think we should recognize the inevitability of personal, tacit knowl-
edge even when all we have are texts, and cast doubt over the possibility 
of truly autonomous texts—even Archimedes first learned mathemat-
ics from some other person. Basic numeracy skills, which are situation-
specific and include a component of tacit, interpersonal knowledge, are 
the sine qua non of mathematical knowledge. In this sense, again, Asper 
is right.
Third, especially when marked, code-switching emphasizes self-
determination and situation-specific agency. The authority to ascribe 
identity thus shifts from an external classification of people and math-
ematical activities (including at the hands of modern historians), to self-
definition or, in the absence of explicit statements, the presumption of 
self-definition. The mathematicians active both within the theoretical 
tradition and the practical tradition, the big authors and the anony-
mous ones, and others involved in mathematical practices who may have 
not produced any texts, under this model ought to be all recognized as 
agents. The idea that we can separate out “real” mathematicians from 
those who never wrote a text, and specifically a text proving a theorem, 
is, in my view, unacceptably arbitrary (pace Netz 2002). You could see this 
as an extreme version of preferring actors’ to observers’ categories, which 
is again very much one of Lloyd’s seminal contributions to the history 
of ancient science.
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A perspective that frames things in terms of situation-specificity 
rather than culture or tradition recognizes that there are power relation-
ships to do with mathematical practices and mathematical knowledge, 
but does not attribute power exclusively to the group or tradition that 
happen to be more similar to modern mathematics, or to modern schol-
ars. Monica Heller has drawn on (again) Pierre Bourdieu to argue that 
code-switching can be used to gain entry to groups with cultural capital. 
Using the metaphor of a game with rules,
specific groups set the rules of the game by which resources can be 
distributed. . . . It is necessary to display appropriate linguistic and 
cultural knowledge in order to gain access to the game, and playing 
it well requires in turn mastery of the kinds of linguistic and cultural 
knowledge which constitute its rules. Buying into the game means 
buying into the rules, it means accepting them as routine, as normal, 
indeed as universal, rather than as conventions set up by dominant 
groups in order to place themselves in the privileged position of regu-
lating access to the resources they control. (Heller 1995: 160)
And yet, Heller does not allow for participants to change the game, 
deliberately in an act of subversion, or less deliberately by not play-
ing the game well. She surrenders control of the game to the already-
established participants, not simply in terms of setting or abiding by 
the rules but also in terms of who should access the game, and how 
well they are playing. Transferring this to cultural identity, if both situ-
ated learning and code-switching are ways to reclaim and construct—to 
own—cultural identities, then Lave and Wenger, compared to Heller, 
reaffirm the significance of self-definition over authorization by other 
parties. Transferred to Hero, this means that we, historians, ought to 
take seriously his claim to belong to the same tradition as Eudoxus and 
Archimedes, while recognizing it as an operation of code-switching. 
Transferred to wider discourses about cultural capital and learning in 
the ancient Greek and Roman worlds, this creates an alternative, and 
possibly a subversion, to the concept of paideia, which can be easily 
recognized as a Bourdieu-type social-distinction linguistic and cultural 
game. This would seem to work particularly well for ancient Greece and 
Rome because, while there were political, social, and economic hierar-
chies and inequalities, culture was not deeply institutionalized, and for 
many forms of knowledge there was, as Lloyd has repeatedly demon-
strated, a marketplace.
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chapter five
Is There Mathematics in the Forest?
Mauro W. B. de Almeida
Is it possible to translate forest mathematics into modern language? The 
immediate answer is yes, because otherwise there could be no ethnogra-
phy—not to mention history—of mathematics, a bleak conclusion that 
would deprive of meaning many works on counting systems among il-
literate people and on their worldviews.
This argument, of course, begs the point, which is precisely whether 
or not there is mathematics among nonliterate, Indigenous cultures in 
the first place—that is to say, whether we are talking about the same 
thing when we include finger-counting among Indigenous societies and 
theorem-proving in axiomatic style as comparable instances of math-
ematics. Are we not, in so doing, committing another act of charitable 
translation, by redressing other people’s acts and assertions so as to make 
them look better in our modern garb? And, granted that there is, so to 
speak, mathematics in the forest, is it the same as Western mathematics, 
and can it be translated without distorting the peculiarities of Indig-
enous ontologies in which it is embedded?
Ethnographies as well histories of mathematics that deal with differ-
ent cultures suggest strongly that we can actually engage in meaningful 
conversations with people in other cultures, in the sense of talking signif-
icantly to each other, and not merely just misunderstanding each other. 
Thus it is that a contemporary introduction to the Theory of Numbers 
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invokes the “sophisticated means” employed by Babylonian clerks to 
generate Pythagorean triples, uses the “Chinese remainder theorem” in 
proofs, and places Euclid’s “division algorithm” as the foundation stone 
of the whole subject.1 Anachronistic as these references may seem to 
the eyes of the modern scholar, and notwithstanding the deep differ-
ences between the worldviews of ancients and moderns, there remains 
the fact that Euclid’s division algorithm survives a variety of translations 
from bad to excellent. The reason for this fact is what is at stake. I am 
aware that while mathematical agreement in the pragmatic and struc-
tural sense may be consistent with ontological pluralism, it can also be 
the case that this sense of familiarity of moderns when reading ancient 
mathematical texts lies in the fact that our own mathematics belongs to 
the Greek tradition, and has developed along successive rewritings of 
Euclid’s as well as of Archimedes’s and Diophantus’s works.2 But there 
is more to it than that, because we also understand intuitively the use of 
Roman and Greek calculating boards as well as of Chinese and Japanese 
sorobans and African counting systems (Cuomo 2001, 2007; Zaslavsky 
1973; Lloyd 1990, 1996; Lockhart 2017). When it comes to nonliterate 
Amerindian societies, these issues are the subject of controversy. An-
thropologists argue that there is indeed mathematics among Indigenous 
people, involving counting with the body, with actions, with beads, and 
embodied in social life. They look for mathematics embedded in social 
practices and institutions as well as in kinship, cosmology, and religion 
(Mimica 1988; Crump 1990; Urton 1997; Verran 2001; Passes 2006; 
Ferreira 2015), and also “in the stones” (Hugh-Jones 2016) as well as in 
“in everyday life” and “in the street” (Lave 1988; Nunes, Schliemann, and 
Carraher 1993; Mesquita, Restivo, and D’Ambrosio 2011).
Ethnographic studies tend to conclude that “forest mathematics” is 
incommensurable with modern mathematics, and oppose the ontological 
content of Indigenous numeral systems—for instance, with the suppos-
edly abstract, disembodied, ontology-free arithmetic of modern times. 
1. On Babylonian mathematics, the Chinese Remainder Theorem, and Eu-
clid’s Division Algorithm, see Stillwell (2003: 12–13, 66, 158, 171–76); see 
also Lloyd (1996, 2004) and Cuomo (2001).
2. An authoritative author argues that Gauss “not only did see that Euclid 
was right . . . he also saw that [the parallel axiom] implied the existence of 
a geometry different from that of Euclid” (Kelly and Matthews 1981: 12). 
Archimedes is described as the forerunner of the Integral Calculus (Pólya 
1973: 155).
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Against this stance, mathematicians such as Ubiratan D’Ambrosio, 
Marcia Ascher, and Hervé Bazin have argued that there are common 
mathematical ideas expressed by different means in different cultures 
and times, and look for Indigenous “mathematical ideas” that overlap 
modern mathematical themes (Ascher and Ascher 1981; Ascher 1991, 
2002a; D’Ambrosio 2001; Bazin and Tamez 2002).3 Concurrent with 
the second interpretation, mathematicians have in the last century il-
lustrated abstruse areas of pure mathematics, such as crystallographic 
groups, knot theory, and permutation groups, by means of such concrete 
subjects as Egyptian decorative patterns (Tietze 1942), Polynesian navi-
gation charts and quipus (Speiser [1922] 1937) and Australian kinship 
systems (Weil [1949] 1967). These examples suggest that the “unreason-
able effectiveness of mathematics” in the natural sciences (Wigner 1960) 
may have a counterpart in the human sciences, where mathematics ap-
pears to play a role similar to that of music as a means of communication 
between different cultures, although with different meanings. The latter 
view can of course be dismissed as charitable at best, and Eurocentric at 
worst, or, in other words, as yet another variant of a Whig view in which 
all previous modes of knowledge converge toward contemporary science. 
Should then anthropologists counter this supposed scientific ethnocen-
trism with the thesis of radical noncommensurability? Against this dis-
mal epistemic posture, I think that a defense of mathematical translat-
ability across time and space is compatible with the acknowledgement 
of the unlimited varieties of mathematical activity in different cultures 
and epochs.4 A plurality of mathematical ontologies and the consequent 
ambiguity and indeterminacy of mathematical translation are not an 
impediment to transcultural mathematical understanding. More specifi-
cally, I argue that the pragmatic effects of mathematics, as well as its re-
lational and iconic character, account for its interculturality, despite the 
multiplicity of ontologies associated with mathematical activities in the 
same or in different cultures.5 The thesis, of course, is far from new. It is 
3. Cf. Sahlins’s proposal that there is a common core of “kinship ideas” recog-
nizable across all known cultural forms (Sahlins 2013).
4. This point may perhaps be taken as a special case of Lloyd’s argument 
against the incommensurability thesis and the homogeneity of mentalities 
(Lloyd 1990).
5. For these points I am indebted to Da Costa’s pluralistic philosophy of sci-
ence (Da Costa, Bueno, and French 1998; Da Costa and French 2003), and 
from his reading of Peirce’s pragmatism (Peirce 1932, 1965).
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a reinstatement of a view pioneered by Wilhelm von Humboldt early in 
the nineteenth century, the point being that all languages are capable of 
expressing any human thoughts, although with different grammatical 
means and carrying, accordingly, distinct connotations.6 To use an anal-
ogy employed by Edward Sapir, translating between languages is like 
changing the coordinate system when representing a geometrical figure. 
The representation will come across in both frames of reference, but some 
reference systems allow an elegant representation, while others lead to a 
cumbrous formulation, as becomes evident when we look for an equa-
tion representing a circumference in the Cartesian plane (Sapir [1924] 
1949).7 The important point in Sapir’s analogy is that the completeness 
of all human languages is not the same as semantical equivalence.8
One could advance the argument a bit further to suggest that mod-
ern mathematics is well equipped for conveying the ontological variety 
of non-Western cultures, sharing somehow the similar claim of anthro-
pological and historical disciplines. For contemporary mathematics is a 
multicultural continent where Platonists, formalists, and constructivists 
live together while disagreeing on basic issues of existence and method 
(Connes, Lichnerowicz, and Schützenberger 2001; D’Espagnat and 
Zwirn 2017). Mathematics is ultimately “what mathematicians do.” In-
cidentally, this is not a unique feature of modern culture, for a similar 
plurality of views and methods flourished in ancient Greece and China 
(Lloyd 1996). Platonic realism, represented by some of the most eminent 
6. “No language has ever been found that lies outside the boundaries of com-
plete grammatical organization .  .  . even the so-called rude and barbaric 
language families already possess everything that is needed to a complete 
usage.” Humboldt’s most noteworthy example is “a literature flourishing 
since millennia in a language nearly devoid of any grammar in the usual 
sense of the word,” that is, Chinese (Humboldt [1820] 1994:1ff.; [1822] 
1994).
7. Jerrold Katz stated the point as the “principle of effability” (Katz 1978). The 
creator of the “Sapir-Whorf ” hypothesis was neither Sapir nor Whorf, but 
the editor of the posthumous works of Whorf (Whorf [1941] 1956:134ff.).
8. While asserting that the “Eskimo” have linguistic means to express the no-
tion of causality and to translate Kant’s work, Sapir calls attention to how 
grammatical schemata have ontological implications: “Stone falls is good 
enough for Lenin, as it was good enough for Cicero . . . [the] Chinese . . . 
content themselves with a frugal ‘stone fall,’ and in Nootka no stone is as-
sumed at all, and ‘the stone falls’ may be reassembled into something like ‘It 
stones down’” (Sapir [1924] 1949: 124, 158–59, 160–66).
Is there Mathematics in the Forest?
101
modern mathematicians, maintains that sets exist in a realm of their 
own that is independent of human thought and inaccessible to senses.9 
It also holds that mathematicians have an intuitive perception of such 
suprasensible beings.10 Kurt Gödel’s ontological and epistemological 
position is diametrically opposed to the views that mathematics is the 
result of human activity. But in this camp, there is no consensus either, 
because there are those who say that only mathematics objects exist that 
can constructed by well-defined rules (Bridges and Richman 1987), and 
those for whom mathematics is the free creation of human mind—not 
to mention the naturalistic attitude that sees mathematics as an em-
pirical science dealing with properties of the physical world (Maddy 
1997).11 In short, just as Indigenous and ancient mathematics are laden 
with multiple metaphysical worlds, contemporary mathematics over-
brims with ontological and epistemological varieties ranging from ideal-
ism to constructivism and formalism, just as anthropology has its own 
corresponding epistemic strategies—namely, looking for metaphysical 
systems, describing how things are actually constructed, searching for 
rules and algorithms.12
9. “The objects of transfinite set theory . . . clearly do not belong to the physi-
cal world, and even their indirect connection with physical experience is 
very loose (owing primarily to the fact that set-theoretical concepts play 
only a minor role in the physical theories of today)” (Gödel (1964) 1990: 
267–68).
10. “I don’t see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of 
perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which 
induces us to build up physical theories and to expect that future sense per-
ceptions will agree with them” (Gödel (1964) 1990: 268). Meinong’s ontol-
ogy, which allows for the existence of “impossible objects” such as square 
circles (Meinong (1904) 1999) and Da Costa’s “paraconsistent logic,” which 
allows inconsistent propositions (Da Costa 1974) are examples of contem-
porary ontological anarchism (Almeida 2013).
11. It is perhaps of interest to anthropologists who struggle with “neopositiv-
ism” to mention that Quine deconstructed a long time ago the “two dogmas 
of empiricism”—that is to say, the separation between “logical truths” (inde-
pendent from experience) and “synthetical truths” (relying on experience), 
and between theory and observation (Quine 1953).
12. These three broad branches are not the whole story. There are radical con-
structivism (cf. Bridges and Richman 1987), naturalism (Maddy 1997), and 
structuralist mathematics (Bourbaki 1994), among other varieties.
Science in the Forest, Science in the Past
102
Do the Amerindians have Numbers?
The thesis of the universal existence of mathematics across cultures 
would seem to have been refuted by Daniel Everett’s thesis, according 
to which the alleged absence of “recursiveness” in the Pirahã language 
explains why the Pirahã people lack “numbers of any kind or a concept of 
counting” (Everett 2005: 621). Everett empirically supported his argu-
ment with the absence of words for numbers among the Pirahã (Everett 
2005: 621).13 In his 2005 article, Everett relied heavily on Peter Gordon’s 
counting experiments among the Pirahã, from which Gordon concluded 
that Pirahã were unable to count large “numerosities” with exactness, 
attributing this failure to the lack of number-words (Gordon 2004).14 
The same issue of Science that features Gordon’s report includes another 
experiment on Indigenous counting abilities, this time with the Mundu-
rucu, whose language lacks words for “numbers beyond 5,” but who “are 
able to compare and add large approximate numbers that are far beyond 
their naming range,” although “failing in exact arithmetic with numbers 
larger than 4 or 5” (Pica et al. 2004); the point being that there is a dis-
tinction between a system of approximate counting without numerals 
and a language-based system for counting that consists in a routine for 
pairing in a one-to-one way objects with numerals (Pica et al. 2004: 499, 
503). We can conclude from the latter statement that the “no-number, 
no counting” thesis is based on the mistaken identification of the num-
ber concept with the use of numerals, and of the counting concept with 
“counting with numerals” (Gelman and Butterworth 2005). In fact, that 
is not all there is to it. In a later paper, contra Gordon (2004) and con-
tra Everett (2005), Michael Frank (2008) and collaborators (including 
Everett) recognize after new experiments—this time using a more cul-
turally friendly setting—that Pirahã speakers, although they have “no 
linguistic method of expressing any exact quantity, even ‘one,’” are, after 
13. A large section of Everett’s 2005 essay is dedicated to the “absence of num-
ber concept,” giving as corroborating evidence the absence of numerals or 
number-words among the Pirahã (Everett 2005: 623-24, 626). We are also 
told that the Pirahã do not have “ordinal numbers” either, although they 
order generations as above and below Ego (Everett 2005: 633).
14. Everett´s central thesis is that, pace Chomsky and collaborators (Hauser, 
Chomsky, and Fitch 2002), recursiveness is not a universal feature of hu-
man languages, the Pirahã being a counterexample (Everett 2005). Everett 
gives this thesis as the explanation for the “the absence of numbers of any 
kind or a concept of counting” among the Pirahã (Everett 2005: 621).
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all, able “to perform exact matching tasks with large numbers of objects 
when these tasks do not require memory,” the conclusion being now 
that the Pirahã lack “words for numbers,” which are a “technology” in-
dispensable for memorizing and comparing “large quantities” (Frank et 
al. 2008: 820). Notwithstanding, the Pirahã proved in these experiments 
to be able to pair quantities one-to-one and thus compare quantities as 
larger and smaller: “performance on the one-to-one matching task was 
nearly perfect, and performance on the uneven match task was close to 
ceiling as well” (Frank et al. 2008: 822). The authors conclude: “a total 
lack of exact quantity language did not prevent the Pirahã from accu-
rately performing a task which relied on the exact numerical equivalence 
of large sets” (Frank et al. 2008: 823; my emphasis). Facing this evidence, 
the remaining argument is that, although the Pirahã can check the “nu-
merical equivalence of large sets,” they lack “memory” devices for num-
bers, which are supposed dependent on words.
How about the “absence of a number concept” and of a “counting 
concept”? Let us recall the main empirical facts revealed by a second 
counting experiment, which differed from the one performed by Gordon 
in that “matching” was done with objects familiar to Pirahã: first, Pirahã 
can distinguish a collection with n from another having n+1 objects, and 
can compare cardinally two collections, as larger and smaller.
In fact, in Peano’s axioms, natural numbers are constructed from a 
sign for one, and by the act of adding one to a number already con-
structed—that is, from 1 and from the operation designated as n+1, or, 
even more basically: starting from |, juxtaposing | successively, so as to 
obtain |, ||, |||, and so on.15 Therefore, the Pirahã, having the ability to 
make these distinctions, already have all that is needed for doing Peano’s 
arithmetic—without the use of numerals. Also, in Cantor’s set theory, 
infinitely large numbers are compared by means of one-to-one matching 
of two collections, an act that can be performed with bundles of sticks.16 
And this is precisely the method used by another Amazonian Indigenous 
15. This is Hilbert’s basic characterization of the number system (Hilbert 
(1904) 1967).
16. In the manual of arithmetic in Tukuya language (Bazin and Tamez 2002; 
Cabalzar 2012), Tukuya’s finger-based counting system is represented as 
bundles of sticks, with the addition of a Mayan symbol for positional zero 
(to allow the construction of big numbers). Calculation with an abacus or a 
soroban is essentially another way of “counting with fingers,” without using 
number-words at all.
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group. As for memorizing quantities, the Palikur of northwestern Ama-
zonia, when inviting a neighbor for a party, used a “day-counting” device 
consisting in “a number of finger-sized sticks,” “richly decorated with 
cotton and feathers.” Curt Nimuendaju, the German ethnographer, con-
tinues: “After receiving the Iyen-ti, the invited person kinks off daily the 
ends of two sticks. If at the end there is still one stick left, then the party 
starts at noon of this day, but if there is none left, then the party starts at 
night” (Nimuendaju 1926: 94, quoted in Vidal 2007: 23, my translation).
There seems to be no doubt left about the presence of a modern con-
cept of counting and of number even among the Pirahã, not to mention 
of the actual ability to count large numbers by means of the matching 
method. If there is any conceptual shortcoming here it is not on the 
Pirahã’s side. As for the “memory” role of numerals, one should recall, 
besides the Iyen-ti technique quoted above, the method of quipus and of 
the Christian rosaries as efficient techniques for storing large numbers 
without words (Almeida 2015).
Mathematics in the Forest
This is our cue to go back to the comparative ethnography of math-
ematics, which was the starting point of my argument. Studies of Indig-
enous mathematics have focused on number systems (Zaslavsky 1973; 
Closs 1986; Gilsdorf 2012; Ferreira 2015; Lockhart 2017) and on re-
lated pedagogical issues (Verran 2001; Bazin and Tamez 2002; Cabalzar 
and Bazin 2004). How to go beyond the focus on the metaphysics of 
numbers in the Tylorian tradition ([1871] 1920), toward a wider view 
of mathematics?
I go back to Gary Urton’s thesis: that Quechua number ontology has 
a relevant contribution to make to contemporary philosophy of numbers 
(Urton 1997). While agreeing with the point, I suggest that contempo-
rary mathematics has also a relevant contribution to make to anthropol-
ogy, by offering a wider view of what mathematics is about. This wider 
perspective is illustrated by the cooperative work of mathematicians and 
anthropologists, which has thrown light on nonnumerical, non-measure-
oriented “mathematical ideas” embedded in human life. One of the best 
examples is Marcia and Robert Ascher’s Mathematics of the Incas: Code 
of the Quipu (Ascher and Ascher 1981), a deep analysis of the many uses 
and possible meanings of quipu. In subsequent books, Marcia Ascher 
drew attention to the interesting and nontrivial mathematics implied in 
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“sand drawings” by Angolan children and in “tracing graphs around rice 
grains” by Tamil Nadu women (Ascher 1991: 30; 2002a: 162; 2002b; 
on children’s drawing, see also Gerdes 2007). Other areas where Ascher 
revealed subtle “mathematical ideas” are “the logic of kin relations” and 
other “systems of relationships” (1991: 67–83; 2002a: 128–59), a point to 
which I will return. The “symmetric patterns” (1991: 154ff.) and “models 
and maps” (2002a: 89; 2002b: 122) are other domains where “mathemat-
ical ideas” are found. Other examples of cooperative work by anthropolo-
gists and mathematicians include the catalogue of plane patterns found 
in Indigenous designs by Dorothy Washburn and Donald Crowe (1988, 
2004), based on the theory of groups. This is the approach that I will use 
in the next section, as a tentative example of how mathematics can be 
found in social systems.
The Point of Incommensurability: “My Father is My Son”
I now turn to an example of translation from another modern math-
ematical theory into a Native idiom of kinship, emphasizing the point 
that the translation does make ontologies commensurable, for what is 
being translated are ideas about relations, not about things related by 
them. I take as an instance the Cashinahua kinship language.17 First, I 
argue that ontological translation is unavoidably ambiguous in this case.
Epan is the Cashinahua vocative translated as pai in Portuguese and 
as “father” in English. This is clearly a case of equivocation both in the 
extensional sense and in the intensional sense, since in standard usage, 
Brazilian pai refers to a single individual at the next ascending genera-
tion, while a Cashinahua can address as epan not only his “father” in the 
English sense but also all his “father’s brothers” and also his “sons” to-
gether with his “brother’s sons”—keeping in mind that English kinship 
terms within quotation marks are not meant as translations of Cashina-
hua terms. Thus, terminologically, “father” and “son” could refer in differ-
ent contexts to individuals that a Cashinahua speaker would address as 
17. The Cashinahua are an Indigenous people inhabiting the course of the up-
per Jurua River. They belong to the Panoan linguistic family, which encom-
passes several Indigenous groups distributed along the Jurua River and the 
Ucayali River. My main sources are the monographs by Kensinger (1995) 
and McCallum (2001), as well as Capistrano de Abreu (1941) and Cama-
rgo (2002), in addition to conversations with Sian Caxinauá.
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epan, as well as all his “father’s brothers” and his “brother’s sons.”18 As an 
example, Sian, a Cashinahua of Jordão River, explained in Portuguese to 
an undergraduate class, “Eu respeito meu filho porque meu filho é meu pai” 
(“I respect my son because my son is my father”).
To understand this, it is necessary to know that Cashinahua people 
are divided not only by gender and moiety but also in groups of people 
who are namesakes (chuta) to each other. Sian addresses both his “son” 
and “father” as epan. Similarly, a male speaker addresses both his “grand-
sons” and “grandparents” in the male line as huchi, the same term used for 
“elder brothers.”19 The consequence of this is that all generations are col-
lapsed into two alternating sets of “brothers” or “namesakes”: INU AWA 
and INU KANA, and DUA YAWA and DUA DUNU. There are there-
fore two INU sections (represented by the jaguar) in alternating genera-
tions, and two DUA sections (represented by the puma) in alternating 
generations, which result in four male namesake sections (see Kensinger 
1995; McCallum 2001). For each male namesake section, there is a fe-
male namesake section, resulting in a female set of four namesake sec-
tions, parallel to the four male sections. For the sake of convenience, I 
will focus on male namesake sections in Figure 3, which represents the 
kinship terminology used between moieties and namesake sections. 
A Mathematical Translation
I now proceed to a mathematical translation of the above fragment of 
the Cashinahua’s rules for combining kinship terms. These rules express 
the way the Cashinahua relationship words are combined to produce 
new ones.20 The formal version of the relationships shown above are de-
picted in Figure 4.
18. Anthropologists will be familiar with the terminological identification of 
“father” with “father´s brothers,” and of “sons” with “brothers’ sons”; on the 
other hand, the terminological identification of “father” with “son” is a rare 
feature of systems with “alternating generations.”
19. For instance, Sian is a DUA YAWA member and his son is a DUA DUNU. 
The latter’s son will again be named Sian and be a DUA YAWA.
20. For reasons of space and of simplicity, the full set of relational words and 
their possible combinations will not be shown here. 
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Rule I. Betsa is a neutral term, which, when combined with any other 
term, produces that other term. Here is how it operates with the term 
epa:
epa * betsa = epa
The term for same-sex parent is epa, and the term for same-sex sibling is 
betsa. We can also translate the above equation as:
same-sex parent * same-sex sibling = same-sex parent,
Figure 3. The symmetries inherent in the kinship terminology are illustrated 
as symmetries in the Jaguar and Puma images representing the INU and DUA 
moieties, respectively.  These two moieties are connected by the marriage alli-
ance term chai (shown by hollow arrows). The epa term (thick arrows) connects 
men in the two namesake sections INU AWA and INU KANA (alternating 
generations of the INU moiety) in a reciprocal manner, just as it does for the 
two namesake sections DUA YAWA and DUA DUNU. The relationship be-
tween two epa is called betsa (“my other me”), a term also used between same-
sex siblings. It has the role of the identity in mathematics.
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which can be mistranslated as:
a father’s brother = a father,
and formally, as:
f * e = f.
The above reasoning holds good when the order of terms is reversed, 
which means that (in the English mistranslation) “a brother’s father is a 
father.” 
Figure 4. The relationships between moieties and namesake sections are shown 
in formal terms: the relationship between epa is shown formally as ff, while that 
between chai is represented by aa, and the neutral term betsa is shown as e. Two 
epa may call each other betsa, which can be expressed algebraically as epa / epa 
= betsa, or in its formal version as ff = e. The two moieties INU and DUA, con-
nected by the operator chai, also follow the rule of chai / chai = betsa, represented 
in its formal version as aa = e. All these equations are versions of the familiar 
multiplication rule p x p-1 = 1.
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By putting all this together, we obtain the following formal representation: 
f * e = f = e * f
And this is familiar algebraic property, with which we are familiar in the 
form
a x 1 = a = 1 x a,
where a is any rational number (this holds also for integers). This holds 
true not only for epa but also for all Cashinahua kinship terms. This 
means that the term betsa, formally represented as e, behaves syntacti-
cally as the number 1 in multiplication. This is the algebraic version of 
Lewis Morgan’s diagnostic trait for “classificatory systems of relation-
ships,” by which he meant systems that mix linear and collateral relatives 
(Almeida 2018). 
Rule II. Every term has an inverse. Again focusing on relations 
among men and using the descriptive form epa as an example, without a 
loss of generality:
epa * epa = betsa,
or “a father’s father is a brother,” and, in the algebraic translation, 
f * f = e
This rule means that the inverse of f is f itself, that is to say:
f = f -1
Rule II says that there is an inverse for every kinship term. This parallels 
the fact that, for any rational number a, there is a multiplicative inverse 
a-1 such that a x a-1 = 1. Recall also that in Boolean algebra, 1 + 1 = 0, 
where 0 is the neutral element, so that here 1 plays the role of its own ad-
ditive inverse. It should be noted that f f -1 = e, or in the additive version, 
1 + 1 = 0, is the algebraic version of Sian’s assertion that “my father is my 
son,” since it is equivalent to say that “my father’s father is my brother” 
in one of many possible mistranslations.
Extending this analysis would demand a separate essay, so I will stop 
here, having already probably abused the patience of the reader with 
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what Bronisław Malinowski called depreciatively the “mock-algebra of 
kinship.” The point is that there is here a legitimate isomorphism be-
tween the Cashinahua calculus of kinship relationships and a particular 
mathematical structure. This structure occurs in many contexts.21
Let me return to the analogy traced above between Cashinahua’s 
kinship relational calculus and a mathematical structure. My point is 
that there is more than an analogy: for the Cashinahua kinship rules 
are a way of calculating with words, just as the abstract symbols of 
algebra are a way of calculating with another class of words, and to 
say that these calculi have a common structure—or, in other words, 
that there is an isomorphism connecting one system into the other, 
where by “isomorphism” is meant a dictionary that translates the sym-
bols of one system into symbols of the other system so as to preserve 
the structure.22
The existence of such an isomorphism has the following pragmatic 
consequence. Suppose one wishes to calculate a product of f and a in a 
mathematical system (Fig.  4). One way to perform the calculation is as 
follows: first translate f and a (Fig. 4) into Cashinahua kinship terms 
(Fig. 3) and ask a Cashinahua speaker for the term that results from 
combining them; finally, translate the resulting kinship terms back into 
the formal symbols (Fig. 4). The results should agree. This intriguing idea 
was suggested to me by the Tamil anthropologist Ruth Manimekalai 
Vaz (2014).23 
21. The specific structure is not trivial at all. For we face here the task of gen-
erating eight relations (corresponding to the eight xutabaibu classes, divided 
in moieties, generations, and gender) by means of just two relations cor-
responding to filiation and gender-change. The key to this effect is combi-
nation of alternating generations and noncommutativity (see diagrams in 
Almeida 2014: 4–6).
22. Lévi-Strauss once asked the eminent Henri Hadammard for help with a 
complicated problem in “Australian kinship,” being told that “mathematics 
deals with the four operations and kinship could not be assimilated to any-
one of them”; he then met younger André Weil, who told him that “only the 
relations among marriages mattered” (Lévi-Strauss and Eribon 1988: 79). 
Hadammard was a renowned but aging mathematician, while the young 
Weil was one of the founders of the Bourbaki structuralist reconstruction 
of mathematics.
23. I gave a precise formulation for Vaz’s conjecture on Dravidian kinship cal-
culation by means of a calculating method borrowed from quantum phys-
ics—that is, Pauli matrices (Almeida 2014). 
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The Issue of Reverse Translation
The above example is a particular case of a more general fact. I think 
that, as a matter of fact, every translation of ancient/forest mathematics 
in the language of modern mathematics is automatically a candidate 
for a reverse translation of modern mathematics in Indigenous terms.
Keeping the focus on kinship issues, I will suggest a case of a concept 
in modern mathematics that was originally expressed in the language of 
kinship. The theory of relations, created independently by Richard Dede-
kind and by Gottlob Frege as a foundation for mathematical induction, 
was expressed by Alfred Whitehead and Bertrand Russell in Principia 
Mathematica (following the lead of Frege) in the idiom of descent, ances-
trality, heredity, succession, and generation (Whitehead and Russell 1910: 
570). This is how the principle of mathematical induction works: given 
that number 1 has the property P, and granted that, if a number n has a 
property P, its successor n + 1 inherits the property P, then all descendants 
of 1 have the property P, and the property P is shared by all ancestors of n. 
This means that the property is hereditary, as Whitehead and Russell put 
in a nice way: “If m is the Peerage, m is hereditary with respect to the rela-
tion of father to surviving eldest son” (Whitehead and Russell 1910: 570).
The authors of Principia Mathematica were using—in the first really 
mathematical chapter of the book—the fact that the ordering of positive 
integers is isomorphic to the ordering of peers, a fact that justifies the use 
of the language of British peerage to define the concept of an inductive 
relation as equivalent to that of a hereditary relation.
Could Euclid Prove √2 x √3 = √6?
Dedekind claimed that his construction of irrational numbers afforded 
for the first time a proof that √2 x √3 = √6 (Dedekind 1963: 40). The 
mathematician and historian of mathematics John Stillwell countered 
Dedekind’s claim with a proof that √2 x √3 = √6 in purely Euclidean 
terms (Stillwell 2016: 156–57). The mechanism of the proof is essential-
ly the same as Euclid’s proof of Pythagoras’s theorem, since in both cases 
the point is to show that successive transformations of an initial figure 
preserve their areas. The beautiful geometrical proof requires, however, as 
an initial step the translation of the product √2 x √3 of irrational num-
bers (as constructed by Dedekind) into a geometrical figure—namely a 
rectangle having irrational sides that are the geometrical translations of 
√2 and √3. This geometrical object is then successively transformed by 
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means of purely Euclidean constructions, all of them justified in Book I 
of the Elements, resulting in a final rectangle equal to the initial rectan-
gle—in modern language, having the same area. And the final rectangle 
has sides that are the unit and the Euclidean version of √6. Translating 
the Euclidean result into Dedekind’s language, one obtains √2 x √3 = √6 
(see Figure 5).
One has again an isomorphism between two proofs. However, there 
is a catch. While Euclid’s geometrical √2 is constructed by means of rule 
and compass—being the diagonal of a square with unit side—Dede-
kind’s √2 is defined as a couple of infinite sets of rational numbers: those 
the square of which is less than 2, and those the square of which is bigger 
than 2. Dedekind’s “cut,” composed by two infinite sets of rational num-
bers—in the actual sense, not the potential sense—looks very much like 
two Zeno tortoises approaching one another without ever meeting be-
cause there is no rational number for them to meet at—the whole point 
being that the races themselves define a new kind of number.24 And not-
withstanding this ontological chasm separating Euclid’s and Dedekind’s 
mathematical universes, there is a bridge connecting them. For not only 
does the translation between the two languages preserve the structure of 
the proof, but Archimedes and Dedekind would agree on the following: 
given an arbitrarily small quantity, it is possible to produce a rational 
number that, when squared, differs from 2 by less than this quantity by 
excess or by default. Another case in point, and more relevant, is Euclid’s 
proof that, given any list of prime numbers, one can show that there is a 
prime number not in it (Elements IX: 20). Not a single word needs to be 
changed in Euclid’s proof by today’s standards, but modern versions of it 
are often phrased as stating that “the set of primes is infinite,” while Eu-
clid’s subtle statement avoids any reference to “infinite” altogether. (The 
Cambridge mathematician Godfrey Hardy, who praised Euclid’s proof 
as an example of immortal beauty in mathematics, did not participate in 
this ontological mistranslation.)
Mathematical Translation and Ontological Bridgeheads
As a final note, I am aware that mathematical agreement in the pragmat-
ic and structural sense may be consistent with ontological pluralism, but 
24. “I still regard the statement . . . that the theorem √2 √3 = √6 has nowhere 
yet been strictly demonstrated” (Dedekind 1963: 40).
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Step 0. Translate the product √2 x √3 (Dedekind’s irrational numbers) into a 
Euclidean object—namely, an object constructed by means of unmarked rule 
and compass. This is a rectangle with irrational sides that we can interpret as 
√2 and √3 (Stillwell 2016: 156).
Step 1. Transform the initial rectangle into a rectangle with sides that we 
interpret as 2√3 and √2/2. This transformation conserves the area.
Step 2. Transform the resulting rectangle into a parallelogram, cutting at left 
and adding at right half a square. This again conserves the area (Elements I). 
The diagonal of the square is 1 by Pythagoras’s theorem.
Step 3. Left: Rotate the resulting parallelogram, transforming it into a par-
allelogram with base equal to the unit and height equal to the side h of a 
square with diagonal equal to 2√3. Right: Transform the resulting parallelo-
gram into a rectangle with unit base and height equal to h. As it happens, h2 
+ h2 = (2√3)2 = 4 x 3 = 12 by Pythagoras’s theorem, so h2 = 6 and h = √6. The 
area of the last rectangle is therefore 1 x √6 = √6.
And since all the figures are equal in area, the initial rectangle with sides √2 
and √3 is equivalent in area to the final rectangle with sides equal to the unit 
and to √6. Translating this back in Dedekind’s irrational numbers, this can 
be interpreted as meaning √2 x √3 = √6.
Figure 5. A Euclidean proof of a theorem that Dedekind claimed Euclid could 
not prove (Stillwell 2016: 156–57).
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it can also be a means for ontological cleansing and active evangelization 
(Vilaça 2018), a point also exemplified by Gottfried Leibniz’s proposal 
of using his binary mathematics as a bridgehead for religious conversion 
in Chinese (Leibniz 2006: 305–16). Against these ontological invasions 
and under the disguise of mathematical pedagogy, there remains the al-
ternative of struggles for ontological autonomy also in the domain of 
mathematics (Viveiros de Castro 2003). 
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Different Clusters of Text from Ancient China, 
Different Mathematical Ontologies
Karine Chemla
Dedicated to the memory of Michel Kerszberg, 
whose mind faded away all too early.
In the different contexts in which mathematics has been practiced, we 
can observe a certain diversity in the types of entities actors’ work has 
actually brought into play. So far as numbers are concerned, we note that 
some groups of actors in the ancient world worked only with integers as 
such (this is notably the case in Euclid’s Elements [1956]), while others, 
as we shall see, took into consideration quantities composed with inte-
gers and fractions, and also sometimes measurement units.
Moreover, when we might think that different actors are dealing with 
the same kind of entity, that may well not be the case for them. For in-
stance, we can recognize that the circle figures in all extant mathematical 
corpora but only in some contexts did its center play a prominent role. 
Further, the geometrical constructions carried out on circles, and also the 
statements considered, differ depending on the contexts.
So the nature of the entities that actors deal with in the context of a 
given mathematical activity cannot be taken for granted. This statement 
holds true in general and for the ancient world in particular, though 
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there the scarcity of sources makes the nature of the mathematical enti-
ties considered especially difficult to address. This will be the main focus 
of this study.
The issue is even trickier when we ask what the actors’ own ontologi-
cal ideas and assumptions were, for our texts are seldom explicit on that 
topic. In Euclid’s Elements, for instance, we have definitions, postulates, 
and axioms, followed by theorems and problems with proofs, yet no 
second-order statements addressing ontological issues. Tackling Euclid’s 
own views on that subject raises a methodological problem. This was 
already a point of contention in antiquity.
In the framework of this volume, we can certainly not afford to project 
our observers’ assumptions on the texts, for that would erase the diversity 
within and among them. We should also refrain from seeking answers in 
ancient Greek writings that seem to us to belong to the same context as 
Euclid’s Elements and that yield evidence on the issue of the ontology of 
mathematical entities. Such a hermeneutical practice is doomed to shape 
Greek antiquity as more uniform than it actually was. I shall argue that 
this, too, would be anachronistic since, after all, we are those who shape 
the writings as pertaining to the same context and then interpret some of 
them in the light of the others. Is it surprising that as the result of such a 
practice, we end up speaking of “the Greeks,” or elsewhere, of “the Chi-
nese”? Perhaps our method puts the rabbit in the hat in which, as if by 
magic, we find it at the end of the operation. What other method can we 
use? I shall suggest that to address ontological questions, we should (and 
actually can) rely on corpora shaped by groups of actors themselves. This 
element of method is correlated with an assumption that holds that the 
answers to our ontological questions should be sought not in general but 
rather only in specific contexts. This principle will turn out to be justified 
by the facts that it will enable us to perceive.
But when corpora shaped by actors do not explicitly discuss the on-
tological questions that interest us, how should we proceed? One of the 
goals of this essay is to suggest a possible way ahead.
I shall use a case study to show how actors’ ontological positions are 
reflected in their technical language and their material practices insofar 
as they can be reconstructed. This case study will rely on the corpus of 
Chinese mathematical canons and commentaries that, from 656 CE on, 
were used as textbooks in one of the two curricula taught in the Imperial 
“School of Mathematics,” established in the first decades of the Tang 
Dynasty (618–907). Some of the commentaries that had been selected 
and edited in this context include terse ontological statements. I will 
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show how we can suggest an interpretation for these statements, rely-
ing on an observation of the technical language and material practices 
shaped to carry out mathematical activity in this framework. The inter-
pretation that I will offer will thus reveal a correlation between ontologi-
cal statements on the one hand, and features of the technical languages 
and material practices on the other hand. Hence, this suggests that we 
can rely on a close study of technical languages and practices to grasp at 
least some aspects of actors’ ontological views.
I will then apply the same method to another cluster of Chinese 
mathematical texts—that is, mathematical manuscripts dating from ear-
ly imperial China, some of which were recently found in tombs sealed 
in the last centuries BCE and others bought on the antiquities market. 
Again, these manuscripts do not contain any statement that makes ex-
plicit aspects of the scribes’ ontological ideas. However, both the technical 
language these documents use and the features of the material practices 
to which they attest do not appear to reflect ontological assumptions 
similar to those to which the first corpus of writings testifies. The same 
conclusion holds true for another corpus of mathematical writings in 
Chinese that Zhu Yiwen recently uncovered (I return to a more precise 
description of my clusters of writings below).
This set of facts invites a first general conclusion; that is, that actors’ 
ontological ideas in mathematics are not determined by the language 
they speak and write, and even do not necessarily depend on it. Indeed, in 
ancient China, we have different clusters of writings whose authors seem 
to have embraced different ontological positions even though they prob-
ably spoke the same language. More generally, I will suggest that in any 
given context, actors’ ontological ideas, technical language, and material 
practices in mathematics are correlated with one another, since they were 
all shaped by actors while carrying out mathematical activity and they 
were thus produced in intimate relation to one another. My case study 
further invites the second (more speculative) conclusion that, in the same 
way as technical language and material practices change while math-
ematical work is carried out, ontological ideas also change accordingly.
A First Cluster of Mathematical Texts: Canons and Commentaries
Let me outline the context in which actors put together the corpus of 
texts on which I will rely for my main case study, since this will highlight 
how I suggest using it.
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In 656, Li Chunfeng 李淳風 (?602–670) presented to the Tang 
throne an anthology of mathematical writings entitled The Ten Canons of 
mathematics (Suanjing shi shu, 算經十書; hereafter, The Ten Canons).1 This 
anthology was the result of a task that Li Chunfeng had fulfilled upon 
imperial request, together with a group of scholars who had been con-
vened for this purpose. Li and the colleagues working under his supervi-
sion had selected ten Chinese mathematical canons, with—for some of 
them—ancient commentaries. They had prepared new editions for all 
these writings and had composed annotations on them.2 Immediately 
after the anthology had been completed and presented to the throne—
that is, from 656 on—its canons and commentaries, together with two 
additional writings, were used as textbooks in the newly established Im-
perial “School of Mathematics,” which trained students in mathematics 
with a view to securing a career in the bureaucracy for those who had 
passed the examinations.3 The study of eight among these canons, with 
their commentaries, formed the core of an elementary curriculum, while 
the other two canons defined a more advanced program. My argument 
only requires that I focus on the elementary curriculum.
This curriculum began with the study of Mathematical Canon by 
Master Sun (Sunzi suanjing 孫子算經), a book completed in circa 400 
CE and whose ancient commentaries are lost. The third book that was 
taught, The Nine Chapters on Mathematical Procedures (Jiuzhang suanshu
九章算術; hereafter, The Nine Chapters), was the major piece of the cur-
riculum, in the sense that its study, together with that of the fourth book 
(a short tract that had been composed as a complement to the last of the 
nine chapters), required three years and was thus by far the longest. In 
fact, the title The Nine Chapters referred not only to the canon bearing 
that title, which had been completed in the first century CE, but also to 
the commentary on it that Liu Hui 劉徽 completed in 263, and finally 
to Li Chunfeng et al.’s subcommentary. The curriculum concluded with 
the study of two books with commentaries and subcommentaries: The 
Gnomon of the Zhou (Zhoubi 周髀), a canon, the most recent layers of 
1. In the last decades, two critical editions of the anthology have been pub-
lished: Qian  Baocong  錢寶琮 (1963) and Guo  Shuchun  郭書春 and 
Liu Dun 劉鈍 (1998). They organize the canons in chronological order.
2. I have examined the evidence we have about the editorial work carried out 
by Li Chunfeng’s team in Chemla (2013a).
3. For details about the school, its official organization, its curricula and modes 
of examination, see Volkov (2014), on which I rely here.
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which (commentaries aside) dated to the first century CE, and which 
was devoted to mathematics required for the calendar, and a sixth-centu-
ry compilation, Mathematical Procedures for the Five Canons, which gave 
mathematical procedures accounting for numerical values stated in his-
torical commentaries on Confucian Canons and other related classical 
texts.4
I interpret the fact that these canons, composed during different pe-
riods, were taught in the same curriculum at the time as evidence that 
for seventh-century actors they could be considered as delivering a co-
herent body of mathematical knowledge and practices, even if one can 
find minor differences between them. This is a key hypothesis for my 
argument. It implies that before the seventh century, the specific body 
of mathematical knowledge and practices to which these canons testify 
and that will be at the center of my argument had been handed down 
in some milieus for centuries. Moreover, evidence shows that these ten 
canons were regularly re-edited upon imperial order, and were used for 
teaching in subsequent centuries in China. These last remarks thus ad-
ditionally imply that these elements of mathematical knowledge and 
practice continued to be handed down later.
For the sake of my argument, a second type of evidence will prove 
useful. The first six canons taught in the first curriculum were mainly 
composed of problems and mathematical procedures. In addition, their 
texts all refer to the use of counting rods to write down numbers on 
a calculating surface, which was separate from the text and on which 
computations were carried out. By contrast, this type of content is only 
part of what we find in the commentaries and subcommentaries on these 
canons that have survived until today—that is, only a fraction of those 
that Li Chunfeng et al. had selected or else further composed for the 
656 edition. This holds true, in particular, for Liu Hui’s commentary and 
4. About the order of study, which is an important point in my argument 
here, see Volkov (2012: 515–18; 2014: 61). This order differs from the one 
adopted in modern critical editions of The Ten Canons. The status of the 
critical editions is in fact not clear. Since they both include one of the ad-
ditional texts studied at the School of Mathematics, it seems that they give 
a critical edition of the writings studied in this school. However, the order 
of the writings that they adopt is chronological, and hence is not related 
to the order of the curricula. On the specific canons just mentioned, one 
can consult, respectively, Lam and Ang (2004); Chemla and Guo Shuchun 
(2004); Cullen (1996); Zhu Yiwen 朱一文 (2016).
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Li Chunfeng et al.’s subcommentary on The Nine Chapters. These com-
mentaries include, among other things, discussions about mathematics, 
and explicit references to mathematical practice. They also provide evi-
dence on how the earliest readers we can observe read and interpreted 
the canons. Of particular importance for us in this study is the fact that 
commentaries further formulate the terse ontological statements that I 
mentioned above and whose interpretation we will discuss below.
For these reasons, commentaries, and the features of the canons to 
which they can be related, play a central role in my argument, which 
accordingly, grants pride of place to The Nine Chapters and its commen-
taries. However, another canon will also give us essential elements of 
information—that is, Mathematical Canon by Master Sun, with which the 
elementary curriculum began.
Restoring Material Practices to Which All Canons and Commentar-
ies Refer
Indeed, the fact that Mathematical Canon by Master Sun was the first 
textbook taught in the elementary curriculum has important implica-
tions for us. The assumption that the corpus taught delivered a glob-
ally coherent body of mathematics entails that the elementary pieces of 
knowledge and practices presented in the first pages of this canon can 
be considered as valid for the whole corpus (but, as I will show later, not 
for all mathematical writings from ancient China).5 Let us outline them.
Mathematical Canon by Master Sun began with basic knowledge 
about measurement units and key constants, before explaining how to 
use counting rods to represent numbers. This material representation of 
numbers was formed on a surface, on which we do not have precise in-
formation, apart from the fact that canons and commentaries regularly 
prescribe to “put zhi 置” numbers on it (sometimes making explicit how 
to arrange them in specific positions) in order to execute computations.6 
Computations could, and did, rely on the numbers thus represented and 
5. This strategy was used in Proust (2007), in which knowledge taught to 
scribes in schools is used to interpret more advanced tablets.
6. Martzloff ([1997] 2006: 188) notes that we have no evidence that “count-
ing boards” existed, by contrast with counting rods, which are mentioned 
explicitly in texts, and samples of which have been found in several excava-
tions. See also Volkov (2001).
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arrayed to proceed. The way in which computations were conducted 
shows that they also made use of the facts that numbers written with 
rods could be moved on the surface, and the value of the numbers placed 
in a given position of the surface could likewise be changed. We will 
shortly see an example of this, with the first calculations presented in 
Mathematical Canon by Master Sun immediately after the description of 
the number system.
As a consequence, in the practice of mathematics to which our corpus 
of texts attests, computations were carried out wholly outside the texts, 
and only materially (if we set aside the possibility of mental computa-
tion, which, however, our corpus never evokes). Further, when numbers 
were mentioned within mathematical writings, they were written using 
the Chinese language. It was for computations, and only for computa-
tions, that the number system using rods that Mathematical Canon by 
Master Sun described was employed. Before the tenth century, we know 
of no graphic illustration that would have been included in a text to 
show how numbers were represented with rods, or how computations 
were actually conducted.7
Features of the practice of computations taught in the elementa-
ry curriculum (the practice with respect to which our corpus makes 
sense) are pivotal for my goal in this essay. However, the argument 
requires that we restore (at least part of ) this practice, on the basis 
of the references that writings make to numbers and computations. 
The first pages of Mathematical Canon by Master Sun yield precious 
evidence for this.
Let us examine what these pages tell us about the number system 
using rods. To represent numbers, Mathematical Canon by Master Sun 
prescribed to “first determine the positions,” which correspond to suc-
cessive decimal components of the numbers, and then, to place rods for 
the subsequent digits, from right to left, first the units, vertically, then 
7. The earliest known documents showing illustrations of the number system 
to which Mathematical canon by Master Sun refers are Dunhuang manu-
scripts. Manuscript Pelliot chinois 3349, which bears the title Suan jing 笇經 
(Mathematical canon), and seems to date from the second half of the tenth 
century, features both a description of the number system close to that in 
Mathematical canon by Master Sun and illustrations for it inserted into the 
writing. The same number system is recorded in the Dunhuang manuscript 
Or. 8210/S.930, with captions similar to that of Mathematical canon by Mas-
ter Sun.
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the tens, horizontally, and then, alternatively, vertically (for even powers 
of ten) and horizontally (for the odd powers) (Qian Baocong 錢寶琮 
1963, 2: 282). Let us leave aside the specific way of using rods to write 
digits (Lam and Ang 2004: 33ff., 191ff.). In what follows, to represent 
computations that I restore using the descriptions given in the text, I 
replace rods with Hindu-Arabic numerals. What the canon describes 
here is indeed a place-value decimal system, in the sense that, up to the 
change of orientation, the same set of digits is used to write down deci-
mal components of numbers in successive positions, and the position 
where a digit is placed determines the order of magnitude (the power of 
ten) with which it must be understood, in the same way as in the inscrip-
tion 123, 1 means a hundred in relation to its position in the sequence 
of digits.8 With our assumption of the coherence of the corpus, we can 
assume that this number system described in the Mathematical Canon by 
Master Sun was the one to which all the other canons taught in the same 
curricula refer.
In the absence of any illustration of the number system in our corpus, 
we find evidence for our assertions about it in clues collected from com-
putations of our corpus that rely on it. In particular, the two procedures 
that follow in Mathematical Canon by Master Sun and outline the pro-
cesses to multiply (cheng) and divide (chu) with this number system on 
the calculating surface, confirm the place-value decimal features of the 
number system. These procedures will play a central role in my argument 
(see Figures 6a–6b for how the executions of multiplication and division, 
respectively, are commonly restored relying on Mathematical Canon by 
Master Sun). The key fact for us is that the text for the division algo-
rithm begins not with a prescription but with a statement. It asserts that 
the algorithm for division is “exactly opposed” to that of multiplication 
(Qian Baocong 錢寶琮 1963, 2: 282). This assertion yields a clue though 
its precise meaning is not immediately clear. Interpreting this statement 
will highlight an important feature of the practice with counting rods on 
the surface.
8. This is what Dunhuang manuscripts show. The fact that the orientation 
of the rods alternates from one position to the next has no impact on this 
conclusion. This point is confirmed by the nature of the arithmetic. I have 
dealt with this issue elsewhere, and since it is of minor importance here, I 
do not return to it.
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Figure 6a. Process of a multiplication with rods on the calculating surface, ac-
cording to Mathematical Canon by Master Sun, circa 400 (the example chosen 
is mine).
Figure 6b. Process of a division with rods on the calculating surface, according 
to Mathematical Canon by Master Sun, circa 400 (the example chosen is mine).
According to the texts recorded in Mathematical Canon by Master 
Sun, the algorithms for multiplication and division combine two types 
of “positions (wei).” First, numbers are written as a horizontal sequence 
of digits placed in successive (decimal) “positions.” These positions echo 
a characteristic feature of the algorithms—that is, that the algorithms 
iterate the same subprocedure along the sequence of digits to execute 
the operations, exactly like in present-day practices of place-value deci-
mal notation in multiplication and division (I use the plural, since they 
present variations worldwide).
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Second, the execution of each operation uses three positions (upper, 
middle, and lower). In the lower position, the multiplier (Figure 6a) and 
the divisor (fa 法, Figure 6b) are respectively placed. In the context of 
the execution of the two operations, both the multiplier and the divisor 
are similarly moved leftward (multiplied by a power of ten) at the begin-
ning of the process and, then, progressively moved rightward during the 
execution. The Chinese text uses a classical pair of opposed operations 
for this: “moving forward” 進 jin versus “moving backward” 退 tui. We 
return to this point below. The significant digits of the numbers placed in 
these lower positions thus similarly do not change, whereas their decimal 
position is constantly modified in their respective rows. Note that in this, 
the algorithms rely on the place-value number system.9 This illustrates 
why, more generally, operations reveal features of the number system to 
which they are applied. This remark explains how operations in Math-
ematical Canon by Master Sun give clues to material inscriptions with 
rods, which left no trace in the writings.
How Mathematical Practices Make Statements About Mathematical 
Entities
For both multiplication and division, the type of change occurring in 
the lower rows stands in contrast with those undergone by the num-
bers placed in the two rows above: the decimal position of the latter 
will not be shifted, whereas their numerical value will change along the 
process of computation. In these two rows, the starting configurations 
of multiplication and division both have an empty row and a full row, 
but which is which depends on the operation (what follows constantly 
refers to Figure 6a–6b). The starting configurations for multiplication 
and division are thus opposed to one another, exactly like the final ones 
will be. Indeed, for both multiplication and division, the execution will 
proceed through emptying the full row while filling up the empty row. 
Again, here, the Chinese text evokes a classical pair of opposed pro-
cesses for this: 得de “yield” versus 失 shi “lose,” when it states that the 
9. The text of the algorithms in Mathematical canon by Master Sun makes clear 
that the positions writing down the numbers are decimal and these motions 
of the counting rods representing the numbers correspond to multiplica-
tions by powers of ten. They thereby yield key clues indicating the place-
value decimal features of the number system underlying these procedures.
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multiplication yields the result in the middle row, while the division 
yields it in the upper row. We also return to this pair below.
In the process of multiplying, the leftmost digit of the multiplicand, 
in the upper row, will be multiplied by the multiplier, and the product 
is added to the middle row. Once the subprocedure is over, the leftmost 
digit of the multiplicand is deleted, the multiplier is moved one position 
rightward, and the subprocedure is applied again with the next leftmost 
digit in the upper position. By contrast, in the upper row of a division, 
the successive digits of the “quotient” are inserted at each stage, and each 
digit is multiplied by the divisor, in the corresponding position, the prod-
uct being subtracted from the middle row (the “dividend” shi 實). We thus 
see that the two rows (upper and middle) in the processes of multiplica-
tion and division behave in ways exactly opposed to each other.
As a result, these executions of multiplication and division are glob-
ally devised in such a way that the processes of computation on the 
calculating surface, as they can be restored using the text, display a 
network of oppositions and similarities. In particular, the relationship 
of opposition between the operations translates into a row-to-row dy-
namic opposition between the processes of computation. Vertical posi-
tions (upper/middle/lower) and their arrangement are essential for this, 
since if we compare the two processes, we see rows are involved in either 
identical or opposed operations, and thus present identical or opposed 
behaviors. It is by reference to this property of the flows of computa-
tion that I suggest interpreting the statement inserted in Mathematical 
Canon by Master Sun that the algorithm for division is “exactly opposed” 
to that of multiplication. The statement implies a more general conclu-
sion, essential for us: processes of computations on the calculating sur-
face are not merely means to yield a result, but they are also designed to 
assert something about the relationship between the operations thereby 
executed. Positions (wei), with the type and sequence of elementary op-
erations applied to them, provided actors with tools that analyzed these 
processes. In other words, the practice with positions was used for math-
ematical theory.
In this case, the algorithms and the rows have one more property. 
Suppose we were dividing not 1,311, but 1,312, by 23. The computa-
tion would yield in the three rows, respectively, 57, 1, 23, which would 
be read as the exact result 57 + 1/23. The process of multiplication, ap-
plied to these three rows, would restore the original values and configu-
ration of the division. The succession of multiplication and division on 
the calculating surface cyclically restores the original configuration of 
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the previous operation. In addition, multiplication and division are op-
erations for the execution of which algorithms are given. They are also 
operations that occur in other algorithms executing other operations. 
The property of canceling each other out holds for the operations as well 
as for the configurations (since results are given as exact). In conclusion, 
multiplication and division are both opposed to each other and cancel 
each other out when applied in succession.
This example illustrates an unexpected practice of computation with 
the calculating surface, which is specific to the mathematical culture to 
which our corpus of text attests. The practice is exemplified by two pro-
cesses, whose relationship with each other conveys meanings that Math-
ematical Canon by Master Sun makes explicit.10 Without restoring this 
material practice, we would miss meanings stated in ways that are differ-
ent from common modes of expression today. Moreover, we would not 
be able to interpret accurately the statement made about the processes of 
computation in Mathematical Canon by Master Sun. What is essential for 
us is that the interpretation of the statement reveals how actors in this 
context observed processes of computation on the surface.
Remember that these algorithms and this book were learned at the 
beginning of the elementary curriculum. This suggests that the practice 
was taught at the time, including a specific way of reading material pro-
cesses of computation in relation with one another and analyzing the 
relation of opposition between them on this basis. In fact, several other 
canons, taught in the same curriculum, testify to the use of a similar way 
of working with dynamic processes of computation on the calculating 
surface. I will only evoke them briefly here, to shape the background 
on the basis of which I will offer an interpretation of some ontological 
statements, and also draw a contrast between this first corpus and other 
corpora of mathematical texts from ancient China.
The Nine Chapters already contains texts for all the processes of com-
putation for which I could identify the same practice on the calculat-
ing surface. It must be noted that this canon does not describe algo-
rithms for multiplication and division. However, the way in which The 
Nine Chapters refers to multiplication cheng and division chu supports 
the hypothesis of the coherence of the corpus; that is, that the algo-
rithms learned with Mathematical Canon by Master Sun were also those 
on which The Nine Chapters relied, and in particular, those with respect to 
10. In this chapter, space precludes further worked examples. They can be found 
in Chemla (2000, 2017).
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which processes of computation described in The Nine Chapters likewise 
stated relations of similarity or opposition.
For instance, in this latter canon, we find texts for algorithms execut-
ing square root and cube root extractions.11 Like multiplication cheng 
and division chu, they rely on the positions of the decimal expansion 
of the number, whose root is extracted. Moreover, likewise, these algo-
rithms bring into play three main positions (upper/middle/lower), called 
respectively “quotient,” “dividend,” “divisor.”12 In the same way as the 
names for the positions borrow the terms used for division in Math-
ematical Canon by Master Sun, the elementary operations used to execute 
both square and cube root extractions derive for the most part from the 
process of division. As a result, the elementary operations applied to each 
of the positions “quotient,” “dividend,” and “divisor” present a strong 
similarity with those featuring in the process of a division. The use of the 
same name thus echoes the fact that the positions undergo correlated 
changes in the process of execution. As a result, the material processes 
of computation on the surface, as they can be restored, appear to state a 
similarity between division and root extraction in exactly the same way 
as in Mathematical Canon by Master Sun the related processes stated the 
relation of opposition between multiplication cheng and division chu. In 
addition, the same practice of writing processes on the calculating sur-
face indicates that likewise, a relation of similarity between square and 
cube root extraction is asserted.
Other canons in our corpus contain texts for algorithms executing 
square and cube root extractions, which present slight variations by com-
parison with those in The Nine Chapters. Interestingly, these texts of al-
gorithms appear to use exactly the same practice of stating relationships 
between operations using the processes of computation on the calculat-
ing surface. However, the way in which they shape similarities differs. 
This suggests that these processes of computation were a tool with which 
actors explored how one could understand the relationships between op-
erations (Chemla 1994). Again, without reading these processes as we 
have seen above actors read them, we would miss part of the mathemati-
cal work carried out using these means.
11. Chemla (1994) deals with these algorithms, and the others executing the 
same operations that occur in The Ten Canons. I do not repeat the details, 
and only state the conclusions here.
12. By contrast, fleeting positions are sometimes inserted below these three, 
and they receive no name.
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To return to The Nine Chapters, we could highlight other phenomena 
on the basis of restoring material processes of computation and reading 
them in the same way as was described above. Interestingly, these phe-
nomena correspond to phenomena affecting the terminology. We have 
an example of this in the two expressions “dividing this by extraction of 
the square root kai fang chu zhi 開方除之” and “dividing this by extrac-
tion of the cube root kai lifang chu zhi 開立方除之,” which are used to 
prescribe square and cube root extractions, respectively. The terminology 
thus shows a structure in the set of three operations that is strictly paral-
lel to what the processes of computation state.
The Nine Chapters introduces a fourth operation in a similar way. For 
us, it is a quadratic equation. In the canon, it appears as an arithmetical 
operation. The process of its execution is extracted from the process of 
computation of a square root extraction, using the latter execution from 
a given point onward.13 Accordingly, on the calculating surface, the pro-
cess of computation of the former is a part of the latter. The operands 
to which the quadratic equation as an operation is applied are precisely 
those featuring on the calculating surface at the point where the part 
of the process of square root extraction that is kept begins. In this case, 
positions on the calculating surface serve to introduce a new operation 
that builds upon one that is already known. These operands are referred 
to as “dividend” and “joined divisor,” which evoke the names given to 
these positions in the context of the execution of a square root extraction. 
Finally, the new operation is prescribed using the expression “dividing 
by extraction of the square root.” So, again, the relationship of similar-
ity between the processes of computation of the quadratic equation and 
the square root extraction echoes the relationship expressed using the 
terminology.
Positions are again central in a fifth algorithm described in The Nine 
Chapters to solve what for us corresponds to systems of linear equations.14 
The text of the algorithm prescribes to lay out the data corresponding to 
each equation in a column in such a way that all the data correspond-
ing to the same unknown in different equations are placed in the same 
13. On the argumentation supporting the claims about the quadratic equation 
that follow, and the transformations of the operation in the next centuries, 
see Chemla (2017), which contains a more complete bibliography on the 
topic.
14. What follows relies on Chemla (2000), where a more detailed argument 
and references are given.
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row. Accordingly, The Nine Chapters again uses a place-value scheme. The 
data of each problem form a rectangle, in which the data associated to 
unknowns are arranged in a square, whereas the constant terms of the 
equation form a row under this square. The algorithm solving the prob-
lems will rely on this rectangular layout to determine the unknowns.
What is remarkable is that the algorithm combines essentially two 
main operations that are repeated, one between columns, and the other 
between positions in the upper square and the lower row. The former 
operation, which (relying on the physical properties of numbers repre-
sented with rods) brings into play two columns to eliminate the upper 
position in one of them, is prescribed as “an upright division zhi chu 直
除,” while the latter is a plain division chu. In this context again, the pro-
cess of computation shapes a relation of similarity between this execu-
tion and that of a division. What is striking is that the data arranged in 
the lower row are referred to as “dividends,” whereas the data arranged in 
the upper square are referred to using a synonym of “divisor”—namely, 
“measure cheng 程.”15 This identification of the shaping of a similarity 
using positions and terms enables us, then, to interpret the name that 
The Nine Chapters gives to the operation that this algorithm executes: 
“divisors/measures in square fangcheng 方程.” In other words, the opera-
tion appears to be a generalization of the division chu. Instead of having 
a single divisor and dividend, “measures in square” opposes a square of 
divisors to a row of dividends, and the operation is executed using the 
key process of division first vertically, and then horizontally.
To summarize, the same practice on the calculating surface, which 
relies in an essential way on how data are arranged in positions, and the 
same (and related) use of the terminology shape and state the opera-
tion “measures in square” as similar to that of division. In this context, 
we find again the same group of features that we have met in all the 
contexts in which these practices were in play in our corpus: positions 
forming place-value notations on the calculating surface; the use of the 
same terms or of related terms to designate the elements from two dif-
ferent operations that were brought into relation; the establishment of a 
relationship between the processes of computation.
In all the examples from The Nine Chapters that we have evoked, we 
have seen that one of the two fundamental operations that were opposed 
to each other—that is, the division chu—played a cardinal role, since it was 
15. Both terms refer to the idea of “norm” with respect to which one will shape 
a given quantity, and thus measure it.
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used as a basis to which the processes of execution of other operations were 
reduced. More generally, we see that the pair of opposed operations and 
the practice of computation on the calculating surface that were learned 
at the beginning of the elementary curriculum played a key part for the 
knowledge that would be taught later. This knowledge included not only 
actual algorithms but also the understanding of a structure in a set of op-
erations. To grasp this structure, students had to know the two operations 
of multiplication and division, and also to understand the way of reading 
their relation of opposition directly on the processes of execution. Both 
aspects formed the cornerstone of the knowledge they would acquire later.
So far, we have uncovered a practice of searching for relations be-
tween algorithms executing operations, whose conduct and expression 
used two types of tools: on the one hand, the processes of computation 
on the calculating surface and the relationships that could be established 
between them using positions in a specific way, and on the other hand, 
the terminology referring to positions and prescribing operations. What 
this search appears to have established is that a certain number of algo-
rithms could be shown to be reducible to the division chu—that is, one 
of the two poles of a pair of opposed processes.
Ontological Statements, Material Practices, and the Differences in 
Ontological Ideas Between Different Clusters of Texts
In this section, I propose a hypothesis concerning the possible connec-
tion between the practices in The Nine Chapters and certain philosophi-
cal—indeed, ontological—statements in Liu Hui’s commentary, and 
then point to a contrast in a second corpus of mathematical texts that 
have recently come to light. In both cases I must emphasize the tentative 
character of my proposals.
The conclusions of the previous section have an echo in a statement 
that the third-century commentator Liu Hui formulates in the preface 
to his commentary on The Nine Chapters. He writes that in that work, “I 
observed the dividing of Yin and Yang and I synthesized the source of 
mathematical procedures.” Taken out of context, this terse statement is 
hard to interpret. But one possibility may be suggested using the back-
ground described above.
The mention of Yin and Yang evokes philosophical developments in 
China that took their reference point in the Book of Changes (Yijing 易
經) and the ancient commentaries that were handed down with this 
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writing, notably the “Great commentary” (Xici zhuan), which seems to 
have assumed the form under which we know it in the first half of the 
second century BCE. Reflections putting Yin and Yang into play, such as 
those we can read in the “Great commentary,” approached realities from 
the viewpoint of processes of transformation at play in them. In this con-
text, Yin and Yang featured polarities enabling observers to account for 
how processes unfolded as the interplay of fundamental and general pat-
terns of transformation opposed to one another. The scope of this type 
of analysis in the “Great commentary” encompasses the natural world, 
social interactions, and cultural artifacts. Liu Hui’s mention of Yin and 
Yang in the context of mathematics suggests that some practitioners of 
this discipline also thought about mathematics from the same ontologi-
cal viewpoint. This assumption is supported by the multiple quotations 
of the Book of Changes and the “Great commentary” that we read in the 
commentaries on The Nine Chapters.16
In this context, one possible interpretation of Liu Hui’s statement 
in his preface would derive from establishing a connection between the 
pair Yin/Yang and the two operations of multiplication and division, with 
their execution on the calculating surface. Given the analysis developed 
above, it seems natural to suggest that multiplication and division have 
embodied fundamental and general patterns of transformation, opposed 
to one another, by reference to which other processes of transformation 
could be analyzed. Another piece of information supports this interpre-
tation: in his commentary, Liu Hui refers to the flow of transformations 
that algorithms carry out on numbers using one of the general terms 
referring to change in the “Great commentary”—that is, bianhua 變化.17 
16. Chemla (1997) analyzes one such quotation in its context. The analysis that 
I develop (and will not repeat here) implies that the choice of a title in The 
Nine Chapters, which this quotation echoes, might entail that even in The 
Nine Chapters, we might perceive a reference to the “Great commentary.” If 
this assumption holds true, the commentator would only make explicit what 
he reads in the canon. Moreover, the analysis developed in this other study 
shows that mathematical entities were also approached from the viewpoint 
of their transformations, and not only computations. However, here I will 
only focus on the aspect that will enable me to establish a contrast between 
the corpus under consideration and other mathematical writings.
17. In Chemla (1999), I have analyzed this reference in context. Let me insist 
on the fact that I do not claim to offer the only interpretation possible, nor 
do I mean to have exhausted the meaning of these terms and sentences in 
this discussion.
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According to this interpretation, Liu Hui’s statement would refer (in 
particular, but probably not only) to how one might observe the inter-
play of multiplication and division in processes of computation.18 The 
statement might also refer to the pair of elementary and fundamental 
operations that are in play in the processes executing multiplication and 
division as in many other natural processes. Indeed, “moving forward” 
進 jin and “moving backward” 退 tui are terms that regularly occur in 
the “Great commentary,” as are “yield” 得 de and “lose” 失 shi). Finally, 
when Liu Hui claims to have “synthesized the source of mathematical 
procedures” it may be that he has in mind his uncovering of elementary 
and fundamentally opposed operations to which all the other processes 
of computation can be reduced.
These interpretations have two main consequences of importance 
for my purpose here. First, whatever the precise reference of the state-
ment might have been, the interpretations that I have sketched all 
suggest that mathematical realities like computations would thus sys-
tematically have been viewed as processes. This ontological assumption 
went hand in hand with a program of research: as was the case for other 
processes of change, this program aimed at identifying fundamental 
processes to which all other processes could be reduced, through an 
inquiry comparing processes with one another and searching how they 
related to one another. In this case, like in other contexts, this search 
seems to have uncovered that fundamental processes and key patterns 
of transformation could be arranged into pairs of opposed operations 
(multiplication and division, moving forward and backward, yielding 
and losing, etc.).
It is important to note that this search was carried out using specific 
practices, like the material practice of computation with rods that we 
have restored on the calculating surface. This brings me to the sec-
ond consequence that is essential for us and that concerns the type 
of relationship that practices and ontological assumptions have to one 
another. Indeed, the ontological assumption that mathematical entities 
can be viewed as processes and the type of search that correspond-
ed to this assumption are reflected in practices that actors shaped to 
work on mathematics. One such practice is the use of “positions” on 
the calculating surface, thanks to which flows of transformation could 
18. I have given an interpretation of the part played by multiplication and divi-
sion in another range of phenomena in mathematics, and also on a longer 
time span in Chemla (2010).
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be shaped, analyzed, and compared. This latter practice interestingly 
echoes the use of trigrams and hexagrams in the context of the Book 
of Changes. Another practice is the use of terminology, which shaped 
networks of similarities and oppositions. Perhaps, in fact, actors did 
shape these practices in relation to their ontological assumption and the 
related program that it led them to pursue. This would account for why 
to some extent practices bespeak the ontological assumptions actors 
held. After all, it is about the processes of multiplication and division, 
shaped using positions and terms in a specific way (our two practices), 
that Mathematical Canon by Master Sun asserts that they are “exactly 
opposed” to one another—that is, that the canon inserts a statement 
that relates to an interest in polarities in mathematics. These practices 
can also be identified in The Nine Chapters, and I have emphasized that 
they were taught (probably with the corresponding approach to pro-
cesses of computation) at the beginning of the elementary curriculum. 
We have seen that the commentator Liu Hui referred explicitly to the 
related ontological assumption. The occurrence of the same practices 
in The Nine Chapters invites us to assume that the same ontological as-
sumption and the same program already existed at the time when The 
Nine Chapters was completed.
The hypothesis that mathematical practices reflect (at least to some 
extent) ontological assumptions provides to us a method to approach 
such assumptions in the context of writings that contain no explicit 
statement about them. I will now use this method to show that none 
of the mathematical manuscripts from early imperial China so far pub-
lished (my second cluster of texts) seem to reflect ontological assump-
tions similar to those I have associated with the elementary curriculum.
At the present day (2017), these manuscripts include Writings on 
Mathematical Procedures (Suan shu shu 算數書), which was found in a 
tomb sealed circa 186 BCE, at Zhangjiashan,19 and Mathematics (Shu 
數), which was bought on the antiquities market and which its editors 
date from no later than circa 212 BCE.20 Both appear to be related 
to the same milieus for they present tight connections with the prac-
tice of administrative regulation. They also include other manuscripts, 
19. Peng Hao 彭浩 (2001) published the first annotated edition of the text. 
English translations can be found in Cullen (2004) and Dauben (2008).
20. The first annotated edition was provided in Xiao Can 蕭燦 (2010). The 
slips are reproduced, transcribed, and an annotated edition is given in Zhu 
Hanmin 朱漢民 and Chen Songchang 陳松長 zhubian 主編  (2011).
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which were not yet published. However, I will also mention the pub-
lished part of the manuscripts from early imperial China (the Qin 
dynasty) kept at Beijing University. All these manuscripts attest to 
mathematical practices and knowledge presenting some similarities 
with those in our first corpus. They refer to the use of rods, and to the 
positioning of numbers on a surface to compute. The mathematical 
terminology they use has a lot in common with what we find in The 
Ten Canons.
The key point about these manuscripts concerns the operation of 
division. Although all other arithmetical operations (including mul-
tiplication) are usually prescribed by verbs, the division to which the 
manuscripts attest (by contrast with what we have described above) is 
only prescribed using whole sentences (this holds true of every bit of 
manuscript so far published).21 In particular, even if the verb chu occurs 
in them, at the time it only had the meaning of subtraction (including 
repeated subtraction). This suggests that the executions of multiplication 
and division are not related to one another. I have offered a reconstruc-
tion of the execution of a division at the time, which confirms this as-
sumption. But there is more.
Several manuscripts contain an algorithm to extract a square root.22 
This algorithm does not rely on a decimal expansion of the number 
whose root is sought, and it does not have any relationship with an al-
gorithm of division of the type we have mentioned above for writings 
in our first corpus. More generally, nowhere do we have any hint that a 
place-value notation would be used. In particular, in contrast to the writ-
ings in the first corpus, nowhere do we find a division or a multiplication 
by ten carried out using a shift rightward or leftward of the rods rep-
resenting a number. However, this is an aspect of a much more general 
phenomenon: the manuscripts do not attest to the use of positions in 
the execution of computations similar to what we have described for our 
first corpus. Finally, nowhere does an interest in the relations between 
algorithms come to the surface.
21. I have been exploring this issue in Chemla (2013b, 2014, and forthcoming). 
More publications will follow.
22. See in particular Han Wei 韓巍 (2013: 38–39), which shows that the man-
uscripts kept at Beijing University have the same procedure as Writings on 
mathematical procedures. This suggests that this procedure enjoyed a certain 
stability at the time.
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These elements strongly suggest that these manuscripts do not reflect 
any program of searching for elementary and fundamental operations 
within processes of computation similar to the one to which The Ten 
Canons attests. By contrast, these mathematical texts seem to reflect the 
use of operations as means to reach a result rather than as processes to 
be pondered. If so, this suggests that the ontological assumptions about 
processes of computation were not the same.23
Conclusion
Whether a similar analysis applies to other mathematical traditions 
must wait on further study, which I hope this study might inspire. For 
the time being, let me simply emphasize the general issues that the in-
quiry presented here invites us to ponder.
The two sets of documents that I have considered (one more exten-
sively than the other) testify to two (partly) different ways of practic-
ing mathematics, which related to different material and terminological 
practices. Accordingly, I have suggested that in the two contexts, math-
ematical processes of computations were shaped and explored in dif-
ferent ways, with significant consequences for the knowledge produced. 
This has led me to conclude that the related ontologies of mathemati-
cal processes were different in the social backgrounds in which the two 
clusters of texts were produced and used. The evidence is not enough to 
allow us to dig further into ontological assumptions held by the actors 
who used the manuscripts. However, it suffices to point out a contrast in 
this respect between the two clusters of texts.
The hypothesis we are led to propose on this basis is the following. 
Ontological assumptions are not solely determined by written or spoken 
language. In our case, although all the actors wrote (and most probably 
spoke) in Chinese, they seem to have embraced at least partly different 
ontological ideas about mathematical entities.
23. I could develop the same argument relying on the corpus of mathematical 
writings that Zhu Yiwen uncovered in seventh-century commentaries on 
Confucian canons—that is, in writings composed more or less at the same 
time as Li Chunfeng’s annotated edition of The Ten Canons (Zhu Yiwen 朱
一文 2016). In this case, actors never seem to place rods on a calculating 
surface for mathematical work.
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I have insisted that ontological ideas can be approached both through 
the technical terminologies the actors shaped and through the material 
practices that can be reconstructed from their writings. The reason for 
this is that these three facets of mathematical activity are interrelated. In 
this latter respect, perhaps we can go one step further.
Indeed, since the two clusters of texts that I have considered had 
several features in common, we know they are somehow related to 
each other. In case, in the future, we can prove that they are histori-
cally more closely related—that is, that the mathematical practices 
and knowledge to which the manuscripts attest in fact developed into 
mathematical knowledge and practices to which The Ten Canons tes-
tifies—this would have an interesting consequence for our topic. It 
would indeed point out that ontological assumptions of the type we 
have analyzed in The Ten Canons took shape in correlation with the 
shaping of mathematical practices that reflect them and enable actors 
to work with and explore them. In this case, we would be in a position 
to observe how ontological assumptions change and how this process 
relates to actual practices that actors design for their mathematical 
activity.
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Shedding Light on Diverse Cultures of 
Mathematical Practices in South Asia: Early 
Sanskrit Mathematical Texts in Conversation 
with Modern Elementary Tamil Mathematical 
Curricula
Agathe Keller
The Politics of Alternate Modernities
Since India’s Hindu-nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi has 
been in office, he and other government officials have made headlines 
with surprising statements concerning the scientific feats of past Hindus: 
for instance, he proclaimed that ancient Hindus knew how to perform 
cosmetic surgery, as proved by the existence of Gaṇeśa, the god who has 
the shape of a human with an elephant head.1 The Chief Minister of the 
state of Tripura has recently claimed that at the time of the Mahābhārata, 
Hindus had internet and satellites, since Saṃjaya Galvani could give 
vivid accounts and updates of the formidable Kurukṣetra battle to King 
1. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/28/indian-prime-minister-
genetic-science-existed-ancient-times.
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Dhṛtarāṣṭra; and one could come up with other such examples.2 These 
laughable claims of Indian officials can be understood as a sign of con-
temporary India’s enchantment and disenchantment with science (Raina 
1997). It reveals the complex social, political, but also emotional relation 
that South Asia has to its past and present knowledge and know-hows. 
Indeed, part of South Asia’s postcolonial identity-building has to do 
with an engagement with its “science of the past,” but also its “science of 
the forest” (here, forest being understood more largely as “rural India”). 
The most famous example is the gandhian reclamation of economic au-
tonomy by promoting traditional know-hows, such as khadi (hand-spun, 
hand-woven cloth). Such an engagement carries many diverse political 
nuances and takes many forms. Many paths, models leading to what 
could be a new modernity (Prakash 1999) are thus explored. Imagined 
alternatives of what could be a non-Westernized, non-Christian, non-
capitalist, or non-imperialist, et cetera appropriation of science and its 
power are investigated. Villages and forests, then, can be seen as poten-
tially sowing the seeds of the future society as activists turn to them to 
learn how to harvest water, find medicinal plants, or teach science class-
es.3 As action for the future, the recovering of contemporary local know-
how and knowledge also nourishes approaches to history—notably, in 
the case we will explore here, the history of mathematics.4
In 2005 I embarked, with Senthil Babu of the French Institute of 
Pondicherry, on an ethno-mathematics (lit. anthropology of mathemat-
ics) project; we visited some villages of the Nagapattinam area in south-





3. For Babu (2015) this would rather be about different imagined publics for 
which specific mathematics are shaped.
4. The reappropriation and reactualization of one’s scientific history, ques-
tioning how to situate it in today’s world, are something that has been at 
work, of course, for a very long time. Studies now document how before 
India’s independence itself, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of 
the twentieth century, all sorts of hermeneutical schemes and hybridization 
were at work, from the adaptive translation of De Morgan’s mathematical 
manuals into Marathi (Raina 2016) to the reading of the Vedas as provid-
ing the fundamental elements of chemistry (Dodson 2005), all of which, of 
course, are to be understood in their specific contexts.
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and the ability to make conversions were at the heart of the negotiations 
between landless, low-caste laborers, and the higher-caste owners. Con-
verting hours of labor, in relation to areas of sowed fields, yielding given 
capacities of more or less refined grain, would be what would determine 
the amount that such laborers should be paid. In such transactions, ten-
sions relating to evaluations of fractional parts, of measures falling be-
tween standards of measurement, were obvious. Much of the payment 
was in-kind. Part of the village economy rested on value rates enabling 
exchanges in-kind with the help of capacity vessels: this amount of rice 
can pay for that amount of oil or clarified butter. In this system, the ca-
pacity measures were local, as were the laborers’ measures of areas. The 
landowner and, crucially, the surveyor knew how to navigate between 
the local measuring unit system and the metrical system that is officially 
in use all over India today. Here, then, what numbers you know how 
to compute with, with what units you know how to make conversions, 
how much you can convert kind into money, were markers of the power 
you had or did not have, but also of a knowledge that, if acquired, could 
empower you. Further, the economy and system of value for the laborer 
seemed a parallel system to the more mainstream one of the national 
economy. There could be many economies of values, and as long as they 
were easily convertible into one another, they could yield power. The 
questions we had and could not answer were these: Is the laborer’s value 
system entirely convertible into our terms? Should it be?
Both Babu and I were historians of mathematics, improvising as eth-
nographers. And this experience became a lesson in history writing: it 
first revealed precisely how mathematical knowledge and practices could 
be a point of conflict. It also raised the question of how, and with what 
sources, we were uncovering such a history: Were we writing the history 
of the winners, of the power holders? We also couldn’t help but raise 
the question—which Marilyn Strathern justly criticizes in her essay—in 
terms of traditions. What from the past explained the present in this 
case?
In what follows we will examine what can be said, in the past, of 
what appears as two separate cultures of computations and measuring: 
medieval (seventh–twelfth century) Sanskrit mathematical treatises 
and commentaries and modern (seventeenth–twentieth century) Tamil 
school primers, before coming back, in the conclusion, to the question of 
the existence of different mathematical ontologies.
Most of the history of mathematics of South Asia has been writ-
ten using scholarly documents in Sanskrit. Sanskrit, an Indo-European 
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language, was at first a high-caste Hindu, brahmanical language. By the 
fifth century CE, the language was used by a certain cosmopolitan elite, 
which might live outside of South Asia, might not be a Hindu, and not 
necessarily be a Brahmin. Not much is known of the institutions of learn-
ing in which such texts were produced, studied, or copied. Astral sci-
ence is believed to have been both a scholarly field of study and a family-
related occupation. Training would have been attended to either within 
one’s family or through prestigious schools (Plofker 2009: 178–81). For 
the most part, however, the contextual information—including what we 
can glean about teaching—is embedded in the texts themselves.5 In all 
cases, Sanskrit mathematical texts represent highbrow mathematics. Two 
different types of texts have been transmitted to us. The first, the most 
prestigious, is in the form of chapters of theoretical astronomical texts. 
These were mostly transmitted by continuous copying. Another kind of 
text, much less copied, often referred to as “mathematics for worldly prac-
tices” (loka-vyavahāra), is known to us by the chance find of one or two 
manuscripts. These sources document different mathematical practices, 
but they also share many common technical tools and topics. One of the 
characteristics, and important values of what Sheldon Pollock (2006) la-
bels the “Sanskrit Knowledge System,” is its aim at being universal. San-
skrit treatises and their commentaries do not want their scholarly produc-
tion to rest on circumstances of time and place, which are regularly erased. 
Until roughly the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the mathematical 
texts we have articulate and think of themselves as an immemorial disci-
pline (gaṇita): a new text is always the reframing of a preceding treatise 
or of an orally transmitted doctrine (śāstra). This can partly explain why 
histories of mathematics in Sanskrit have provided a very homogeneous 
and ahistorical point of view on this literature.6 We know that astral and 
mathematical texts written in Sanskrit in the fifth, seventh, or twelfth 
century were still in circulation in different parts of South Asia during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century. However, this Sanskrit literature lived 
side by side with texts in other Indian languages, generically called “ver-
naculars.” Sources documenting past mathematical practices in Telugu, 
5. The problem, then, is to find ways of retrieving such information from 
them. Ganeri (2008) and Keller (2015) use Speech Act Theory to do so.
6. Of course, other reasons can be added to this one, such as the importance 
of constructing a national scientific heritage, or the belief that when dealing 
with exact sciences historicity is not what is at stake but rather the technical 
contents of a text.
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Bengali, Tamil, Marathi, Malayalam, Persian, and in various forms of 
Prakṛt exist, ranging mostly from the seventeenth century onward, ex-
cept for the Jain Prakṛt texts that were canonized in the sixth–seventh 
century of our era. The texts have been edited and sometimes studied in 
the last fifty years, but the mathematics they testify to has remained in 
the margins of the writings on the history of mathematics in South Asia. 
Circulation of mathematical and astral knowledge between the vernacu-
lar and the Sanskrit is documented essentially as transmissions from the 
Sanskrit to the vernacular (Sarma 2011). It is possible, however, to imag-
ine that the reverse could at times be true as well—notably, through the 
circulation of mathematical problems and riddles. We will discuss these 
transmissions below. Babu (2015) documents the elementary schooling 
in Tamil in the early nineteenth century in mathematics and shows that 
brahmanical and rich children were not schooled in the same way as other 
children. This is discussed in further detail in the next section. India has 
long been perceived as the champion of arithmetics, the continent from 
which zero and our way of computing with decimal place value notations 
have come. Do vernacular documents show alternative systems of not-
ing numbers and dealing with values and measuring units? Do they con-
trast with what can be found in Sanskrit texts? Do these practices reflect 
distinct social contexts? And are these systems mutually exclusive: Does 
adopting one mean you can’t convert back to the other?
Computing or Not with the Decimal Place Value Notation
In what follows, I present what may have been two very different cultures 
of quantification and culture that can be documented in South Asia—
more specifically, in the Tamil world of the seventeenth century and un-
til the late nineteenth century. The decimal place value notation was a 
technical and scholarly device found in Sanskrit lore from at least the 
fifth century CE all over the Indian subcontinent. In addition, another 
mode of noting numbers existed: the “Tamil numerals,” a decimal nota-
tional nonpositional system, including special signs for small fractions, 
which, Babu suggests, was widespread among “practitioners” (account-
ants, surveyors, etc.).7 To execute operations on values noted with Tamil 
7. The existence of this numerical system is well attested. Other numerical 
forms as well, including very ancient systems of numerical noting, which 
might predate the decimal place value notation.
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numerals, the tables that were part of the elementary Tamil curriculum 
could be used: operations such as multiplications and division were not 
“executed” at least; their resolution was made through the more or less 
elaborate use of the entries of tables. Second, in the Sanskrit corpus, the 
decimal place value notation figures as a tool for computing on numbers, 
without paying attention to the unit in which its value makes sense. Yet, 
by contrast, in the widespread Tamil primer the Kaṇakkatikāram (circa 
fifteenth–eighteenth century), computations were always carried out in 
such a way that they were meaningful in terms of measuring units each 
step of the way.
These are very preliminary results, which rest on what is still a very 
fragmentary access to proper documentation. For instance, the Sanskrit 
mathematical texts in circulation in Tamil Nadu in the seventeenth–
nineteenth centuries need to be adequately documented, to specify more 
precisely the kind of practices that would have been familiar at that time 
and place and in real conversation with the Tamil texts. Their practices 
of value, number, and quantification will be presented while dealing with 
two common problems: the computing of areas and the purity of melted 
gold.8
Computing approximate areas of quadrilaterals: With or without specific 
measuring units?
In the mathematical chapter of the Brahmasphuṭasiddhānta, a theoretical 
astronomical text authored by Brahmagupta in 628 CE, the first part of a 
versified rule in Sanskrit provides the rough area of trilaterals and quad-
rilaterals): “BSS 12 21ab. The gross area is the product of half the sum of 
the sides and counter-sides of a tri (or ) quadrilateral” (Dvivedin 1902).
In his commentary on this chapter, Pṛthūdhaka provides some exam-
ples of computations of such rough areas. The computations all deal with 
numbers with no associated measuring unit. The problems, although 
dealing with kṣetras (lit. “field”), should be understood in this technical 
8. A new interest in manuals in vernacular languages should lead to a se-
ries of new publications. Here I use the very fragmentary elements that I 
have gleaned from Babu (2015). Hopefully, this thesis will be followed by 
more substantial and extensive re-editions and translations. Roy Wagner as 
the new chair of History and Philosophy of Mathematical Sciences at the 
ETZH (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) in Zurich is also translating 
similar material in Mayalayam. Both have launched on a new program to 
create a census, edit, and study the vernacular sources of South India.
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context as concerned with “geometrical figures.” Since the chapter con-
tains also a rule defining the decimal place value notation, and rules to 
compute multiplications, cubes, and cube roots with this notation, we 
can assume that the simple and more complex computations with frac-
tions all used the decimal place value in this case. This is indeed how it 
can be found in the late manuscripts we have of this text. This rule was 
subsequently found throughout Sanskrit texts devoted to mathematics, 
outside of the realm of astronomy.9 The measuring units used in Sanskrit 
mathematical and astronomical texts were standard, and could also be 
found in other texts of Sanskrit literature—notably, in treatises of state 
administration.10 According to Sreeramula Rajeswara Sarma, they were 
called the “Magadha Units” (māgadhamāna) and were maybe part of the 
reverence shown by the discipline to its past.11 Were these measuring 
units just theoretical ones, or were they those standardly used in South 
Asia, as part of the means for the educated to convert and compute, 
whatever their local circumstances? In the texts to be examined subse-
quently, the lengths are given in the famous linear measure, hasta (fore-
arm, sometimes translated cubit), which measures twenty-four linear 
aṅgulas (breadth of a finger). The square hastas in the following problems 
are made of twenty-four square aṅgulas: the ratio is the same as in the 
linear case. Thus, square hastas are not made of linear hastas, as explained 
in the appendix on measures at the end of this essay.
In the anonymous and undated commentary on the Pāṭīgaṇita of 
Śrīdhāra, problems are formulated in words with measured values. They 
are solved by translating these problems into numerals with no associ-
ated measure, on which computations are carried out. The result of the 
computation can then be restated, with an associated measuring unit and 
9. As noted in Shukla (1959: 87 n. 2), in the Pāṭīgaṇita of Śrīdhāra (eighth–
tenth century) (in verse 111cd); in the Gaṇitasārasaṃgrāha of Māhavīra, 
(vii, 7ab), in the Mahāsiddhānta of Āryabhaṭa (xv, 66) or the Gaṇitakaumudi 
of Narayaṇa (II, verse 8), etc.
10. Those used in what follows are presented in an Appendix at the end of this 
essay.
11. Sarma: “The Sanskrit texts on arithmetic employ in their sums the so-called 
Māgadhamāna, i.e., units of measurement, weight, and coinage, which are 
said to have been prevalent in Magadha in ancient times (probably when 
Āryabhaṭa was writing at Kusumapura) and not the contemporary units” 
(2011: 204). This remark can be nuanced, as close study shows that units 
were far from being as homogeneous as they seem.
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a certain shape (fractions are not generally found alone). In what fol-
lows, the computation of the area of a rectangle is carried out: “PG.115.
Ex.123. Tell me the computation when a rectangle’s base and mouth 
amount to five and a half hastas, while the flanks and middle height are 
three hastas” (Shukla 1959; Sanskrit p. 161–62).
The rectangle’s sides in this example are named as conventionally as 
those of any quadrilateral, with an implicit orientation: the base (bhū) is 
usually horizontal, the face (vadana) is its opposite side, there are both 
flanks-sides (pārśva-bhuja), and a height (lamba), which extends from 
the middle of the base and the face, since it is a rectangle.12
The edition of the text provides a diagram, which notes the measures 
of each length, as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. The rectangular diagram in the problem of the Pāṭīgaṇita (Shukla 
1959).
The treatise’s rule states that “the product of half the sum of the sides 
and counter-sides” should be taken. The “base” and its opposite side, “the 
face,” is according to the statement of the problem, five and a half hastas, 
which is noted 5
 1
 2.
The two other opposite sides measure 3 hastas.
12. The resolution of the problem also extends to the case were only the value 
of the height is considered.
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The computation, then, following the rule stated by Brahmagupta 
and restated by Śrīdhāra, first computes the sum of each couple of sides, 
(5 + ½) + (5 + ½) = 11, 3 + 3 = 6, and then their halves, 1½, 3, and then the 
product of both: 33/2. This is then converted, and since 33/2 = 16 + ½, 
and since 1 square hasta is 24 square aṅgula, the result obtained is “six-
teen [square] hastas twelve [square] aṅgulas.”
The resolution literally reads as follows:13
Procedure: the base is 5 the mouth 5
 1  1
 2  2
(. . .)
(The sum of both sides and opposite sides 11|6), their half 11| 3, their 
product 33
 2 2
from which the result is just that: sixteen hastas, twelve aṅgulas. 
(Shukla 1959; Sanskrit p. 132)
The numbers in the diagram, like those of the computation that fol-
lows, are noted, for their integral part, with the decimal place value nota-
tion. No mention is made of their units. The result of the computation is 
stated twice, once in a numerical form, then restated and converted spec-
ifying its measuring units in words. It is also striking that in the diagram 
the number associated with the “base” and the “face” is not 5 + ½ but 
11/2. Indeed, the value stated in the text of the problem is first converted 
into numbers noted on a working surface. Here, the resolution does not 
seem to require the transformation of the fractional form of an integer 
increased by a fraction smaller than one (5 + ½), into a simple fraction 
with numerator and denominator (11/2), but the edited diagram does.14
It is not clear why such elementary computations are detailed here, 
amid much more complex problems, but they do highlight an articula-
tion between values that are stated in problems and answers, on the one 
hand, and numbers noted in specific manners to compute with, on the 
other hand. Further, the two texts taken as examples can easily be seen 
13. () indicates the editorial additions made by K. S. Shukla. (. . .) indicates that 
part of the text has been skipped.
14. This might be the choice of the editor, Shukla, or that of a scribe. The loca-
tion of this unique manuscript of this commentary is not known today, so it 
is difficult to check.
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as exhibiting some of the spectrum within the Sanskrit corpus itself: on 
the one hand, a prestigious theoretical astronomical text of the seventh 
century, and on the other hand, an undated (but seemingly quite late) 
commentary on a tenth century text concentrating on mathematics as a 
topic of worldly affairs. However, they both share a way of emphasizing 
the computations on numbers over measured values.
As mentioned above, a corpus of mathematical texts in Tamil, a Dra-
vidian language of southeastern India, has been edited and studied in 
the last fifty years. This corpus encompasses texts of different kinds and 
times.15 In what follows, a mathematical text written in classical versi-
fied Tamil, which might have been a canonical primer if not an actual 
textual genre, the Kaṇakkatikāram (hereafter abbreviated as KK) will 
be used as a source.16 A first author of such a text, Kāri Nāyaṉār, would 
have lived in the fifteenth century in what is today the Nagapattinam 
district of Tamil Nadu (Babu 2015: 32), while manuscripts from the 
eighteenth century onward can be found throughout Tamil Nadu, sug-
gesting a widespread textbook. The edited text, which attempts to col-
lect in one text all the variations of thirty-three different manuscripts, 
presents itself as an “exposition of mathematics to the world,” and is 
composed of rules in classical Tamil verses and problems, some versi-
fied, others in prose, and some cursory resolutions. Among the standard 
topics it treats, problems of land measuring and alloys will be singled 
out here. The mathematical practices documented in this text will be as-
sociated with the two texts that formed in the early nineteenth century 
(and probably before that) the basis of education/learning, in rural ar-
eas, for non–high caste children: the lexical lists, called Poṉṉilakaṃ and 
the multiplication tables, called Eṇcuvaṭi. Babu (2015: 127) has shown 
how they were important parts of the village schools (also known as 
veranda or Tiṇṇai schools) that English observers sometimes called the 
“multiplication schools.” Babu (2015: 83–103) further argues that the 
KK should be understood as a textbook to train practitioners such as 
the surveyors (veṭṭiyāṉ), the tax collectors, or accountants (kaṇakkaṉ).
Tamil numerical notations extended to higher numbers and to frac-
tions smaller than one, in many forms. And, as demonstrated by Babu 
15. For a preliminary study of computations in Tamil inscriptions, see Sub-
barayalu (2012) and Selvakumar (2016).
16. Three editions of the texts are noted by Babu: Satyabama (1998), Subrama-
niam (2007), Satyabama (2007) For the status of the text, see Babu (2015: 
32–33).
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(2015: 119ff.), the teaching associated learning by heart, learning how 
to write the notations, and learning their values. The Eṇcuvaṭi tables, as 
edited by Babu, are hybrid in terms of numbers and measured values. 
Some state the measuring unit of the numbers considered. Further, the 
tables incorporate examples of how to find the value of a product when 
such a multiplication is not directly tabulated. For example, as shown in 
Figure 8, to multiply 17 x 17 kuḻi (an area measuring unit described be-
low as well as in the appendix at the end of this essay), the value is found 
by considering the entries for 10 x 10, 10 x 7 (twice), and 7 x 7, and by 
adding them progressively.
Figure 8. The entry for 17 x 17 kuḻi in the Eṇcuvaṭi, edited in Babu (2015).
In the Kaṇakkatikāram we can see how an approximation of quadri-
lateral areas was computed:
KK. 81 Add one side to another and halve and multiply the result-
ing side by the larger one. If you do so, you will obtain all the areas 
(nilaṅkaḷ) of the world like the rays of the sun spreading on earth. 
(Babu 2015: 46, quoting Subramaniam 2007: 125)
The general rule thus approximates the surface of any quadrilateral by 
approximating it to the area of a rectangle whose sides would be half the 
sum of the quadrilateral’s opposite sides. As in Sanskrit texts, orienta-
tions of figures are provided by cardinal directions.
In South India, before and during the Chōḻa rule (850–1250) the kuḻi 
was an important area measuring unit. The kuḻi corresponds to a square 
having for side the length of a measuring rod (in linear measures of 
kōl). The kuḻi served as a surface unit by which other surface units could 
be determined (Subbarayalu 2012: 83; Babu 2015: 135). The rule stated 
above is followed by a problem and its resolution:
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right/South kōl 13 left/North kōl 11 therefore kōl 24, half of that is 
12; West/lower kōl 9 East/upper kōl 19, therefore kōl 28, its half is 14; 
multiply this 10 x10 = 100, 4 x 10 = 40, 2 x 10 = 20, 2 x 4 = 8. There-
fore <the result is> 168 kuḻi; this is how you say it. (Babu 2015: 46, 
quoting Subramaniam 2007: 125)
In this problem a quadrilateral has four sides measured in kōl, whose 
values are given as couples of opposite sides. The “flanks” of the quad-
rilateral in the Sanskrit text are here its South and North sides, respec-
tively 13 and 11 kōl. The opposite “base” and “faces” are here the West 
and East sides, 9 and 19 kōl.
The rule provided above involves first: “Add one side to another and 
halve.” Thus, for the first pair of sides, the computation is carried out, 
13 + 11 = 24 kōl, its half is 12. For the second pair, 9 + 19 = 28 kōl, its 
half is 14. The next step of the process is then: “multiply the resulting 
side by the larger one.” Although it is unclear what this means in terms 
of assessments of the respective “mean sizes” just computed, we under-
stand that the product of 12 by 14 has to be carried out. Here, as in the 
multiplication table examined above, the product of (10 + 2) x (10 + 4) 
is carried out, the individual products are made explicit and their sum 
100 + 40 + 20 + 8 = 168 computed. This last computation provides the 
result.
In this resolution, the execution is such that at each step the measur-
ing unit of what is being computed is always known. And this is often 
(although not always) stated. When the area is computed, however, and 
the product of 12 by 14 is carried out, the detailing of how values are 
taken from a table seems to be noted, as in multiplication tables. Here, 
then, when using multiplication tables, the computation is carried out on 
numbers, with which measuring units are not associated. But as soon as 
the result is input into the resolution of the problem it exists as a meas-
ured value again, and the result is too.
Another problem deals with proportions of areas and their different 
uses:
If the total vēli is 1000, and if 1⁄10th has been sown; 1⁄8th has been 
transplanted; 1⁄4th has nurseries and 1⁄2 has matured paddy, how much 
was the wasteland and how much was the cultivated area? (Babu 
2015: 49, quoting and translating Subramaniam 2007: 160)
The solution of this problem involves computing 1000 x 1⁄10, 1000 x 1⁄8, 
1000 x 1⁄4, 1000 x 1⁄2, and adding all the results. At each step of such a 
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computation the results would always be in vēli (another area measuring 
unit). It is possible to arrive at a resolution using the tables, the lexical 
lists (Poṉṉilakaṃ), and the multiplication tables (Eṇcuvaṭi) to retrieve 
the value of each product.17
These examples illustrate how tables of multiplication could have 
been used to execute more complex products, without the decimal place 
value notation. We can thus contrast the following: Sanskrit sources (the 
Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta and the Pāṭigaṇita, for example), which compute 
using the decimal place value notation and whose emphasis is on the 
different operations executed on numbers not associated with measuring 
units when computing areas, with the Kaṇakkatikāram in which the area 
is computed with an attention given to the measuring units linear and 
square at every step. Numbers—for example, values without a measur-
ing unit—would come into play in the intermediate steps of retrieving 
values in multiplication tables when computing products.
“Gold computations”
Similar contrasts of practices with numbers, measured values, and com-
putations can be documented in problems about the fineness of gold, 
its price, or the mixing of silver and gold. It is striking that in the San-
skrit texts dealing with this quite standard topic (suvarṇa-gaṇita) (Sarma 
1983), computations are carried out mechanically with numbers. For in-
stance, in the canonical arithmetical Līlāvatī by Bhāskara (b. 1104), a 
problem of the cost of gold is solved by an inverse Rule of Three (vyasta-
trairāśika). After the quantities are displayed on a grid on a working sur-
face, represented by a “setting” (nyāsa) clause in the text, a multiplication 
is carried out on the left and a division is made on the right. The answer 
here is given in noted numbers, with no measuring unit associated with 
17. 1/10th of a 1,000 can be obtained by reading the multiplication table from 
right to left of Encuvatti Mēlavai ilakkam, and retrieve 100 (Babu 2015: 
appendix III, 52). 1/8th is a standard fraction, having its own sign in the 
“Tamil numeral system”; 1000 x 1/8 = 125 is the last line of the part devoted 
to 1/8th in Mēlavai ciṟṟakkam (Babu 2015: appendix III, 62). 1/4th is also 
a standard fraction; it also has its own multiplication table. 1000 x ¼ = 250 
is the last line of the part devoted to 1/4th in Mēlavai ciṟṟakkam (Babu 
2015: appendix III, 67). 1000 x ½ = 50 is the last line of the part devoted 
to 1/2 in Mēlavai ciṟṟakkam (Babu 2015: appendix III, 68). How additions 
(100 + 125 + 250 + 500 = 975 ) and subtractions (1000 – 975 = 25) were 
computed is not made explicit here.
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them. The varṇa (lit. color) of gold stands for its purity, a measure not 
unlike the carat, the gadyāṇaka is a measure of weight, and the niṣka a 
gold coin (Āpaṭe 1937: 75; Colebrooke 1817: 35, 46–47).
An example concerning the price of gold according [to its] varṇa:
If a ten varṇa gold [weighing] a gadyāṇaka is bought for a niṣka say 
then how much [can be bought, with the same amount of money of 
a] fifteen varṇa gold?
Setting
10 | 1| 15|
the result is 2
  3
Here then, 1 x 10 (multiplication on the left) was divided (on the 
right) by 15, and a fraction obtained, 2⁄3. No measuring unit is stated for 
the result, which is implicitly in gadyāṇakas.
In the portion of the same treatise devoted to “gold computations” 
(suvarṇa-gaṇita), a similar phenomenon can be found: a tabular display 
enables the mechanical carrying out of a problem. First a rule is stated, to 
solve a problem where several parcels of gold of different weights wi and 
purity vi are melted together. The weight of the melted result is assumed 
to be the sum of the previous weights (Σwi). The purity of the new lump 
of gold, V, is computed with a procedure that amounts to V= Σ wivi\Σwi.18 
The procedure then amounts to computing the sum of the products wivi, 
then the sum of wi, and divide the first by the second.
The rule is followed by a solved example (Āpat ̣e 1937: 99, verse 104–
5; Colebrooke 1817: 35, 46–47):
An example:
Parcels of gold weighing severally ten, four, two, and four māṣās, and 
of varṇa thirteen, twelve, eleven, and ten respectively, being melted 
18. The sum of the products of the varṇa and [weight of several parcels] of gold 
being divided by the [weight of the melted] gold, the value of the varṇa of 
the [melted] gold [is obtained]. The varṇa is [obtained] when [the previ-
ous result is] divided by the [weight of ] the purified gold, the amount of 
purified gold when divided by the varṇa (Āpaṭe 1937: 99, verse 103; Cole-
brooke 1817: 35; 46–47, verse 102–3). Colebrooke’s verse numbering has 
been adopted here and in what follows. Note that gold and weight of gold 
are one and same word here.
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together, tell me quickly, merchant, who art conversant with the com-
putation of gold, what is the varṇas of the mass? (. . .)
Setting: 13 12 11 10
  10 4 2 4
The measure of the varṇa of gold obtained when melted, 12.
Here, the setting shows how the computation can be done me-
chanically. The varṇas (vi) are on the top row, the weights (wi) of each 
parcel on the lowest row. To compute the weight of the whole melted 
gold, the sum of the cells of the lower row is made (20). The product of 
the numbers in each column can be made (13 x 10 = 130, 12 x 4 = 48, 
11  x  2  =  22, 10  x  4  =  40) and the sum of the products computed 
(130 + 48 + 22 + 40 = 240), to be able then to divide the latter by the 
first (240/20) and obtain the result (12). The products and their sum are 
typically numbers to which no specific measuring unit can be associated.
Similar but different “gold computations” can also be found in the 
Tamil Kaṇakkatikāram. In this context, the māttu is a gold weight as 
well as a way of measuring the purity of gold, the kalañcu and paṇavetai 
measures of weight, and the paṇam a coin.19 In the problem given in this 
treatise here, and the rule that follows, the computation that involves 
first a division and then a multiplication ensures that at each step the 
measuring unit of what has been computed is known:
If the cost of one kalañcu of gold with ten māttu is fourteen paṇam, 
what would be the cost of an eight māttu gold? Then you divide the 
paṇam by the māttu of the given gold and multiply it by the other 
given māttu. (Babu 2015: 51, quoting Subramaniam 2007)
The problem is seen here as a kind of Rule of Three since the weight 
of gold is stable. The first division gives you the price of gold per māttu, 
and the second the price sought.20
It is well established that Sanskrit sources of diverse times and con-
texts dealing with areas or gold computations (but the topics could be 
19. For weight standards as documented in Tamil texts and epigraphy see Babu 
(2015: 7–8); for gold computations, see Babu (2015: 50); Sarma (1983). For 
the paṇa (tamil paṇam), see the appendix at the end of this essay.
20. 14/10 = 1 + 2/5 paṇams, which multiplied by 8 would have been, 9 + 3/5 
paṇas. We do not know if such a result accounts for paṇam denominations. 
Divisions may have beeen carried out by inversing tables of multiplications.
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largely extended) all use the decimal place value notation to compute. 
These computations are carried out with numbers whose value and rela-
tion to measuring units can be made explicit when stating a problem 
or providing the final result, but not while the different steps of the 
computation are executed. In the Kaṇakkatikāram, which we have as-
sociated with the lexical and multiplication tables that were taught to 
children in Tamil Nadu from the eighteenth century, some problems 
seem to be solved in such a way that each step of the computation ac-
counts for the units of the values considered. Only when products are 
carried out, and multiple entries of a multiplication table need to be 
retrieved and added, would numbers be considered with no associated 
measuring unit.
We have thus seen here a testimony of what might have been two 
different mathematical cultures belonging to different social contexts: 
the scholarly world of Sanskrit mathematical lore opposed to elementary 
school texts in Tamil.21
Is It Tamil Versus Sanskrit?
Should we see these two cultures as exclusive of one another and char-
acterized by the language they use? Things are not so simple, of course. 
Thus, in this example from the Kaṇakkatikāram (Subramaniam and 
Satyabama 1999; see also 2005), the fineness māttu of an alloy is meas-
ured against its weight in standard paṇaveṭai:
When 4 paṇaveṭai of gold with 7½ māttu are mixed with one 
paṇaveṭai of silver, what will be a māttu of the resulting gold? The 
original māttu has to be multiplied by its weight to be divided by the 
total weight, to yield the final refinement māttu. 7½ x 4 paṇaveṭai 
= 30; weight of gold 4 and silver 1- (their sum is) 5; 5 is the total 
weight in paṇaveṭai; the new māttu is 30/5 = 6. (Babu 2015: 51, quot-
ing Subramaniam 1999: 224–26)
Here, then, in contrast to the result seen in the previous section, but 
using a procedure that resembles the one we have seen in the Līlāvatī, 
21. For Babu (2015: 83), this would perhaps be better phrased as a “world of 
texts” as opposed to a “world of practice.”
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the procedure to find the fineness of a gold and silver alloy requires 
computing:
•	 the product of fineness and weight of the gold wivi;
•	 the sum of the weights wi of the gold and silver;
•	 the division of the product by the weight: wivi/wi;
•	 which would provide the fineness of the alloy.
Here, then, the purity 7  +  ½ māttu and a measure of weight (4 
paṇaveṭai of gold) are multiplied by one another. The product obtained 
is a number with no associated measuring unit, 4 x 15/2 = 30. The sum 
of measures of weight of the gold and silver (4 paṇaveṭai of gold + 1 
paṇaveṭai of silver = 5 paṇaveṭai) is computed and then the division of 
the product by the sum (30/5) provides the “new māttu,” 6. Here, then, 
one step of the process is not associated with a measuring unit, not un-
like what is common in Sanskrit mathematical texts.
Further, among Tamil sources, the Kaṇitanūḷ, a text known in one 
manuscript at the Government Oriental Manuscript Library (in Chen-
nai) seems to be closer to Sanskrit sources for its emphasis on com-
putations with numbers than to the kind of practices found in the 
Kaṇakkatikāram. Here is a problem for the payment of wages:
Finding the gold in 6 māttu for one who worked for five days, when 
one worked for fifteen days and gets 4 paṇaveṭai gold of 9 māttu. The 
last quantity of 9 māttu gold and its weight 4 are multiplied which 
is 36. This has to be multiplied by the number of days of the first, 
which is 5 = 180. Now divide this by the last given number of days 
which is 15, 180/15 = 12. Now divide this by the first māttu which 
is 2 paṇaveṭai. (Babu 2015: 52, quoting Subramaniam 1999: 226–29, 
verse 70–73)
We can recognize here a Rule of Five, a familiar tool of Sanskrit 
mathematical texts: To find the weight of gold wn paid to somebody who 
worked for n days, for a payment in gold of refinement mn, knowing that 
a work of x days, with a gold refinement of mx is paid wx, the procedure 
amounts to computing: wn = (nmxwx)/xmn. The computation carried out, 
first computing nmxwx = 9 x 4 x 5=180, and then dividing this sum first 
by x = 15 and then by mn = 4, thus finding the result 2 paṇaveṭai, articu-
lates well how the initial values each have a separate associated measur-
ing unit, but the intermediate steps are numbers to which no distinct 
measure can be associated.
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Here is an alloy problem, whose numerical values seem to echo one 
we have seen above:
When a 8 māttu gold weighing 2 paṇaveṭai and another 7 māttu gold 
weighing 2 paṇaveṭai are melted, what would be the resulting māttu? 
The method is to multiply the māttu and paṇaveṭai of each gold and 
add them. That is (8 x 2) + (7 x 2) = 16 + 14 = 30. Add the weights, 
2 paṇaveṭai + 2 paṇaveṭai = 4 paṇaveṭai. Now, divide the previous 30 
by this 4 to get 7½. Therefore, the resultant māttu gold will have a 
māttu of 7½. (Babu 2015: 50–51, quoting Subramaniam 1999: 212, 
verse 58)
We recognize here the same process as the one found in the 
Kaṇakkatikāram and the Līlāvatī, in which to find the fineness of an 
alloy, the sum of the products of weights and purity is divided by the 
sum of weights (V=Σwivi/Σwi). The emphasis here is first on the appli-
cation of a general abstract rule (“to multiply the māttu and paṇaveṭai 
of each gold and add them”), which is applied. It is striking that the 
elements of the process to which no measuring unit can be associated 
are not articulated, while those to which an interpretation in terms of 
measures can be made, are. The resulting value of māttu 7½, is the same 
as in the Kaṇakkatikāram. Would these two texts be in dialogue with 
one another?
The recognition of this circulation of problems and practices, within 
the Tamil sources and with some of the Sanskrit canons, hints at the fact 
that probably these ways of computing and practicing mathematics were 
not separate geographically one from another. In his study of the lo-
cal village schools in South-East Tamil Nadu, Babu notes that Brahmin 
children would go to funded Sanskrit schools, while other children would 
rather be schooled in the Tamil ones. Implicitly, there seems to have been 
a separate space for Sanskrit lore within Brahmin maṭhas. Babu (2015: 
116) also shows how these worlds interacted: some teachers of the village 
schools knew Sanskrit mathematical texts. Translations are also known 
from the Sanskrit to the Tamil. There is a trope of exchange—when we 
come to the relations of Sanskrit with the vernaculars—in mathematics. 
Thus, in his pioneering essay on the topic, Sarma states:
It is certain that these exchanges were never one-sided, i.e., from the 
“Great Tradition” of Sanskrit to the “Little Traditions” of regional 
languages. The two traditions were mutually complementary. While 
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mathematical ideas and processes were systematized in Sanskrit 
manuals, the broader dissemination of these ideas took place in the 
regional languages. Conversely, Sanskrit has also absorbed much 
from the local traditions. (Sarma 2011: 221–22)
Implicitly, a social role is devoted to both tradition. Sanskrit is un-
derstood as the realm of the highbrow elite, while Tamil is used for the 
“dissemination” of the knowledge created in Sanskrit. In the cases we 
have found here, the Sanskrit texts seem to want to build a mathemati-
cal understanding and a more general mathematical context for the rules 
applied in the Kaṇakkatikāram.
Similarly, the fact that even in the seventeenth century computa-
tions could be carried out without using the decimal place value nota-
tion may explain why computations in Sanskrit texts also hint at meth-
ods not involving this notation.22 Time and space prevent me from 
developing the point here, but it seems that a whole range of rules that 
were interpreted as expressing the commutativity, associativity, and dis-
tributivity of multiplication may, in fact, be read as providing general 
procedures when computing with numerals that do not use place value 
notations.
A problem quoted by Sarma (which seems to have traveled widely 
from Europe to Japan) alludes both to how multiple exchanges could 
take place across language and social barriers and also to how the knowl-
edge was kept mostly to the Brahmins, in an atmosphere not at all civil:23
Fifteen Brahmins and fifteen thieves had to spend a dark night in an 
isolated temple of Durga. The goddess appeared in person at mid-
night and wanted to devour exactly fifteen persons, since she was 
hungry. The thieves naturally suggested that she should consume the 
fifteen plump Brahmins. But the clever Brahmins proposed that all 
the thirty would stand in a circle and Durga should eat each ninth 
person. The proposal was accepted by Durga and the thieves. So the 
Brahmins arranged themselves and the thieves in a circle, telling each 
one where to stand. Durga then counted out each ninth person and 
22. Keller and Morice-Singh (forthcoming) considers the use or not of decimal 
place value notations while observing techniques of multiplication in San-
skrit texts.
23. For a more in-depth study of the problem and its circulations, see Sarma 
(1987).
Science in the Forest, Science in the Past
166
devoured him. When the fifteen were eaten, she was satiated and dis-
appeared, and only Brahmins remained in the circle. The problem is, 
how did the Brahmins arrange themselves and the thieves in a circle? 
(Sarma 2011: 210, also quoted in Babu 2015: 1)
Conclusion: What Speaks to Ontological Differences?
I borrow the concept of mathematical practices and culture from Ka-
rine Chemla, Renaud Chorlay, and David Rabouin (2016), and more 
largely to a group in Paris that reflects on these questions. Mathematical 
cultures in this understanding, which associates shared practices with 
shared values, are fundamentally plural. Of course language and local 
contexts come into play in ways that need to be described as well, but it is 
striking that sometimes across language and space people with the same 
occupations develop similar practices which can be very different from 
the practices and values of people sharing the same language but not the 
same occupation. From what we have seen in this essay, it is reasonable 
to believe that it was not two cultures of mathematics but many that 
have existed in the Indian subcontinent during its very rich, vast, and 
long history. If we do not know of many of these cultures as of today, it 
is because they have been overlooked. Indeed, for a very long time, what 
counted as valuable was what was similar to present day mathematics on 
the one hand, and the practices of a cultivated elite on the other hand. 
If we come back to the situation of the Nagapattinam region of Tamil 
Nadu evoked in the beginning of this essay, the question will be first to 
understand the social contexts that these mathematics are an emanation 
of: the story that brought this situation into being. Second, if we consid-
er this situation as testifying to contemporary and geographically close 
but differing mathematical cultures, we may want to raise questions that 
might help us think of how different these mathematical practices are: 
Does the adoption of one exclude the other? Can these mathematical 
practices cross-fertilize each other, can they produce a hybrid? Have 
they done so in the past? Could this serve as a criterion of ontological 
difference?
But in the context of South Asia today what would it mean to hold 
that different mathematical cultures have different mathematical on-
tologies? Those who brandish ontological differences today are those 
who want to see Hindu, Christian, and Muslim cultures as ontologically 
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different. The current fundamentalist and nationalist government would 
like to promote the idea of Indian traditional sciences as alternatives 
to Western secular-Christian-Muslim science, very much insisting on 
the fundamental difference and power that come from exploring science 
with mystical and religious tools. In this very political atmosphere, let us 
leave the question of the existence of different mathematical ontologies 
open, but remember that there have been and still are different cultures 
of how we deal with values and numbers, cultures of measure, and deal-
ings with shapes. Some are still alive today. They are studied by ethno-
mathematics and should be thought of as a cultural heritage in danger 
that needs to be preserved.
Appendix: Measuring Units
Here, I explain the different measuring units found in the extracts dis-
cussed in this essay.
A. Measuring Units in Sanskrit Sources
Measures of lengths and areas
lengths
24 aṅgulas (breadth of a finger) make a hasta (forearm, cubit).
areas
24 square aṅgulas make a square hasta.
The ratio is the same as in the linear case. Consequently, the square 
aṅgula cannot be thought of as being constructed from linear aṅgulas. 
Indeed, a square linear hasta should contain 24 x 24= 576 square linear 
aṅgulas. 24 is not a perfect square; consequently, this square hasta seems 
to be a theoretical unit.
Measures relating to gold
purity is measured not in carats but in varṇa (colors)
weight of gold involves small specialized measuring units such as the 
gadyāṇaka. The māṣa is a more standard weight. The text does not specify 
how they are related.
prices are given in niṣkas, a gold coin, in the Līlāvatī. The treatise provides 
a rule from which we know that there would have been 256 (16 x 16) 
paṇas in a gold niṣka.
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B. Measuring Units in Tamil Sources
Measures of lengths and areas
lengths
kōl is the name of a measuring rod, and also of a unit of length.
areas
1 kuḻi is a square whose side is 1 kōl
Many relations of the vēli to the kuḻi are documented, probably the cho-
las imposed the following:
2000 kuḻi make a vēli
Measures relating to gold
fineness measured in māttu
weight measured in kalañcu and paṇaveṭai
coins are evoked through the paṇam here. Silver and coper punch-marked 
paṇas are known to have been used as early as the Mauryan empire in 
South Asia (321 BCE–187 CE). In the Līlāvatī, a rule explains that 
there would have been 256 (16 x 16) paṇas in a gold niṣka.
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———. 2007. Suriyapūpaṉ Kaṇakkatikāram (Pakuti II). Thanjavur: Sarasvati 
Mahal.
Selvakumar, V. 2016. “History of numbers and fractions and arithmetic cal-
culations in the Tamil region: Some observations.” International Journal 
of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 3 (1): 27–35.
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chapter eight
Antidomestication in the Amazon: Swidden 
and its Foes
Manuela Carneiro da Cunha
It might come as a surprise that I would enlist agriculture as a science in 
and of the forest. Is it a science? Here’s a quotation from the Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary (OED): “If we estimate dignity by immediate usefulness, 
agriculture is undoubtedly the first and noblest science.”1 In the second 
edition of the OED, agriculture is still being defined as a science: “The 
science and art of cultivating the soil; including the allied pursuits of 
gathering in the crops and rearing live stock; tillage, husbandry, farming 
(in the widest sense).”2 However, the third edition, twenty-three years 
later, considers that earlier usage to have become rare: “(a) Originally: 
the theory or practice of cultivating the soil to produce crops; an instance 
of this (now rare); (b) Later also (now chiefly): the practice of grow-
ing crops, rearing livestock, and producing animal products (as milk and 
eggs), regarded as a single sphere of activity; farming, husbandry; (also) 
the theory of this.”3 If the OED change of heart is any indication, it looks 
1. Johnson Rambler (1751) No. 145. ⁋3.
2. Oxford English Dictionary. 1989. 2nd ed. Vols. 1–20. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
3. Oxford English Dictionary. 2012–. 3rd ed. Vols. 1– Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. Continually updated at http://www.oed.com/.
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as if agriculture is being demoted from science to mere practice. And yet, 
somewhat puzzlingly, OED adds the theory of the practice of agriculture 
to its (b)-level definition.
There is no doubt that the scientific establishment tends to keep the 
label science to itself. A depreciation of local communities and Indig-
enous peoples’ agriculture is transparent in a distinction that is some-
times made between knowledge and empirical know-how, something 
the French separate into savoir and savoir-faire (Caplat 2016).
I take it that we can agree that the term science is applicable to tradi-
tional peoples’ agriculture. But then, how can I call it a science in or of the 
forest? How can one reconcile agriculture with the forest, since the for-
mer is blamed for having caused the very destruction of the latter? True, 
some definitions of agriculture include forestry, but this is not what I am 
talking about. What I mean is high forest, a forest that looks pristine 
to nonexpert eyes, even though it might well be anthropogenic to some 
degree (Balée 1994, 2013; Heckenberger and Neves 2009).
It is somewhat ironic that among many South American Lowland 
Indigenous peoples, the forest is often conceived of as itself cultivated. 
True, not necessarily cultivated by present-day humans but rather by 
other “people,” animals, spirits, masters, even planted and cared for by 
other plants. In a sense, it is as if agriculture were the norm, wilderness 
being residual. Thus, the Wajãpi notion of human space is restricted 
to their gardens and fallows while the forest is made by other beings 
cultivating their own food (Gallois 1986; Cabral de Oliveira 2012). 
In Jamamadi Indigenous universe, there are no such things as wild 
plants, since everything is cultivated but by some “other” cultivator 
(Shiratori 2018: 136). Jarawara follow a similar view, yet admit a de-
gree of remaining wilderness (Maizza 2014: 504). Several Amazonian 
Indigenous peoples credit agoutis for cultivating Brazil nuts. Some-
times the forest is reconfigured as the garden planted by the Creator 
himself.
This might correlate with a puzzling and often noted absence among 
Indigenous peoples as well as Amazonian rubber-tappers of a general 
term for designating the Plantae kingdom. A plant for humans is lit-
erally what humans have planted.4 But animals and other beings can 
4. In a similar fashion, for older Wajãpi, wild fruit was designated by an ex-
clusive term that could not be extended to cultivated fruit. Under outside 
influence, the scope of the term now covers both wild and cultivated fruit 
(Cabral de Oliveira 2012: 77). What this might indicate is that in the 
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and do also plant, hence they have their own plants—that is, those they 
cultivate. Knowledge of animal food preferences is truly encyclopedic 
(Cabral de Oliveira 2012: 73ff.).5 An animal’s plant roughly corresponds 
to its food, though such food might be edible for several different ani-
mals and humans alike. Just as many animals partake in what is produced 
in human gardens, so humans may also eat what was produced by ani-
mals: wild food. One could speculate whether this would favor human 
trekking seasons and abandoning cultivation once and for all. In a sense, 
therefore, every sentient being could be a gardener or an agriculturalist.
In contrast with such notion of a wide prevalence of cultivators, be 
they humans or otherwise, John Locke never acknowledged any agri-
culture at all among “Americans”: “In the beginning all the world was 
America.” This somewhat odd quote comes from John Locke’s Second 
treatise of government (1690: chap. 5, sec. 49) and needs some explana-
tion. America and aboriginal Americans stand, in Locke’s scheme, for 
an age of universal undivided commons. Individual property (and hence 
its “conveniences”) does not exist just as was the case when humankind 
lived in the Garden of Eden.
Sec. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than 
several nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, 
and poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as 
liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful 
soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, ray-
ment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one 
hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy. (Locke 1960: chap. 5, 
sec. 41; emphasis added)
The reasoning is: labor being absent, property has not yet emerged. 
Primeval labor was cultivation, and cultivation implied “subduing.”
And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we 
see are joined together. The one gave title to the other (Locke 1960: chap. 
5, sec. 35; emphasis added)
nomenclature criteria of old, actions and relations to plants trumped form 
and function.
5. It exceeds its hunting utility that allows one to anticipate when and where 
one can expect to find specific game by following the ripening of fruit or 
seeds.
Science in the Forest, Science in the Past
174
Half a century after Locke’s Second treatise of government, the joint is-
sue of agriculture as the paradigmatic form of labor and hence the basis 
of rights of dominion over land had firmly taken root.6 Cultivation for 
Locke is subduing the earth.
Not just any kind of agriculture, however. Agriculture in its full sense 
was deemed to be practiced in permanent fields and preferably with a 
plow. A plow no doubt “subdues the earth” more effectively than a stick. 
That those “Americans” merely “scratched the land” and ignored tillage 
could be grounds for asserting that their title to property was dubious 
at best.7
It looks as if in the eighteenth century, issues of style of agriculture, 
domestication, sedentarization, property, and progress had become en-
tangled in a single syndrome. A similar syndrome seems to appear in ar-
chaeology, when Neolithic revolution conflates pottery with domestica-
tion of animals and plants. As archaeologist Eduardo Neves has pointed 
out, the distinct dimensions of the syndrome are disjointed in the Ama-
zon. Pottery is older than agriculture and not necessarily found together 
with cultivated plants. Hence, there was never a Neolithic revolution in 
Lowland South America, as the author puts it (Neves 2016).
As for livestock or any other animal domestication, Amazonian In-
digenous peoples are famous for their love for wild animals as pets as 
well as for their avoidance of animal domestication (Erikson 1987, 1997; 
Fausto 1999). Taming is one thing, domestication is quite another. Fur-
thermore, pets or any creature one has fed are generally not to be eaten.8
Amazonian agriculture is a vibrant topic of research (Carneiro da 
Cunha 2017). This is not the place to review such things as the changing 
historical importance of maize relative to manioc in different societies 
and linguistic stocks, nor what presently appears as a primary domes-
tication of sweet (i.e., nonpoisonous) manioc in southwest Amazonia 
to be followed by selection favoring toxic manioc spreading in other 
6. The word itself, labor, comes from old French Labour, which meant tillage 
using a plow.
7. Such an argument could be brought up in later colonial conquests such 
as Australia, but was (fortunately) never used in earlier European colonial 
empires.
8. An example of the same attitude is brought out by an attempt in the 1990s 
by an NGO at breeding fish on the upper Rio Negro. Women starkly re-
fused to eat fish they had been feeding (Estorniolo 2012).
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areas of the region (Arroyo-Kalin 2010; Santos-Mühlen et al. 2013).9 
While some debate persists on regional issues, there is presently a gen-
eral recognition of the Amazon being a major center of plant domestica-
tion (Clement et al. 2015; Levis et al. 2017). Recently, even rice on the 
Guaporé was added to an already large list of plants domesticated in 
Amazonia (Hilbert et al. 2017). Archaeological research in Amazonia 
has produced evidence of several large sites with long-term intensive 
agriculture in the forest (Heckenberger and Neves 2009). A formidable 
Indigenous contribution to agrobiodiversity has been stressed, covering 
an astounding number of varieties of sweet potatoes, gourds, beans, pea-
nuts, et cetera, not to forget, of course, manioc (Carneiro da Cunha and 
Morim de Lima 2017).
In short, this is a time for academic celebration of Indigenous ag-
ricultural techniques and exploits. And yet, a number of Amazonians’ 
attitudes toward agriculture look somewhat puzzling.
As Claude Lévi-Strauss very early pointed out in the Handbook of 
South American Indians (Lévi-Strauss 1950), people knew and relied at 
least as much on cultivated as on wild plants. In the myth usually called 
“The origin of cultivated plants” among the Ramkokamekra-Canela 
of Eastern Timbira, Star-Woman not only donates seeds and teaches 
Amerindians to cultivate plants but she also introduces them to edible 
wild food: before Star-Woman, people ate “rotten wood” (Miller 2015: 
385–90). It is as if the two modes of procurement, which are so starkly 
distinguished by us, were never really separated.
Present-day foragers like the Maku-Nukak (Politis 2009) will culti-
vate some manioc for special occasions, while not letting cultivation hin-
der their mobility. A significant number of former agriculturalists, such 
as the Western Parakanã, the Awá (or Guajá), the Sirionó, the Ache, have 
reverted to foraging (Carneiro da Cunha and Morim de Lima 2017). 
Conversely, some Gê-speaking societies, who were deemed “marginal” in 
the 1950 Handbook of South American Indians for their little agriculture, 
have presently turned into obsessive gardeners. Ramkokamekra-Canela 
9. Sweet manioc is pervasive on the Juruá River (Acre and Amazon states). 
On the Purus River basin, Indigenous people who cultivated sweet manioc 
claim to have only recently learned of toxic manioc and manioc flour from 
itinerant river traders. In Northwestern Amazonia, in contrast, the word 
mandioca refers only to the toxic varieties and sweet manioc is considered 
a wholly different species, sometimes assimilated to a “fruit” and is called 
macaxeira.
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and Krahó are examples of that move (Miller 2015; Morim de Lima 
2016). Trekking periods are enjoyed even among strong agriculturalists.
There is abundant worldwide evidence of cultivated plants as “people” 
requiring special attention and coaxing. Anne-Christine Taylor (2007) 
and Philippe Descola have described Achuar women’s extreme maternal 
dedication to their plants (Descola 1986). Rio Negro women endeavor 
to make their manioc children happy in the gardens by providing to 
them companion species who should play music and comb their hair 
(Emperaire, van Velthem, and Oliveira 2012).10
Kraho people seem to take this cultivars’ independence and demands 
to the next level. Their plants have their own volition and demand special 
attention. If discontent, sweet potato tubers will migrate on their own 
and establish themselves in gardens of more attentive farmers (Morim 
de Lima 2016). Again, this kind of relationship to cultivated plants is 
hardly seen as the dependency on plants implied in domestication. It 
might look like domestication to us, but it doesn’t seem to look like it 
to them. There is no (ideological at least) subduing implied. Marilyn 
Strathern (2017, this volume) gives several New Guinea examples of 
similar personal relations.11
Even as the Amazon is presently recognized as a major center of 
plant “domestication,” it is as if Amazonians would maintain a virtual if 
not actual possibility of escaping being fully domesticated themselves. 
For agriculture and livestock, as I have argued recently, go both ways: 
they fix and tie down the domesticated as much as the domesticator 
(Carneiro da Cunha and Morim de Lima 2017).
Granted, foragers are commonly despised by more sedentary Low-
land societies. The Kaapor and Guajajara agriculturalists in the state of 
10. Stephen Hugh-Jones (this volume) rightly points out that, according to 
context and situation, very similar attitudes are present in people whose 
ontologies are deemed naturalist as against animist. I recall this old Por-
tuguese lady who pitied her cabbages: “my cabbages are sad, poor things.” 
The more general point of whether one can compare everyday attitudes to 
explicit ontologies provides a bitter ongoing debate.
11. “In the eyes of many Papua New Guineans, however, planting does not axi-
omatically ensure that the plant stays there; once in the care of particular 
gardeners, who may or may not pay them sufficient attention, the souls of 
both taro and yam may have reason to wander away. If they have come from 
somewhere else they can go off too, in a kind of reverse movement” (Strath-
ern 2017: 33n11).
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Maranhão looked down on the Guajá before they settled down in vil-
lages.12 Similarly, the Hupda (Maku) are looked down upon by the more 
sedentary Tukanoans.13 And yet Tukanoans themselves enjoy seasonal 
mobility for fishing or foraging. Central Brazil Gê-speaking societies, 
for all their present-day agricultural activity, have not relinquished their 
seasonal trekking expeditions.
Would there be something like a (so to speak) menu available to neo-
tropical Lowlanders offering a gradient ranging from full sedentariza-
tion to an option for mobility? In support of such view, let us stress that 
many mobile societies seem to share regional space with more sedentary 
ones. It is as if their spatial contiguity could be thought of as jointly 
forming a meaningful unit, much in the way as the articulate coexistence 
of Jivaros and their neighbors, as Taylor (2007) once pointed out.
The term domestication and the expression domestication process are 
loosely used based on more or less stringent definitions. Yet many natu-
ral scientists will argue that proper domestication is that state of affairs 
that demands that the very life and reproduction of a species be strictly 
dependent on human care. Hence, the notion is one of absolute subjec-
tion of the domesticated to the domesticator. Volition, demands, and 
even initiatives by plants in Lowland agriculture ideology hardly con-
forms to that definition. What I mean is that Indigenous peoples, for all 
their exploits in what we call domestication of plants, might not think of 
themselves as domesticators.
Swidden, Manioc, and Colonial Concerns
Manioc, also known as cassava among many other names, has several 
virtues: it grows on poor soils, such as Amazonian ferrosols; it can be 
quite precocious (as little as six months to maturity) as well as very long-
lived (up to two years, according to varieties); and it does not require 
storage arrangements, as it remains stored in the field itself. By now, 
manioc or cassava, which is native to the Amazon, has become staple 
food for some eight hundred million people, mainly in Africa.
Manioc is cultivated in tropical countries around the world in a sys-
tem known as swidden. Swidden is “an agricultural system in which fields 
12. Uirá Garcia, personal communication.
13. They are often accused of pilfering in agriculturalist fields. Yet Hupda are 
used as occasional laborers by Tukanoans.
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are cleared by burning and are cropped discontinuously, with periods of 
fallowing which are always longer than periods of cropping” (Fox et al. 
2000). Fallow—that is, regeneration—is an integral part of the system. 
Yet swidden is often defined (for example, in OED) solely by its use of 
fire, obliterating the importance it places on fallow.
Here is a very general and rough model for Indigenous agricultural 
system in the Amazon: every year, at least one new field is cleared for 
planting manioc, corn, squash, pineapples, sweet potatoes, bananas, and 
a wealth of other plants. Primary or secondary vegetation is cut and 
burned and logs are left in place. The plot will still be productive the fol-
lowing year, with varieties that can mature more slowly. However, weeds 
and secondary vegetation are already present, and weeding is a very de-
manding task. By the third year, as soil fertility has declined, weeding 
and cultivation will cease, but not the visits to the plot and the rights 
over it.
In many neotropical societies, there is an elaborate management of 
gardens and fallows initiated even before anything is planted. It starts 
with the opening of a new plot and persists long after the garden’s last 
crop is reaped. Fruit and other useful trees, tolerated or protected when 
clearing will be growing in there, competing for light with fast-growing 
secondary vegetation. Useful trees comprise not only those that bear 
fruits that humans eat but also fruit trees appreciated by game (and 
hence that attract game when fruit is ripe), trees for attracting birds that 
disperse forest seeds (Bahuchet and Betsch 2012), besides a number of 
other plant species used for construction, health, and all kinds of other 
purposes.
William Denevan (1992) suggests that manioc cultivation exploded 
as steel axes became available in colonial times. Stone axes made felling 
trees much more exerting, but we should remember that there were other 
precolonial Indigenous techniques for felling trees, such as cutting out a 
bark ring on a big tree, causing it to die. That tree would be able to take 
down some others when it fell, and thus open up a clearing in the forest.
In any case, the system required opening up at least one new field per 
year, and led (and still leads) to moving from one place to another every 
so many years when gardens become too distant from villages. Other 
factors, which include game depletion, political disputes, and permanent 
schools and health and administration facilities that function as attrac-
tors are taken into consideration when considering moving. But what-
ever other reasons there were, gardens on their own acted as inducers of 
territorial movement.
Antidomestication in the Amazon
179
Colonial settlers in the hinterland were quick to adopt manioc culti-
vation, while urban settlers tried to stick a little longer to a rarefied diet 
of wheat, wine, and olive oil. Jesuits sent queries to Rome asking if com-
munion with manioc host was acceptable.
Settlers who had slaves took swidden cultivation to a much greater 
scale. To this day, mutatis mutanda, the change in scale is a major cause of 
huge deforestation in the region. Yet, at the time, in contrast with what 
happens now, people were not concerned with deforestation. Officials 
were rather concerned with settlers who moved about too much, settlers 
who did not actually settle down, and who did not produce what was 
expected to stand as cultivation—namely, permanent fields leading to 
permanent homes and villages.
A somewhat extreme measure was advocated by a Jesuit priest. Padre 
João Daniel S.J., born in 1722, had first arrived in the Amazon at the age 
of nineteen and had spent some sixteen years in the region. As Jesuits 
were being thrown out of the Portuguese Empire under Prime Minister 
Pombal, Padre João Daniel was incarcerated. While rotting in prison 
where he died nineteen years later, he wrote a remarkable treatise on 
the Amazon, posthumously published under the title Tesouro Descoberto 
no Máximo rio Amazonas, which can be roughly rendered as “A treasure 
unveiled in the greatest River Amazon” (Daniel [1757?–1776] 2004).
The manuscript described all kinds of Amazonian riches and pro-
ceeded to suggest governmental colonial measures. His odd recom-
mendation was that Amazonian colonial settlers should be barred from 
planting manioc and should turn instead to cereals. There were several 
reasons the prisoner expounded for prohibiting manioc. Most impor-
tantly, manioc meant swidden agriculture, itinerant agriculture meant 
itinerant population. Cereals were much more desirable from a colonial 
government point of view since they were supposed to fix people on their 
land.
His recommendation was actually shared by eighteenth-century co-
lonial authorities. The issue of settling the settlers, fixing them to a spe-
cific portion of land, and even better, urbanizing landowners to some 
extent, appears to have been a permanent concern of the eighteenth-
century colonial state.
By then, manioc was popular almost everywhere in what is today’s 
Brazil. A contemporary of imprisoned Padre João Daniel, the fourth 
Morgado de Mateus (Earl of Mateus) was, by contrast, well regarded by 
the all-powerful Prime Minister Pombal of Portugal. For ten years (1765 
to 1775) he governed a large part of Southeast Brazil (the then captaincy 
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of São Paulo) and became known for the many urban settlements he was 
able to create. He issued ordinances requiring landed citizens to build a 
proper house in town and . . . to abstain from cultivating manioc. Again, 
manioc was considered a hindrance for fixing the population and estab-
lishing title to land (Monteiro 2012).
Swidden in High Modern Times
Swidden agriculture still has a bad name, in more than one sense. True, 
its most common earlier designation, “slash and burn,” which is remi-
niscent of the infamous “search and destroy,” is slowly being abandoned. 
Itinerant or shifting agriculture is a more politically correct expression.14
Yet, to this day, discussions still go on about swidden’s good or bad 
effects. In Southeast Asia, there is a lively, ongoing dispute about the 
overall prohibition of the practice, as many traditional peoples are be-
ing pushed into abandoning it in favor of palm oil plantations (Padoch 
and Pinedo-Vasquez 2010; Ribeiro Filho et al. 2013). All kinds of state 
policies, including the separation of forest and agricultural land have 
contributed to the demise of swidden in Southeast Asia (Fox et al. 2009).
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) bears a strong responsibility on that front. The very same year 
it published the remarkable work by Harold Conklin (1957) on Hanu-
noo swidden agriculture, it delivered a scathing indictment of the very 
same practice. They referred to the practice as “the greatest obstacle not 
only to the immediate increase of agricultural production, but also to the 
conservation of the production potential for the future, in the form of 
soils and forests. . . . Not only a backward type of agricultural practice 
. . .[but] also a backward stage of culture in general” (FAO Staff 1957). 
However, Conklin’s study had ended with no suggestions for improve-
ment of the system, for, as the reviewer E. Biasutti Owen stated, no 
14. The NGO Survival International gives a more updated definition and ex-
planation: “Swidden agriculture, also known as shifting cultivation, refers 
to a technique of rotational farming in which land is cleared for cultivation 
(normally by fire) and then left to regenerate after a few years. Govern-
ments worldwide have long sought to eradicate swidden agriculture, which 
is often pejoratively called “slash-and-burn,” due to a mistaken belief that 
it is a driver of deforestation.” https://www.survivalinternational.org/about/
swidden.
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suggestions were in order, since this was a case of a good, stable equilib-
rium. So, which is it?
Almost sixty years later, in 2015, in what looked like a reversal of 
opinion, the FAO, the International Work Group for Indigenous Af-
fairs (IWGIA), and the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) jointly 
published a book defending swidden agriculture in Southeast Asia (Erni 
2015). However, FAO still discreetly refrained from endorsing the views 
of the authors.
Prejudice against swidden endures. Starting in 1994, a long-term 
program that went on at least until 2004 and was led by an international 
agroforestry research organization was suggestively named “Alternatives 
to slash and burn” (Pollini 2009). It was richly endowed on the promise 
to inject a massive dose of hard science and agroforestry technology: one 
of its recommendations was enriching fallows, something that a large 
number of Indigenous peoples already do.
Swidden agriculture is largely practiced in tropical countries around 
the world, with several variations. Tropical poor soils will use as nutrients 
the ashes of the vegetation that was cleared and burned down. While the 
cropping techniques have been extensively described, much less atten-
tion was paid to techniques related to fallow. These were often thought 
to be merely abandoned on account of the excess of invasive weeds. A 
remarkable paper, published online in 2012 and already cited, provides a 
minute description of an Amazonian fallow creation technology by the 
Wayana people on the Maroni River in French Guiana and their sophis-
ticated method for establishing fallows (Bahuchet and Betsch 2012). 
Fallows will eventually result in a biodiverse and high biomass forest. 
Swidden is not only a cultivation system in the forest, it is as well and very 
importantly a procedure for high forest regeneration. “Swidden cultivation is 
an old paradigm built around the temporary removal of trees but not of 
the forest” (Fox et al. 2000).15
William Balée (1993, 1994, 2013) has published very interesting re-
sults on the importance of biodiversity that can be found on mature 
fallows. Further, by now archaeologists and botanists are claiming that a 
significant part of the Amazon is anthropogenic, based on the presence 
of plant species that indicate secondary forest and on the large distribu-
tion of ADEs, Anthropogenic Dark Earths (for example, Levis et al. 
15. As neotropical agriculture cannot be thought in isolation from forest pro-
duction, many researchers prefer to call such systems agroforestry rather 
than simply agriculture.
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2017). ADEs are highly fertile soils, produced by anthropic remains, in-
cluding food remains and pyrogenic carbon four thousand to ten thou-
sand years old. They are often considered a model for the development of 
modern soil fertility in the tropics. Some ADEs may be quite extensive 
and their presence supports the claim for high density archaeological 
agricultural populations in the Amazon.16
Do Ontologies Account for People Seeing the Trees while Not Seeing 
the Forest?
Shifting cultivation under every other name is still outcast as promoting 
destruction of forests and land degradation. People see (felling of ) trees 
yet they do not seem to see (the regeneration of ) forests.
Among Amazonian Indigenous peoples, humans’ rights in the for-
est certainly do not follow Locke’s theory of dominion. Everything has 
its own “master” or “mother” (Fausto 2008). Wayãpi people, to take an 
example, consider that the human domain is restricted to the clearings 
and plots they cultivate, which by definition are transient (Gallois 1986). 
Everything else has its own masters. Wild pigs or tapirs are obtained 
as prey only through shamanic transactions with their specific masters. 
Moreover, everywhere in Amazonia (and newcomers such as rubber-
tappers learned to behave in the same manner), game carcass and re-
mains are to be treated with “respect” and should not be disposed of 
carelessly (Almeida 2013). In the Amazon, forest-dwellers are supposed 
to follow all kinds of rules and prohibitions that curtail use of resourc-
es. As noted earlier, even cultivated plants have their own volition and 
require to be pampered (Emperaire, van Velthem, and Oliveira 2012; 
Morim de Lima 2016). There is no Lockean talk about “subduing and 
cultivating the earth.”
Locke went on:
Sec. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of 
the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that 
which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, that 
property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man 
16. Very similar systems using fire and resulting in enhanced soil fertility and 
centered around maize cultivation are reported for the Maya forest milpa 
tradition (Nigh 2008).
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tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much 
is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the 
common. (Locke 1960: chap. 5, sec. 32)
Again, this does not apply in Indigenous Amazonia. Surely, people 
have a number of rights over their crops, their fields, and their fallows, 
but these do not extend to rights of property over the land itself.17
What seems to have occurred? What kind of science in the forest 
were and are some Lowland Indigenous people still practicing?
Descola has argued that Amazonians never domesticated wild pigs 
because wild pigs, as every other animal and realm of nature, had their 
own masters (Descola 1994). I think the argument can be extended: it 
looks like Amazonian humans did not give preeminence to their own 
interests, making it the “primary organizing principle” of the forest. In 
that sense, their aim was not to colonize the forest.
Domestication is first and foremost a mode of inhabiting the world by 
occupying it. Occupation here is meant in the settler-colonial sense. 
Indeed, from an inter-species perspective, every human occupation is 
an act of settler colonialism since one occupies a space that is always 
already occupied by other domesticators, whether insects, animals, 
plants or trees. Each of these inhabits the world with some degree 
of instrumentalization too: a tree spreads itself above and below the 
ground in its struggle to extract nutrition, sun, and so on. Ants also 
organize and transform their surroundings in a specific way. What 
defines human generalized domestication is the act of occupying a 
space by declaring one’s own interest as its primary organizing principle. 
As such it relates to prior occupiers of the same space according to 
how their being can be harnessed to the advancement of our own 
being. What comes in the way is excluded or exterminated. (Hage 
2017: 94-95; emphasis added)
Charles Clement describes landscape domestication by Amerindi-
ans as making it “more productive and congenial to humans” (Clement 
1999: 190). What about every other sentient being? Lowland Indig-
enous peoples, with their theory of generalized cultivation, assume that 
17. Groves and immature crops are usually not left behind by a departing 
dweller without bestowing them to someone else, either to keep or to look 
after. Most of the times, all that is required to access an area on which some 
other family enjoys rights is to ask its permission.
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such sentient beings too are organizing the land in order to make it more 
productive and congenial to themselves. What makes Amerindian ways 
different from human domestication in Ghassan Hage’s sense is that 
Amerindians refrain from making their organization of the land into 
the “primary organizing principle” of the forest. In short, one could say 
that they do not submit the forest to human generalized domestication.18 
They no doubt made the forest more favorable to human life but did not 
colonize the forest.
Swidden and Antidomestication as a Science of the Forest
As Balée has first pointed out, Lowland Indigenous societies who strict-
ly resort to foraging are dependent on the preexistence of anthropogenic 
forests (Balée 1989). For the wandering Huaorani, those enriched forests 
are assumed to be the footprints of their own forebears (Rival 2002). It 
looks as if to be able to lead a totally foraging mode of life, one is best 
served by previously enriched forests and/or agriculturalist neighbors for 
resources.
Could it be that the management and enrichment of fallows in swid-
den agriculture are among the main mechanisms that allow for the very 
possibility of foraging societies?19 For most hunting and foraging socie-
ties in the Lowlands (if not every hunting an foraging society), there 
seems to be a move out of a previous agriculturalist way of life, as Lévi-
Strauss early suggested (Lévi-Strauss 1952). Such is the case for the 
Western Parakanã (Fausto 2001), the Hi-Merimã (Shiratori 2018), 
among many other known examples. Rather than being an involution or 
necessarily the outcome of disaster, foraging would be maintained as a 
possibility by the very management practices of Indigenous agricultural-
ists. It would be as if their kind of agriculture—opening forest plots for 
18. Saying this is starkly different from the still-lingering tropes about Indig-
enous peoples “living in harmony with Nature.” For one thing, the very 
concept of Nature as we know it is foreign to Amazonians.
19. Among other important techniques: archaeology as well as forest-dwellers 
are familiar with “ïndian bread” (pão de índio) an elaborate product of wild 
plants preserved in the forest for food in wandering moments or trekking 
expeditions (Shiratori 2018: 140n49).
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gardens and enriching fallows—would account for being able to aban-
don agriculture itself.20
What comes out of the peculiarities of neotropical swidden agricul-
ture is that it resists so-called progress—namely, that irreversible “evolu-
tion,” assumed by theorists to be universal, from foraging to domesticat-
ed life. Indigenous societies seem to have conceived of a forest that they 
inhabit with nonexclusive rights. As do those other species that dwell in 
the same forest, they try to favor their own interests. It looks like their 
aim is to be able, given different historical circumstances or mere choice, 
to turn to a foraging existence.21 At times, they enjoy trekking through 
the forest in small family groups, at others, living in their villages and 
tending their gardens. They retain the possibility of reverting ad libitum 
to different forms of life, to the pleasure of fishing, hunting, and eating 
wild fruit as well as to the enthusiasm of participating in beautiful crowd 
village rituals. As much as former wanderers can become enthusiastic 
gardeners, agriculturalists seem to be able to morph into foragers. Their 
science, as much as their messy gardens that mimic the forest, contra-
dicts what we thought we knew about agriculture: that once one has it, 
there is no turning back; that progress is domestication of plants, ani-
mals, landscapes, and as a result, humans themselves.
There is another lesson here. Sharing rights over the land with other 
sentient beings; avoiding hegemony of human interests for exploiting 
the territory; abiding to a wealth of rules and restrictions; refusing to be 
wholly domesticated could well be the recipe for a good life in a lively 
forest.
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chapter nine
Objective Functions: (In)Humanity and Inequity 
in Artificial Intelligence
Alan F. Blackwell
This essay offers observations and reflections from within a rather dis-
tinctive scientific culture—that of the artificial intelligence (AI) engineer. 
The AI engineer is a figure who appears mundane in person (a geek at 
a computer keyboard) while apparently also harboring the kind of dark 
creative imagination through which scientist-inventors such as Rotwang 
in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, Nathan in Alex Garland’s Ex Machina, or Dr. 
Gall in Karel Čapek’s R.U.R. habitually endow machines with souls, and 
tempt men to fall in love with their sexy robots. AI engineering is a field 
that is both dull and fascinating.
I come to this project as the mundane kind of AI engineer, having 
little contact with robots, whose perspective is distinctive primarily as 
that of a technologist. The perspective of a professional engineer stands 
in contrast to many philosophers and critics, for whom technology gen-
erally appears as a found object, a given, an object of critique. For many 
commentators on AI, technology is something that happens to them, 
not something that they do. For engineers, of course, the world seems 
different. Technologies are things that we made and that we are still in 
the process of making. As technologists, we engineers possess a technê, 
a practice. To the extent that AI engineers also engage in reflection on 
their own work, a fervent rallying call is for them to exercise a critical 
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technical practice (Agre 1997), in which their technology research is not 
purely making but questioning, informed by the epistemological and 
ethical questions that often pervade such work.
Despite such advocacy, engineers are not generally commenta-
tors. They are ontologically interventionist, bringing into existence real 
things, whether new computers, information systems, or the knowledge 
economy. Yet this work means that engineers must also live as prospec-
tive inhabitants of the future that they intend to bring about. Like any of 
us, engineers will inhabit this future when it arrives. But engineers also 
live in the future right now, as their work necessarily proceeds through 
the exercise of imagination to bring into existence novel artifacts.
One might ask whether exercise of the imagination should be con-
sidered a kind of science. British academics are accustomed to speaking 
of STEM—science, technology, engineering and mathematics—as rep-
resenting one of the “Two Cultures” that C. P. Snow observed in public 
life (Snow [1959] 2012). Within this putative shared culture of science-
and-technology, scientists easily think of themselves as technologists, 
and engineers think of themselves as scientists. If they pursue a common 
enterprise, it is the use of measurement and mathematical calculation 
to construct objective bodies of knowledge—positivist proofs and dis-
coveries whose future legacy is not simply the transient and contingent 
practical products of the engineer, but universal and immutable laws of 
science.
Despite this shared aspiration, engineering is not a natural science. 
AI engineers do not study natural phenomena, but only what we make 
ourselves—as named by Herbert Simon, this is a “science of the artificial” 
(Simon 1996). In reflecting on the scientific practices of AI engineers 
such as myself, I am concerned with the nature of knowledge, with the 
ways that engineering researchers represent reality, and with the differing 
ways that words are used to reflect states of affairs as perceived by dif-
ferent academic communities. Even more centrally, I am concerned with 
what engineers achieve through making descriptions—with knowledge 
as a sociotechnical process rather than a private cognitive achievement.
Like all computer science, AI offers an especially intriguing prospect, 
because of the ways that knowledge itself (as information and data) be-
comes a mathematical object subject to mechanical manipulation. De-
spite the fact that computer scientists prefer to align themselves with 
the positivist traditions of STEM, through representational strategies in 
which binary 1s and 0s correspond to truth and falsity, much computer 
science research might be better characterized as a kind of mechanical 
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sophistry, in which only the processing of information matters, and not 
any sense in which that information corresponds to the world outside 
the computer. As a subfield within the artificial science of computing, 
the epistemological and ontological status of AI deserves close attention.
The Relationality and Subjectivity of AI
To summarize the case I will be making in this essay, I will be focus-
ing on the ways in which operational definitions of AI must always be 
constructed in relation to humans. The most famous operationalization 
of AI, the “Turing Test,” draws attention to the potential and/or desire 
for intersubjectivity in relations between a person and a machine (Col-
lins 2018). An AI that passes the Turing Test will have demonstrated 
a degree of intersubjectivity. But in order to be a scientific accomplish-
ment, this subjectivity must be objectively measurable. My argument ex-
plores the resulting relationship between objectivity and subjectivity, and 
the distribution of agency or obligation that might be implicit in that 
relationship.
It is also useful to keep in mind the fact that, as I have explained, AI 
as an engineering discipline is largely an exercise of the imagination. 
Particular qualities of desire may be acquired in the imaginary domain. 
As noted in the introduction, the artificial construction of simulated hu-
mans in fiction seems often to become powerfully gendered, perhaps al-
luding to the gendered nature of all human procreation. The figure of the 
AI engineer building sexy robots and falling in love with them has many 
fictional precursors, including that of Pygmalion. Indeed the Turing Test 
itself was first posed as an Imitation Game in which the challenge as-
signed was not for a computer to imitate a man but for a man to imitate 
a woman.
These transgressive imaginary relationships through which engineers 
fall in love with their own gendered creations are often accompanied by 
guilt and moral retribution. In science fictions the sexy robot, having 
gained the status of a subjective agent, often becomes an agent of punish-
ment. The transgression of the engineer is one of hubris, whether exhibit-
ed as a travesty of naturally gendered procreation or usurpation of a divine 
creator that bestows soul on matter. When engineers aspire to the divine, 
the imagined potential retribution becomes increasingly apocalyptic and 
eschatological, including the emergence of the superintelligent AI Sin-
gularity originally posited by science fiction author Vernor Vinge (1993).
Science in the Forest, Science in the Past
194
If the Turing Test is interpreted as a competition, then in total victory 
the winner will not only have achieved the goal of imitating a human but 
will surpass it, building a machine that becomes more than human. The 
imagined goal, as for Pygmalion, Frankenstein, Geppetto, and all their 
fictional successors, is to create an artificial being that achieves some 
kind of intersubjective agency, whether exhibited as a conscience, soul, 
or erotic love. But what could it mean for a machine to be more human 
than the Turing Test—not only demonstrating intersubjectivity but be-
ing more subjective? We understand that machines are often stronger, 
faster, and more durable than human bodies, and this does not cause 
us to fear retribution for our hubris. Similarly, we are comfortable with 
digital computers that calculate, measure, remember, and react more ef-
ficiently and effectively than we do.
If the attributes of subjectivity are to be the measure of success for 
AI research, how could the competitive scientific achievement be objec-
tively recorded, verified, and replicated? It is necessary to find a domain 
in which human subjectivity is quantified—and board games such as 
chess and Go are repeatedly identified as an ideal research domain that 
is both competitive and quantified. If board games are taken to represent 
a measurable outcome of human subjectivity, then scores beyond those 
attained by any human represent a kind of supersubjectivity, a source 
of anxiety constantly reported in newspaper headlines following dem-
onstrations such as the victory of computer player AlphaGo over the 
(human) world champion: “Stunning AI breakthrough takes us one step 
closer to the singularity” (Dvorsky 2017) or “How the demon plays Go: 
AI advances that will render us obsolete” (Ahuja 2017).
Here, the transgressive imagination of the AI engineer is seen to 
result in dangerous new kinds of subjectivity, objectively measured as 
beyond human capacities, to an extent of superhuman performance re-
sulting in domination and subjection, through which the Singularity be-
comes the ultimate sexy robot that betrays us all. Others have suggested 
that sex and subjectivity may be even further entangled, and that the 
enterprise of AI itself is fundamentally gendered (Adam 1998). Leaving 
that question for now, I return to the question of subjectivity.
Quantifying Intelligence with an Objective Function
This essay has until now presumed that the AI system is indeed, as 
claimed by its developers and press commentators, behaving in ways that 
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emulate human performance. According to this perspective, the numeri-
cal outcome of the Go game (the player who has surrounded the largest 
number of board positions within their territory) is an incidental quanti-
fication used to measure the degree of human-like performance that has 
been achieved. Yet for many AI systems, and arguably for AlphaGo also, 
this measure is not incidental. In fact, the performance of game-playing 
systems depends fundamentally on the definition of some measure that 
the system will be programmed to (or will “learn” to) optimize.
Modern “machine learning” methods are techniques for generating 
simple choices in the presence of complex data. A common requirement 
is simply to predict a single numerical output value, using a much larger 
amount of stored input data. A typical challenge might be to predict 
tomorrow’s stock price, based on a great deal of potentially relevant in-
formation (today’s price, past prices, the weather, articles in the finan-
cial press, company accounts, political announcements, Twitter messages 
from the company’s customers, and so on). The input information might 
be enormously complex, but the output appears very simple—just one 
number (the price) or even a one-bit binary decision (buy/sell). We must 
note, as a point of caution, that many demonstrations of such systems are 
simply tested against historical data, which we might describe as retrod-
iction—as Woody Allen observed, prediction is difficult, especially when 
it applies to the future.
If the software can further predict how a number might change in 
response to its own alternative actions, then it will be able to choose the 
action most likely to result in the number that will make it appear intel-
ligent (in the case of a board game, this would be a final score in which 
the automated player has won the game). Predictive models of this kind 
can be tested and refined within the software by playing huge numbers 
of games against itself—automatically running through many alterna-
tives—to learn as much as possible about the relationship between dif-
ferent actions and their possible numerical outcomes.
The numerical function that measures and thus defines the desired 
outcome for an AI system is effectively a master specification, determin-
ing the goals and objectives that the system will have, and according to 
which it will choose its actions. Technically, this is described as an objec-
tive function, and as indicated in the title of this essay, understanding the 
nature of the objective function is critical to understanding many AI sys-
tems. As apparent from the title, the phrase objective function can be read 
in two ways: either specifying a goal (the correct technical meaning), 
or making an objective judgment in an otherwise subjective situation 
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(which would be a claim deserving careful epistemological scrutiny). As 
noted by Philip Agre (1997), this is not the only word (or phrase) asso-
ciated with AI research that has a double meaning. There are a number 
of other technical terms, directly related to the objective function, worth 
exploring further.
Statistical Machine Learning: Two Kinds of Regression
The process of predicting a single number, based on patterns that have 
been learned from previous data, is described generically as a “regression” 
task.1 The statistical regression techniques used in machine learning, as 
with much of modern statistics, originate in the mathematical study of 
heredity associated with eugenics. Francis Galton (1886) first formulated 
the principle of “regression towards mediocrity” as the observation that the 
children of exceptional parents are less likely to be exceptional themselves.
“Regression” continues to be a core principle of machine learning. The 
machine observes a series of data points, whether stock market prices, 
gene sequences, or board-game moves. Individual points might fit no 
obvious pattern, but over time, some kind of trend can be found, as the 
regression function tends back to an underlying average. This is only 
slightly oversimplified. If many kinds of data must be observed, the trend 
relating them becomes much harder to visualize because the lines must 
be drawn in a multidimensional space (one dimension for every variable). 
Nevertheless, the principle remains the same—that the “machine learn-
ing” system predicts some quantity on the basis that it is the most medio-
cre explanation after all exceptions to the pattern have been discounted.
The second kind of regression is “logistic regression,” in which the 
machine learns to predict a categorical observation (yes/no, buy/sell, or 
animal/vegetable/mineral) rather than a numerical one. Once again, the 
term first appeared in the eugenics literature, being used to predict the 
likelihood over time that a parent will have a genetically defective child 
(Haldane and Smith 1947). The word logistic is slightly problematic. As 
used by statisticians, the “logistic function” is a logarithmic population 
curve, originally described by Belgian Pierre François Verhulst (1845) as 
a fonction logistique. While it seems that modern French uses this word 
logistique mainly in the sense of freight transportation logistics, Verhulst 
was referring to Napier’s logarithms.
1. Or perhaps retrodicting.
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Logarithm itself is an odd word, coined by Napier to describe his 
method of manipulating ratios. It seems that Napier himself did not 
explain his coinage, and the Oxford English Dictionary suggests alter-
native derivations related to arithmetic (ars metrica, the art of metrica-
tion), and also to logos. Logistic might previously have described the ratio 
between two numbers, a rational process, or a rhetorical argument, in 
addition to its potential use as a mathematical term. So in modern usage, 
we might consider a logistic function that offers a logical approach to 
the logistics of formal logic. It may be derived from Napier’s exploration 
of ratio, associated with rationalizing, rationality, and rational (ratio-nal) 
numbers. In the mathematical foundations of computer science, termi-
nology seems constantly to drift between associations of quantification 
and of linguistic argumentation.
Whether or not the behavior to be achieved falls within the general 
categories of linear or logistic regression, the epistemology underlying 
exciting new AI developments, such as “deep learning,” often addresses 
issues that would be familiar from school mathematics. Every school 
student is taught to reduce “big data” to a single quantity by calculating 
the average (“mediocre”), to estimate the trend line through a sequence 
of varying observations (“linear regression”), or assess whether a re-
peatedly tossed coin is fair or not (“logistic regression”). These simple 
intuitions start to falter only where there are many dimensions of data. 
In many dimensions, there are many possible ways to draw a line be-
tween points, or to construct a boundary dividing the set of fair coins 
from that of loaded ones. Many possible lines or boundaries must be 
assessed, in order to see which is the best of the many objective out-
comes, even though each is simple in itself. The process of assessment 
involves searching through the many alternatives, turning this way and 
that as each possible explanation seems marginally more likely than 
the last.
This search process represents a theory of knowledge, in which a va-
riety of possible explanations (“models”) are tested against huge amounts 
of data to see which of them fits it best. The quality of the fit is the central 
epistemological feature in this theory of knowledge. Fit quality must be 
expressed numerically, in order that one possibility can be tested against 
another in an optimization equation. This equation too can be described 
as an objective function—apparently more complex than the simple win/
lose outcome of a game of chess or Go, but equally valuable in allowing 
brute force repeated evaluation of the function, through many reviewed 
and simulated games, to find the best fit.
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Ultimately, the procedure of “logistic” regression, as guided by an 
“objective” function, is not at all the objective and logical foundation of 
knowledge that these words might seem to imply. As I have shown, the 
terminology of machine learning has developed via engineering applica-
tions from the mathematics of eugenics, and has only minimal relevance 
to the philosophical questions that theorists of artificial intelligence hope 
to address. It is not that mathematicians misunderstand the words they 
use. If pressed, any expert in the field would explain that the technical 
term objective should not be taken to mean “objectivity” in any sense, and 
that logistic certainly does not imply “logical.” Unfortunately, such careful 
clarifications are seldom necessary among mathematicians themselves. 
Many computer scientists are poorly trained in basic principles of episte-
mology, while many philosophers are poorly trained in basic principles of 
engineering, meaning that they happily talk at cross-purposes with the 
aid of ambiguous terminology that neither properly understands.
Oracles and Ground Truth
At this point, we can look more closely at how the objective function 
is applied. Recall that the purpose of a statistical machine learning sys-
tem is to find a model that best predicts or categorizes possibly simple 
regularities within a large amount of varying data. In order to compare 
possible alternative models, the objective function may act as an “oracle” 
(another technical term) judging which is the better. As with all predic-
tion, this is far more easily done if we already know the answer.
This is precisely how AI systems are trained—by showing them past 
cases in which we do know the answer, so that the objective function 
may compare each possible model to this “ground truth” (the technical 
term for this comparison process is supervised learning). Where might 
ground truth come from, in these supervised machine learning systems? 
The surprisingly mundane answer is often that thousands of people have 
been paid pennies to help the AI understand how to measure truth by 
providing labels for large data sets of training examples. These workers 
are likely to be recruited via “crowdsourcing” systems such as Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk—a surprisingly direct reference to an earlier mechani-
cal intelligence hoax. In this case, the “objective function” is no more or 
less than a comparison of the trained model to previous answers given 
by the Turkers (as the workers are called). If the artificially intelligent 
computer appears to have duplicated human performance, in the terms 
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anticipated by the Turing Test, the reason for this achievement is quite 
plain: the performance appears human because it is human!
The identity of the Turkers is kept secret, and this is the whole point 
(Irani and Silberman 2013). The researchers and entrepreneurs who col-
lect the big data, store and process it in server farms, and replay the 
“ground truth” of human interpretation have no desire to attribute their 
artificially intelligent creations to low-paid digital pieceworkers. The iro-
ny of this situation is that the behavior of the “objective function” appears 
impressively intelligent only to the extent that it replays human subjective 
judgments. The artificial intelligence industry is a subjectivity factory, 
appropriating human judgments, replaying them through machines, and 
then claiming epistemological authority by calling it logically “objective” 
through a double reading of historically ambiguous mathematical terms.
Logistic Regression and Objective Categorization
Logistic regression seems appealing in situations where machine judg-
ment is necessary for the purposes of “objective” classification. A typical 
ambition for an AI system commissioned by a government agency might 
be to ask the question “Is this person a criminal?” where this question 
should be answered objectively either yes or no. If we have informa-
tion about all persons known to be convicted criminals—such as their 
bank balance, educational history, shoe size, head circumference, length 
of nose, color of skin, and so on—and corresponding information about 
people who are not criminals, then we might train a logistic regression 
system to tell us whether a given person on the street is, or is not, likely 
to be a criminal.
Some of these pieces of information (noses, skin, etc.) may be more or 
less useful in predicting which people are criminals or not, but this is not 
a problem if we have plenty of cheap computer memory. We can store all 
of this “big data” information—ideally, as much as possible—and leave 
the optimization search algorithm to find which of it is useful and how 
it should be weighted. More of a problem is the ground truth on which 
the objective function is based. Are we confident that the ground truth, 
whether based on convictions or prison sentences, is wholly reliable? It 
is disappointingly easy to introduce circular reasoning when large data 
sets have been collected just in case they might be useful. Imagine if an 
arrest record were taken as part of the ground truth. It might easily be 
the case that being arrested is associated with having dark skin, in which 
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case the objective function leads to the conclusion that a person with 
dark skin should be arrested. The old adage that correlation does not 
imply causation applies just as surely to the correlations underlying AI 
systems. Embedding the correlation in an “objective function” makes its 
causal interpretation no more objective!
Unfortunately, the AI methods used in police and security work, al-
though apparently being deployed rapidly, are seldom described or de-
bated in the research literature (Bennett Moses and Chan 2016), so it 
is hard to assess the degree of caution currently being exercised in their 
application around the world. Rather than such potentially controversial 
applications, published research into AI classification tends to involve 
relatively innocuous logistic regression tasks. Is this a photograph of a 
horse? Is it a cat? Is it a fish? A deep learning system considers huge 
numbers of features within an image that might represent fur or water, 
or anything else, and then correlates these features with previous images 
that it “knows” (from the ground truth label assigned by a crowd sourc-
ing worker, hard-working graduate student, or Facebook user adding 
labels to their vacation photographs) to belong to the relevant category.
Distinguishing photographs of fish from photographs of horses may 
be innocuous, but neither is it particularly impressive. Research subfields 
of artificial intelligence rely on classifications that are not too offensive, 
while still being sufficiently interpretive that the results do not seem 
trivial. One such is “affective computing,” in which images of human 
faces are classified according to whether they seem happy or sad. This can 
be challenging when the crowdsource workers are not certain whether a 
given person appears happy or sad. This brings the problem that ground 
truth may be unreliable, unless collected from an actor who has been 
instructed to portray an unambiguous emotion. Indeed, many people 
being photographed (if not actors) find it difficult to tell us whether 
they themselves are feeling happy or sad, in which case it is necessary to 
find an objective alternative—researchers therefore consider alternative 
measures, such as the amount of serotonin in a blood sample, or func-
tional imaging scans that can tell us if our body or brain is happy, whether 
we know it or not. These cases draw attention to the problems that are 
inherent, when we must find an objective measure, with corresponding 
ground truth, for subjective phenomena.
The need to find an appropriate objective function and ground truth 
labels is a challenge for AI research, not only in relation to the nature of 
subjectivity but also in relation to socially normative consensus. For ex-
ample, it is not unusual for AI researchers to train classifiers, using logistic 
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regression, to determine whether a person being photographed is male or 
female. The training set consists of photographs that have been labeled as 
either male or female by crowdsourcing workers. I met a researcher who 
was pleased with results that achieved a high degree of “accuracy” (which 
is to say, consistency with those prior labels), and who suggested that 
such systems would be valuable as an independent assessment of gender. 
That conversation took place at a time when academic claims regarding 
gender identity were highly controversial (e.g., Morris 2015). Yet to the 
AI researcher, having little interest or knowledge of contemporary gen-
der identity issues, the engineering problem seemed to involve straight-
forward binary classification. Indeed, he was not concerned about such 
subjective problems, because he believed that the objective “ground truth” 
of gender could, if necessary, be determined from the body.
Objective Functions and Text
The discussion of statistical machine learning so far has attempted to 
demystify the prediction of stock markets, and “recognition” of photo-
graphic images, emotions, boys and girls, criminals, and so on. Many 
other headline examples celebrating the achievements of AI are similarly 
straightforward, in which the objective function must simply replicate 
a simplified “consensus,” replaying the subjective judgments of the re-
searchers or crowdsource workers. Board games such as chess or Go are 
even more specifically designed to be free from interpretive ambiguity, 
with formally defined rules ensuring that there will be a clearly defined 
objective function. So although humans may find some of these tasks 
difficult because of the large volumes of decisions to be made or consen-
sus labels to be collected, they are all quite clearly mechanical, and thus 
easily amenable to mathematical description.
However, some of the greatest challenges and apparent achievements 
for artificial intelligence are related to the processing of text, rather than 
numbers. How can an objective function be achieved when constructing 
a text?
Consider the following snippets of conversation between a human on 
one side, and an advanced artificial intelligence on the other:
Human question: Why does Juliet die?
 Computer answer: Juliet sees Romeo dead beside her, and sur-
mises from the empty vial that he has drunk poison.
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Human question: Tell me what Donald Trump will do next?
 Computer answer: Donald Trump looks set to be a controversial 
and unpredictable president after an inflammatory election campaign.
These exchanges would be quite unremarkable between two humans. 
But between a human and a computer, they do seem surprising and im-
pressive. This conversation certainly seems to pass the Turing Test. How-
ever, the exchanges above did not surprise me at the time . . . because this 
is the transcription of an actual “conversation” in which I was the human 
and the computer application was simply my web browser, which for-
warded the questions I had typed to Google. The “answers” that I report 
above are quoted from the text that was returned in my browser window 
by the Google search engine.
When viewed in this light, the conversation above is hardly impres-
sive at all. Perhaps fifty years ago these exchanges might have seemed 
magical, evidence that AI had been achieved in the terms proposed by 
the Turing Test. Today, they are so far from magical as to induce a yawn. 
This is not intelligence, it is simply another Google search—an everyday 
transaction. Yet the mechanisms by which this once-intelligent, now-
mundane interaction have been achieved are the same kinds of statistical 
process already described. Google algorithms work by calculating sta-
tistical correspondences between the words that I type and web pages 
that might provide pertinent information. The sentence that is returned 
appears to have been written by a human, because indeed it has been 
written by a human: the author of another web page.
I should note, in passing, that the things I actually saw on my com-
puter screen during this exchange contained many clues that would alert 
an observer from fifty years ago to the relative absence of intelligence. 
The answers as reported in my transcript above appear intelligent as I 
quoted them, because of the fact that I transcribed with a degree of 
interpretation—for example, I had to ignore the Google logo that ap-
peared at the top of the screen; I had to know where to type; I needed 
judiciously to ignore the text of an advertisement that was “clearly” (to 
me) not relevant to my question; and so on. I am able to make all of 
these interpretive judgments routinely and unconsciously, precisely be-
cause Google searches are so familiar to me. For the 1970 observer, my 
own interpretation and transcription of the text appearing on my screen 
might seem as foreign (or even more foreign) than the responses provid-
ed by the search engine. This fundamental property of interaction with 
machines is described by Harry Collins and Martin Kusch (1999) as 
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Repair, Attribution, and all That (RAT)—human users constantly “repair” 
the inadequacy of computer behavior, then attribute the results to intel-
ligence on the part of the machine, while discounting the actual intel-
ligence that was supplied in the process of repair.
So to return to the transcribed “conversation” above, now that we 
know the “answers” are simply text copied from a Google search result, 
it is quite obvious that the original texts were written by human au-
thors. For the first question in my transcription, we may surmise that 
the words appearing in the search result were written by the author of 
a school study guide. For the second question, the words seem to have 
been written by a professional journalist or political commentator. If an 
employee of Google were to pretend that he or she was the actual author 
of these words, then this pretense would be (morally) plagiarism and 
(commercially) an infringement of copyright. On the other hand, if we 
pretend that the Google algorithm was the author, as I did initially when 
presenting the example, then would this algorithmic “artificial intelli-
gence” be equally guilty of plagiarism or copyright infringement? Can an 
algorithm be guilty of anything? It is not morally culpable, and cannot be 
tried in a court of law, despite the fact that using the term artificial intel-
ligence as a noun phrase seems to imply some kind of legal personhood.
In the case of the relatively simple and honest behavior of the Google 
search engine, the question does not arise. Google is quite clear in stating 
(and ample legal precedent has confirmed) that it is simply providing an 
indexing service, not claiming to be the author of the content it delivers. 
(This despite the fact that the text I quote above was copied directly from 
the Google search results page, never visiting the sites created by the 
actual authors, with the consequence that the index has to some extent 
become the text through my reading of it).2
2. Jonathan Swift famously explained the profit that may be obtained from 
indexes like Google as follows: 
   We of this age have discovered a shorter, and more prudent method, to 
become scholars and wits, without the fatigue of reading or of thinking. 
The most accomplished way of using books at present is two-fold: ei-
ther first, to serve them as some men do lords, learn their titles exactly, 
and then brag of their acquaintance. Or secondly, which is indeed the 
choicer, the profounder, and politer method, to get a thorough insight 
into the index, by which the whole book is governed and turned, like 
fishes by the tail. . . . Thus physicians discover the state of the whole 
body, by consulting only what comes from behind.” Swift (1704, §VII: 
A digression in praise of digressions)
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The situation is more complex when an algorithm “mashes up” text 
that was written by multiple authors rather than a single identifiable 
person. It is quite routine to create algorithms that generate text, on the 
basis that after a short sequence of words, it is statistically straightfor-
ward to predict the next word. This behavior is seen every day, in our 
search bars and web browsers. If I type “How may I . . . ,” Google help-
fully offers to complete my sentence: “How may I assist you,” on the ba-
sis of statistical likelihood. Presumably some actual person (more likely 
many) has previously typed these words so that Google may respond 
with this “intelligent” assistance. It would be silly to suggest that Google 
has infringed their individual copyrights, or plagiarized the work of a 
multitude, who themselves have only repeated a cliché.
On the other hand, if I type “It is a tr. . . ,” Google immediately offers 
“It is a truth universally acknowledged.” We know that Jane Austen is 
the author of this phrase, but this is not attributed or acknowledged. Un-
doubtedly, many people have typed these words since Austen did, but it 
is Google that offers them to me, with no mention of the original author. 
It might be suggested that Google is providing me with an “intelligent” 
plagiarist, to be defended on the convenient mathematical principle that 
we have only engaged in a statistical transaction, with no intention that 
the result should be passed off as the work of a creative novelist.
Summary
We are often told that in an imminent era of automated “general in-
telligence,” computers will acquire creative capabilities, acting on their 
own initiative, and perhaps even presenting a threat to the future of the 
human race, as they decide autonomously to act in their own interests 
rather than ours. Yet this essay has argued that the “intelligent” behavior 
of machines is no more than human behavior reflected back to us. The 
ground of mutual intelligibility, between the artificially intelligent ontol-
ogies of the machine world and our embodied experience of the human 
one, may not be as hard to discover as one would suppose.
On the contrary, one might argue that a computer using “deep learn-
ing” techniques to produce text or music is no more displaying intel-
ligence than a television is interpreting Beethoven during a broadcast 
from the Albert Hall. The human orchestra still exists—it is simply 
playing elsewhere. The machine is simply a transmission and filtering 
medium, not an interpreter. It might take us time to recover from the 
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surprising form of new technologies, and to recognize the ways in which 
they yet again reconfigure social relations. Nevertheless, this is all that 
is happening in AI. The objective ground truth can usually be traced to 
subjective judgments, made by a person or persons who are more or less 
hidden from view, and more or less rewarded for their contribution to 
the commercial or scientific achievements of AI.
I introduced this essay with the suggestion that interlocking ques-
tions of (a) translatability/mutual intelligibility and (b) ontology/reality 
might be explored, in relation to the phenomena of “big data,” “machine 
learning,” and “artificial intelligence.” If we are going to consider artifi-
cial intelligence as a matter of philosophical interest, then we must pay 
more attention to the actual algorithmic basis through which reality is 
represented, ontologies are constructed, and human observers interpret 
the interactions that they experience with complex systems (Blackwell 
2015).
I have also discussed the way that words pass among disciplines, ac-
quiring new connotations that may represent wishful thinking on the 
part of researchers, and overexcitement among critics, rather than rigor-
ous analysis. The “objective function” is perhaps the most problematic 
case, sliding from a purely mathematical optimization principle to an 
anachronistically positivist interpretation of statistical machine learning. 
Common narratives of general artificial intelligence, derived more from 
science fiction than from cognitive science, all too often serve to obscure 
the real people whose work is hidden from view, in favor of celebrating 
the companies whose profits are derived from that work.
It is interesting to note how many such companies choose to describe 
their software creations as though the software is itself a person (Wat-
son, Alexa, Siri). Are companies doing this purely as a marketing device, 
or is there some other advantage in arguing that artificial persons are 
being created? Press coverage of self-driving cars pays constant attention 
to the supposed importance of ethical decisions that would have to be 
taken by such person-cars—for example, resolving the moral dilemma 
of whether to drive into various numbers of babies or of pensioners af-
ter the brakes have failed. But if software services, or vehicles, truly did 
become autonomous, then this capacity of the machine to act as a moral 
agent could be used to indemnify those responsible for their design and 
operation. In the same way that claims to objectivity might represent a 
“view from nowhere,” so the philosophically objective-subjectivity of the 
autonomous AI allows moral accountability for an action to be avoided 
through the defense that no-body did it.
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Reducing intelligence to the consequences of an objective function, 
whether undertaken for the purpose of scientific investigation or com-
mercial advantage, results in a problematic understanding of what intel-
ligence might be. If the Turing Test is a competition, then the easiest way 
to “win” it is not by making computers more intelligent but by making 
humans more stupid. The danger of such a surrender, as recently ana-
lyzed with far more detail and sophistication by Harry Collins (2018), 
must not become a serious basis for AI research and investment. A con-
textualized, qualitative, and interpretive social science is needed to de-
fend the true complexity and diversity of embodied and situated human 
experience.
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Modeling, Ontology, and Wild Thought: Toward 
an Anthropology of the Artificially Intelligent
Willard McCarty
I come back to ostranenyi, how we freshen things that have become banal, rather 
than banalize things that have become revolutionary.
—Jerome Bruner (1988)
Raw and Strange
“We shape our tools and thereafter they shape us” is a good place to 
begin (Culkin 1967: 54). Whether it is true of all tools at all times, John 
Culkin’s principle fits the reciprocity between the remarkable adaptabil-
ity of the digital machine and our own.1 It suggests how we come to 
respond to intelligently designed interfaces as if they were “intuitive” 
by nature, not seeing the characteristics of the machine behind them. 
1. In most instances, by “digital machine” I mean the kind we use daily, but 
sometimes all devices conforming to von Neumann’s architecture ([1945] 
1993). Thanks to the common design, much of what I have to say applies 
to all of them. Context should make clear which is intended when clarity is 
needed.
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In Michael Polanyi’s terms, with exposure to the machine we become 
increasingly able to “attend from” it to the work at hand, thinking with 
rather than about it (1983). More so than with earlier tools, engineering 
behind the scenes makes less and less common the phenomenological 
“breakdown” that would otherwise cause us to “attend to” the mechanics, 
and so be reminded of those characteristics. For this reason, digital ap-
pliances are or quickly tend to become part of the furniture, their digital-
ity imperceptible.
Here I want to come back to the primary consequences of design 
responsible for those unseen characteristics: the radical translation that 
the machine requires and the combinatorial “blind thought” (Leibniz’s 
cogitatio caeca) that follows. These bear centrally on the anthropological 
question of intelligence that I explore in this essay.
Anthropology and Computing
Anthropologists were among the earliest to take an interest in com-
puting. Their engagement with it began in conversations at Stanford in 
1960–61. These led the next year to an international conference whose 
aim, Dell Hymes wrote, was to place the virtues and prospects of the 
computer “not in speculative isolation, but in real relation” to the an-
thropological disciplines (1965). But the stage had already been set by 
the early 1940s with the multidisciplinary and hugely influential field 
Norbert Wiener named “cybernetics” (1948a), from which the sciences 
of cognition and computing have inherited a great deal. Wiener took 
the name from the Greek kŭbernḗtēs (“steersman”), invoking the em-
bodied kinesthetic intelligence of a skilled person interacting with what 
James Gibson would later call its “affordances” ([1977] 1986). Wiener 
had worked with this kind of intelligence in the feedback mechanisms 
of antiaircraft fire-control systems during World War II (Galison 1994).
Theoretically, Wiener wrote, cybernetics aimed “to find the common 
elements in the functioning of automatic machines and of the human 
nervous system,” or what he called “control and communication” when 
done by machines and “thinking” when performed by humans (Wiener 
1948b: 14). From their nascent theorizing, the early cyberneticists pro-
posed to fashion these elements into a far-reaching, radically interdisci-
plinary science. Anthropologists Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead 
were keen, seeing in cybernetics, as Mead later wrote, the prospect of “a 
form of cross-disciplinary thought which made it possible for members 
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of many disciplines to communicate with each other easily in a language 
which all could understand” (Mead 1968: 2).2 Cybernetics, in other 
words, appeared to offer fulfillment of the age-old quest for a univer-
sal language that would overcome the distortions and inhibitions of our 
lapsarian tongues (Eco [1993] 1995; cf. Steiner [1975] 1992). Artificial 
intelligence (AI) research pursues this quest in its search for a perfect 
programming language (Blackwell 2017).
What is AI from the “relations everywhere” perspective of social an-
thropology (Strathern 2005: 37)? In simplest terms, it is an engineer-
ing project that reifies personality in interactive, relational machinery; 
in consequence, it estranges and defamiliarizes that which it models. 
To borrow Philippe Descola’s words from his commentary on Eduardo 
Kohn’s How Forests Think (2013), AI is “the project of repopulating the 
. . . sciences with nonhuman beings”—or, in an echo of the related Arti-
ficial Life project, of creating the human in silico. AI thus joins the larger 
shift of focus “toward the interactions of humans with (and between) 
animals, plants, physical processes, artifacts, images, and other forms of 
beings” (Descola 2014: 268). Thus, Alfred Gell: “The entire historical 
tendency of anthropology has been towards a radical defamiliarization 
and relativization of the notion of ‘persons.’ Since the outset of the disci-
pline, anthropology has been signally preoccupied with a series of prob-
lems to do with ostensibly peculiar relations between persons and ‘things’ 
which somehow ‘appear as,’ or do duty as, persons” ([1998] 2013: 9). As 
an art, working in material forms, AI becomes in Polish artist Bruno 
Schulz’s words, “a probe sunk into the nameless” murk of human poten-
tial, in statu nascendi, premoral, barely conceptual, rapidly changing, and 
potentially revelatory (Schulz [1935] 1998: 369–70; McCarty 2009).
2. Mead and Bateson were present at the earliest gathering in 1942, then par-
ticipated as core members of the yearly Macy Conferences on Cybernetics 
from 1946 to 1953, the first of which included a session on “Anthropol-
ogy and how computers might learn how to learn” (Heims 1991: 14–17 and 
passim; Mead 1968). Bateson’s dialogue with Wiener proved highly fruitful 
(Heims 1977; Ramage 2009). For Bateson’s connection of his early an-
thropological work with cybernetics, see “Epilogue 1958” (Bateson [1936] 
1958: esp. 287ff.) and “Foreword” (Bateson [1972] 1987). Other prominent 
anthropologists took up cybernetic theory; see, for example, Talcott Par-
sons and Lévi-Strauss (Geoghegan 2011) and the index to Geertz ([1973] 
1993). Pickering (2010: chap. 2) argues that ontology was central to cyber-
netics.
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In computer science from the 1950s into the early 1980s, recognition 
of the machine as such a “person”—an “acting and interacting other”—
was established; work began on identifying and implementing the “hu-
man factors” it needed to have (Suchman 1998: 5). Serious theorizing 
followed mid-decade with three landmark studies that drew inter alia on 
phenomenology, neurobiology, anthropology, and social science to con-
ceptualize human-machine interaction (Koschmann 2003). The most 
influential of these, Lucy Suchman’s Plans and Situated Actions (1987), 
gave its name to research of this kind. Her work from that book onward, 
with its focus on the relationality of machine and human rather than 
their convergence, is central to my topic (Duguid 2012).
Mimesis and Alterity
Within the analogical frame of human-machine relations, my emphasis 
falls in this essay almost exclusively on differences between the two. The 
mimetic agenda of technological research, its progressive success in fit-
ting digital circuitry to the appliances of modern life, and our own readi-
ness to accept them argue effectively enough for similarities.
Let us suppose, then, an artificial intelligence with which, or with 
whom, we communicate in a probing and critical conversation. Let us 
assume this AI is fully realized, not in our terms but in its own. (While 
it is premature to say what exactly the intelligence at play might be and 
what it means to reason in the context of AI, we can look to the differ-
ences between how we reason biologically and how the machine acts in 
taking full advantage of its digital circuitry. I will return to this question 
later.) Let us assume further that in relation to ourselves it is neither 
servant nor master, neither simply inferior nor superior but different, 
a new kind of being, though with ancient ancestry (Riskin 2016). Un-
discouraged by Wittgenstein’s lion (2009: 235, §327), let us assume we 
converse with it in an effort to learn and understand what this “probe 
sunk into the nameless” has to tell us. Let us think of it and ourselves 
as situated on opposite sides of a Galisonian “trading zone” (Gorman 
2010) or separated by a beach we would cross with Greg Dening (2004), 
then attempt to strike up a conversation. How would we proceed? What 
might we learn and understand?
The structure I propose closely resembles two well-known scenarios: 
Alan Turing’s “imitation game,” which he devised to attract attention 
to artificial intelligence (Whitby 1996; Gandy 1996: 124); and ELIZA, 
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Joseph Weizenbaum’s simulation of a psychoanalyst’s responses to the 
user as patient (1976: 1–16). My proposal differs: I assume realization of 
that which Turing invited others to explore, and I want to focus specifi-
cally on a full-frontal encounter that preserves critical distance. In other 
words, in parallel with recent work in ethology (Cheney and Seyfarth 
2007; de Waal 2016; Godfrey-Smith 2017), I want to pluralize intel-
ligence. I want to raise it not as a criterion to be met but a question to 
be asked, so that we may meet creatures unlike ourselves with some pos-
sibility of understanding them in their terms rather than bending them 
to ours—without moving the goalposts to preserve human separateness 
(Darwin 1871: 47). Again, an analogical investigation is called for, using 
the similarities so easily spotted and differences we must work to identify 
to strike sparks off each other.
The computer scientist Peter Wegner has said of Alan Turing’s origi-
nal design, from which the machine we have is derived, that it is “autistic 
in precluding interaction” beyond itself (Wegner 1998: 318; cf. Blackwell 
2010; Zuboff 1988: 86). This autism was overcome with the machine’s 
first implementation, but it continues in our conception, application, and 
deployment of the machine insofar as we think of or configure it as isolated, 
as merely taking input and delivering results. One consequence is the 
tendency to conceive the artificial kinds of intelligence as utterly alien 
(that is, nothing whatsoever to do with us) rather than other (enigmati-
cally and unresolvably both like and unlike us). A former colleague, an 
ex-pat who had lived in a European country for decades, once remarked 
to me that the longer he lived there, the better he knew its people and 
the stranger they became. He was a misanthrope, but he had a valuable 
point about what depths lie beneath superficial similarities. His is the 
sense of relatedness I would apply to the machine.
Ontology and Modeling in Computer Science
Anthropology, we are told, has taken an “ontological turn” (Salmond 
2014) that radically pluralizes the conventionally singular if incom-
pletely accessible account of “what there is” (Quine 1948) familiar to 
us from the natural sciences. The core anthropological idea is that we 
cannot rightly speak of a single ontology about which there are mul-
tiple perspectives but must recognize multiple, problematically related 
ontologies. This raises the question of whether ontological pluralization 
has anything to do with the practice in computer science of resolving a 
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domain of interest into a more or less adequate “ontology,” hence differ-
ent “ontologies” for different domains and conceptions of them.3
The term ontology came to be used in computer science about forty 
years ago to denote a particular formal description or many of them. An 
ontology in the computational sense is thus indeterminate, one of an 
indefinite number, each one shaped by choice, interpretation, and the af-
fordances of the computer-language into which problem and source ma-
terial are encoded. This “ontology” is basis for an interpretative “model.” 
These two words can and often do overlap in meaning, but in the sense 
used here an ontology is to a model as a map is to an itinerary.4 A model 
may achieve a stable form and be accepted as a standard research tool (as 
usual for mathematical models, for example, in economics), but since the 
late twentieth century, technological improvements have made compos-
ing and changing software on the fly ever easier. This has foregrounded 
the dynamic, exploratory process of “modeling,” hence the computer it-
self as a modeling machine with which serio ludere (“seriously to play”). 
Programmers will recognize this playfulness in what they often do.
It seems plausible if not obvious that the computer would simulta-
neously influence and reflect how we conceive and engineer the world 
we live in. Furthermore, it seems plausible that although the modeling 
machine is largely a tool of the established order, a net effect of its use 
over the last many decades would have been not only to work against the 
status quo but, as it were, to liquefy it, or come to express and accelerate 
its liquefaction. Argument for the place of our “machine for doing think-
ing” (Mahoney 2011: 87) in such a shift of emphasis from the stable, well 
defined, and uniform to the mutable, transgressive, and diverse is beyond 
my scope here, but I suggest it has played and is playing a part. One 
rather crude bit of evidence is the surge in occurrences of “model” and its 
inflected forms in English from circa 1950 to the present alongside an 
equally dramatic surge in occurrences of “ontology.”5
3. Efforts at designing a comprehensive ontology in computer science proved 
impractical from the beginning, were largely ignored, and have more or less 
been abandoned (Smith 2004: 159).
4. This is a highly simplified version of the relationship between “ontology” 
and “model.” For model in the human sciences, see Flanders and Jannidis 
(2018); for ontology in computer science, see Gruber (2009; cf. 1995), and 
in digital humanities, see Eide and Smith Ore (2018).
5. The Google Ngram Viewer (https://books.google.com/ngrams) may be 
used to show this—with caution: word-frequency is a very blunt instrument 
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Less dramatic though also less problematic evidence comes from 
the transformations computing has wrought within the physical and 
life sciences (Gramelsberger 2011; cf. Keller 2003). Again, however, my 
concern is with possible relations between the digital machine on the 
one hand and anthropological interests on the other. My argument will 
be that the machine and the ontological turn in these disciplines are 
complementary. What underlies both, draws them together, or associ-
ates them is a teasing question I cannot answer and suspect is best left as 
is. The digital machine has become the great (and quite amoral) engine 
of civilization since its implementation mid-twentieth century, but the 
rapidity of its diversification and strength of its appeal suggest a techno-
logical response to something else—a Zeitgeist? Robin Gandy’s “some-
thing in the air which different people catch” (1995: 53)?
I have noted the relative youth of the term ontology in computer sci-
ence: it was, in fact, not poached from philosophy until circa 1980 and 
not formalized until the 1990s. Nevertheless, the ontological question 
was from the very beginning implicit in the design of the stored-pro-
gram computer (the kind we have). Hence the ease with which “ontol-
ogy” slipped noiselessly into the discourse of computer science.6 But as it 
did so, it changed from denoting a philosophical account of “what there 
is” to a practical inventory in a schema. Ontological disagreements have 
divided philosophers since the Presocratics (or earlier, and elsewhere), 
but the computational redefinition pluralized ontology in a different 
sense by substituting an indefinitely large and proliferating number of 
engineered objects for an ultimate referent: metaphysically, not differ-
ent conceptions of the world but different (“toy”) worlds. Ontology in 
this sense became part of how computing redefines whatever research 
for probing ideas or concepts; mistakes in OCR affect accuracy; and “meta-
physics” is sometimes used as a synonym for “ontology.” Since “model” is 
highly polysemous, searching for “model of ” and “model for” will reduce 
false positives (although the shape of the curve for “model” alone is the 
same). To compare the shapes of the graphs and so rates of change in us-
age, scaling is recommended: none for “model,” a factor of 4 for the other 
model-words, 80 for ontologies et al., 20 for “ontology” and “ontological.” 
The rough point is that something quite dramatic happened circa 1945–50.
6. For early examples see Kosslyn (1978) and especially McCarthy (1980). See 
also Alexander et al. (1986). Formal definition came with Gruber (1995; cf. 
Sowa 2000: 51–131; Zúñiga 2001).
Science in the Forest, Science in the Past
216
questions it embraces, at least those in the human sciences: as a locus of 
indeterminate approximations that sum to a statistical result.
“Ontology” was first pluralized in Anglo-American philosophy of the 
mid- to late 1940s by Willard van Orman Quine.7 Quine understood the 
digital machine theoretically, from its mathematical origins in the work 
of Turing and others, the design of logic circuitry for actual machines (in 
which he participated), and the challenges of programming as “mechani-
cal brains come to be adapted to purposes farther and farther beyond 
mere arithmetical calculation” ([1960] 1966: 40; 1955). He concludes, 
“the utterly pure theory of mathematical proof and the utterly techno-
logical theory of machine computation are thus at bottom one, and the 
basic insights of each are henceforth insights of the other.” While it is 
true that he regarded physical science as providing best access to knowl-
edge of “what there is,” in his work on language he argued that our in-
dividual accounts of it are indeterminate and incommensurable ([1960] 
2013: chap. 1 and 2). Quine’s ontology remains a matter of different takes 
on a singular world, but by ruling out the possibility of resolving them, his 
hugely influential position undermined ontological singularity just at the 
point at which the computing machine began its own subversive work.
Quine famously made his point by analogy to an anthropological 
linguist attempting to produce a definitive translation of an imagined 
native’s utterance, arguing that although the natural sciences give us the 
most reliable account, only incompatible versions of the one ontology are 
possible. Subsequently his influence on anthropology seems to have been 
slight, but the connection his work made between the digital machine 
and social anthropology is suggestive.8
Forests
The connection between the anthropological experience of the disturb-
ingly different human and of the disturbingly different machine made by 
7. For the state of ontology at the end of WWII see Feibleman (1949). Seri-
ous attention to ontology and its proximity to the digital computer hap-
pened earlier in Germany (see Heidegger [1927] 2001: §3; Steiner 1978: 
79–80; see also Zuse 1993: chap. 3). Heidegger’s work became known in 
Anglophone computer science with Dreyfus (1972) and important in that 
discipline thanks to Winograd and Flores (1987).
8. http://openanthcoop.ning.com/m/group/discussion?id=3404290%3ATopi
c%3A52720. Accessed November 29, 2018.
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humans may be suggested by positioning ourselves with Charles Dar-
win, in the moment when he first set eyes on a “Savage,” as he called 
him, a “naked Fuegian his long hair blowing about, his face besmeared 
with paint .  .  . [with] an expression .  .  . inconceivably wild.” Gillian 
Beer quotes these words from Darwin’s correspondence then comments, 
“Here no relation, in the sense of a message or narrative, can be estab-
lished. The other is ‘inconceivably wild.’ But that which is inconceivable 
is also here a mirror image” (Beer 1996: 23, 25).
Beer’s catoptric metaphor, informed by the long tradition of revela-
tory, perilously existential mirroring from Greco-Roman times onward 
(McCarty 1989), fits our anthropomorphic machine. My interest here is 
not so much in the question of the human that this mirroring provokes, 
rather more in the possibilities opened up by meeting my AI-as-may-
be on level ground. Donald MacKay once commented that attributing 
intelligence to machines “would not primarily be a matter of using evi-
dence and knowledge, but a matter of having the nerve” (Gandy 1996: 
136). Indeed, that nerve will out; it has been driving very well-funded ef-
forts to realize the imaginative possibilities of computing (bad and good) 
for decades. So I think it not exaggerated to insist that we bring to light 
the reasoning we are doing in concert with this Heraclitean machine, 
whose containing mathematics shapes a torrent of proliferating changes 
into the future.
The historian of computing Michael Mahoney tellingly asked how 
we get back into the driver’s seat of this machine in its proliferating 
manifestations and interpretations of them. He saw us standing “before 
the daunting complexity of a subject that has grown exponentially in size 
and variety, looking not so much like an uncharted ocean as like a track-
less jungle. We pace on the edge, pondering where to cut in” (2011: 23). 
I know exactly what he meant and am likewise daunted by the spread-
ing, metamorphosing, interpenetrating forms of “the” computer and the 
many takes on them and their effects. But I wonder if the tracklessness 
of that jungle is not a matter of perspective. What might it look like to 
an artificial native? What might we look like? Imagine the “semantic 
stretch” necessary in both directions (Lloyd 2007: 65).
Machines Are (Not) Us
To answer those questions of stretch we need history, specifically the his-
tory of how we came to accept (and act on) the notion that this digital 
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native will one day be more rather than differently intelligent. David 
Hanson, founder of Hanson Robotics, has observed, “people get used 
to the robots very quickly . . . within minutes” (Guizzo 2010). Even if 
features of a robot make “getting used to” difficult, one may find oneself 
drawn in, wanting the robot to be alive.9 Again, what was once spectacu-
lar, spooky, or curious, if successfully engineered, becomes part of the 
furniture. How has this happened in the case of AI?
Consider the neatly unbroken sequence from Turing’s foundational 
paper of 1936 onward. In that paper Turing, in response to one of David 
Hilbert’s mathematical challenges, proved that there can be no purely al-
gorithmic procedure for deciding whether mathematical statements are 
universally valid, thus helping to rescue mathematics from a sentence of 
terminal exhaustion.10 To do this he invented an abstract machine that 
allowed him to show in principle what such a procedure could not do. 
He began with a metaphor: “We may compare a man in the process of 
computing a real number to a machine which is only capable of a finite 
number of conditions q1, q2, . . . qn . . . .” (Turing 1936: 231; Wittgenstein 
1980: 1096). His machine imitated the mathematician but reduced him 
to a discrete logical form. A few years later neuropsychologist Warren 
McCulloch and mathematician Walter Pitts used Turing’s abstract ma-
chine to design a computational schematic for the human brain (Mc-
Culloch and Pitts [1943] 1988). Two years after that John von Neumann 
used the McCulloch-Pitts schematic and its neurological vocabulary to 
describe the architecture of the digital machine more or less as we have it 
now ([1945] 1993). Eventually—I pass over a complex history—a “com-
putational theory of mind” settled into the cognitive sciences and became 
a standard account if not the standard account (Rescorla 2016). Develop-
ment of neuromorphic chips, hence brain-based robots, has been under-
way since then (Hof 2014). Thus the coevolutionary human-machine 
9. See, for example, Alice at 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0NLHVJoI_E, an experiment in 
producing facial expressions.
10. G. H. Hardy wrote, “Suppose, for example, that we could find a finite sys-
tem of rules which enabled us to say whether any given formula was de-
monstrable or not. This system would embody a theorem of metamath-
ematics. There is of course no such theorem, and this is very fortunate, since 
if there were we should have a mechanical set of rules for the solution of all 
mathematical problems, and our activities as mathematicians would come 
to an end” (1929: 16).
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“looping effect” (Hacking 1995: 21; McCarty 2015: 297–98): from in-
ventor to the invention that bears his imprint; from the invention to a 
new human self-image or life-style; from the self-reconfigured human 
builders to a new machine; and so on.
Work on neuromorphic chips and the ongoing research in both com-
putational biology (simulation of life in silico) and biological computing 
(computation done with biological materials) bears out von Neumann’s 
view of artificial intelligence: always simultaneously an engineering and 
a mathematical problem (1958). He had argued in 1949 that to conceive 
of automata purely in the abstract was to throw “half of the problem”—
the physical half—“out of the window, and it may be the more important 
half ” (1966: 77). Among other things, von Neumann’s suspicion and the 
prehistory of the computational model of mind underscore the impor-
tance of the biological turn in computing (Keller 2002, 2003) and the 
embodied and socially situated mind in the cognitive sciences (Wilson 
and Foglia 2017).
The Machinery
The machine we have is a composite of hardware and of software that 
progresses stepwise in layers, from the circuitry that creates and main-
tains the crisp binary signals so often assumed to be simply a given, to 
the ever friendlier, “intuitive” interface that trains as much as reflects 
the user’s intuition. The low-level details can be left to electrical and 
software engineers, but this logic survives through all the layers of ab-
straction and has much to do with how its resources are applied and 
how we are affected (Evens 2015). Furthermore, at all steps at which 
a scholarly problem and the resources on which it draws are defined 
and encoded, binary logic is the gatekeeper and disciplinarian. For this 
reason, a scholarly understanding of the digital machine begins (but does not 
end!) with these terms of reductive translation. Those who use the machine 
as an instrument of critical reasoning need to have the sensitivity of the 
princess who feels the hard pea under those many mattresses and cannot 
sleep because of it.
In the reception history of computing in the human sciences, that 
sensitivity was greatest in the early period, when the small minority of 
scholars involved were attempting to sort out what in principle the ma-
chine was for. In 1976, the great pioneer Fr. Roberto Busa asked, “Why 
can the computer do so little?”; he dismissed the damaging notion that 
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the machine should be “aimed towards less human effort, or for doing 
things faster and with less labour,” insisting on the greater efforts the 
computer made possible. Fourteen years earlier, the Cambridge linguist 
and philosopher Margaret Masterman wrote that the potential of the 
computer “is so great as to make of it the telescope of the mind” (1962: 
39), arguing that to treat it as the “purely menial tool” that others had 
described was a great mistake. Four years later, the American literary 
critic Louis Milic argued, “The true nature of the machine is unknown 
to us,” that “its intelligence and ours must be made complementary,” 
and so implied the crucial question of what we take intelligence to 
be (1966: 4). “Thinking in a new way is not an easy accomplishment. 
It means,” he said, “reorientation of all the coordinates of our existence” 
(1966: 5, my emphasis)—that is, a cosmological reconfiguration. He 
called his brief article, “The next step.” I don’t think we’ve taken that 
step yet. Several factors, including assimilation of the machine as an 
appliance of daily life, have dulled us to its fundamentally different, 
algorithmic way of reasoning—once again, to the hard pea under those 
mattresses.
The historian of science David Gooding put it like this:
To digitalize is to represent features of the world, including relation-
ships between them, in a manner that establishes and fixes unam-
biguous meaning. . . . It is a method designed to achieve two things: 
to preserve the invariance of tokens in a symbol manipulation system 
and to make the value of the tokens unambiguous. (2003: 279 and 
283n33)
Hence my two axioms of digitization: that everything to be encoded 
in software, both source material and operations to be done on it, must 
be rendered with the complete consistency and with the absolute explicitness 
demanded by all-or-nothing digital logic. The severity of these axioms 
makes it difficult to see how the machine has anything to offer beyond 
clerical assistance, however fast, however accurate. The machine’s price 
of admission may seem entirely too high, offering as reward only some 
light on whatever cannot satisfy those axioms. It is true that the escapees 
do help us ask how we know what we know if we cannot spell it out 
digitally, hence a valuable via negativa. But this is cold comfort if that is 
all that is possible. Indeed, this via negativa does not, in fact, require use 
of the machinery at all.
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Digitization, however, is only the first of three stages. Overall, these 
stages comprise the iterative and exploratory process I have called “mod-
eling.” They are illustrated by the diagram in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Three stages of the computational process (after David Gooding, 
“Varying the Cognitive Span” [2003], fig. 13.4).
Although in practice these stages can take place rapidly with little 
demarcation, I will describe them in a clearly distinct sequence. Again, 
the first and third involve the machine primarily in the abstract, as a set 
of requirements and as the source of results to be considered. Only the 
second stage involves the machine directly.
We may think of operations in this middle stage as “mechanical”—
that is, not human—but since the machine is a human artifact, it is more 
productive to ask after the model of thought-processing the machine in-
stantiates—its hardwired “theory of mind,” if you will. In the nineteenth 
century, Charles Babbage’s friend Lady Ada Lovelace, commenting on 
his Analytical Engine, wrote that the machine “can do [only] whatever 
we know how to order it to perform” (Lovelace 1843: 722). In other words, 
her human correlate was a perfectly obedient servant. In the mid-twen-
tieth century, her long-lived dictum resurfaced in numerous statements 
to the effect that the digital computer was no more than a “fast moron” 
(e.g., Soule 1956: 173–74; Andree 1958: 2, 106). IBM supposedly made 
“fast moron” and similar phrases doctrine, promulgating this doctrine via 
sales staff in order to salve public fears of artificial intelligence following 
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the successes of the machine at the game of checkers and the ramping up 
of publicity required to sell the very expensive “giant brain” (McCorduck 
1979: 159). The mantra certainly became a stubbornly persistent meme.
But such is not the machine they had nor the one we have (the one 
von Neumann helped to design), nor the one for which he and Her-
man Goldstine sketched the basics of programming in a very early pa-
per on that subject, “Planning and coding of problems for an electronic 
computing instrument” (1947). They pointed out that the difference in 
design (which in effect transcends Lady Lovelace’s dictum) is the provi-
sion allowing a running program, conditional on the outcome of previ-
ous operations, to deviate from the linear sequence of instructions or to 
rewrite those instructions on the fly. They explained—note these words 
well—that coding “is not a static process of translation, but rather the 
technique of providing a dynamic background to control the automatic evo-
lution of a meaning” as the machine follows unspecified routes in un-
specified ways in order to accomplish specified tasks (Goldstine and von 
Neumann 1947: 2; my emphasis; Campbell-Kelly 2011). Thus Herbert 
Simon: “This statement—that computers can only do what they are 
programmed to do—is intuitively obvious, indubitably true, and sup-
ports none of the implications that are commonly drawn from it” (Si-
mon [1960] 1977: 67; Feigenbaum and Feldman 1963: 3–4). The idea of 
“machine” behind it is, as Marvin Minsky remarked, “precomputational” 
(McCorduck 1979: 71).
The high level of complications that result from the design of the 
stored-program computer, Goldstine and von Neumann went on to 
note, are “not hypothetical or exceptional . . . they are indeed the norm”; 
the power of the machine “is essentially due to them, i.e. to the extensive 
combinatorial possibilities which they indicate” (1947: 2). In essence, as 
von Neumann suggested four years later, machines “of the digital, all-or-
nothing type” work by combining and recombining the data under given 
constraints until coherent patterns emerge (von Neumann 1951: 16). By 
design they are combinatorial. Hence, in a nutshell, the core benefit they 
confer is their recombinatorial potential, which does not offer the enquir-
er closure on truth but generation of unforeseen or unforeseeable pos-
sibilities for consideration. Thus, the mathematician Martin Gardner: 
“When ideas are combined in all possible ways, the new combinations 
start the mind thinking along novel channels and one is led to discover 
fresh truths and arguments” (Gardner 1958: 17). That is essentially what 
Ada Lovelace went on presciently to write after laying down her dictum: 
that the Engine’s power of  “mechanical combinations” would throw new 
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light on “the relations and nature of many subjects,” leading to more pro-
found investigation of them (1843: 721, 723). In his 1950 paper, Turing 
quoted her, noting in agreement with Douglas Hartree that she had left 
open the possibility of an intelligent machine; all that was lacking was 
memory and speed (1950: 450).
While it is true that interpretative significance does not survive digi-
tization, that the machine sorts only configurations of bits from which 
this significance has been stripped, meaning stays with the enquirer and, 
after the Leibnizian cogitatio caeca in hardware, is reattributed to the 
resorted output at the end (Picon 2008: 223).
Hence the emphasis falls on Gardner’s “new .  .  . novel .  .  . fresh,” 
which deserves further, stronger emphasis—and considerably more 
attention than I have space for here. The best, most highly developed 
example for AI is the rapidly evolving AlphaGo system, designed to 
play the ancient board-game known as go in Japanese, weiqi in Chi-
nese (Papineau and Black 2001; Fairbairn 2007). AlphaGo’s victories are 
impressive,11 especially given the antiquity and complexity of the game 
and the discipline required to master it. The significance for AI, however, 
is that in the 2017 (AlphaGo Zero) version, it acquired its skill by play-
ing against itself repeatedly, starting off as tabula rasa with no historical 
knowledge of play beyond the basic rules (Silver, Schrittwieser, and Si-
monyan 2017), and that in doing so it deployed legal moves that no hu-
man player had thought to make in the approximately 2500-year history 
of the game. Ambitions for the latest algorithm, AlphaZero, are stronger 
yet: to achieve “superhuman performance in many challenging domains” 
(Silver, Hubert, and Schrittwieser 2017).
For the question of intelligence that I raise here, these developments 
are unquestionably important. What they import, however, is not so 
much a superhuman intelligence but a clearly different kind. However 
dependent on the rigidly defined rules and structure of this and other 
games, these developments in AI serve as an existence-proof that, in the 
lineage of Turing’s provocation, draws attention to possibilities of intel-
ligence in the built world, in conversation with us.
Permit me a few wild thoughts. For the future, AlphaGo and progeny 
raise the question of what happens as the precisely defined limits of the 
game-board fall away and expand, as the application of explicit and con-
sistent rules relaxes into the playing of roles. For the present they direct 
11. For the history, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AlphaGo#AlphaGo_
Zero_and_AlphaZero.
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us to look toward exploratory experimental work with the machines we 
have for the conversation happening there, right now. Anthropologi-
cally, as the history of board games suggests, they point toward manipu-
latory ethnomathematical and divinatory practices, which likewise use 
combinatorial techniques to direct the client toward something other (a 
subject for another time). It is, in other words, a question of what the AI 
does in concert with us.
Incommensurability?
Back to Darwin’s naked Fuegian, inconceivably other but simultaneously 
a mirror image. On the one hand, the Fuegian cannot have been incom-
mensurable, since that would made any kind of comparison impossible. 
On the other hand, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has pointed out, to grant 
commensurability or guarantee it by presuming continuity short-circuits 
“the challenge .  .  . to construct a commensurability (i.e., a reciprocal 
measurability)” between the kinds (2010: 330). The crucial thing is not 
to ignore the challenge, however we construe it.
For scholarship, the disciplinary marches—Thomas Kuhn’s Gestalt 
switch (1977), Beer’s open (but hazardous) fields of cultural encounter 
(1996; cf. 2006), Dening’s beaches of the mind (2004), Strathern’s com-
mons and borderlands (2004), Galison’s trading zone (Gorman 2010)—
provide preparatory examples close to hand. What these scholars have 
not done is the reason I cite them: they have not underestimated the dif-
ficulty or breezily assume an ontologically neutral standing point from 
which each discipline can be viewed objectively, its ways and means 
poached at will without error or partiality (McCarty 2016). This error 
is comparable to Viveiros de Castro’s “modern cosmological vulgate”: 
the multiculturalist supposition of “a single world or nature . . . around 
which different partial cultural views orbit” (2010: 329). Look closely, 
he argues, and the one nature it supposes turns out to be this cosmology 
naturalized. Michel Foucault’s invocation of Jeremy Bentham’s pano-
pticon, with its “sentiment of an invisible omniscience,” gives us a fit-
ting image for it.12 G. E. R. Lloyd’s corrective statement, “there is no 
12. Foucault, “Panopticism” (Foucault [1975] 1995: 195–228; plate 3 shows 
Bentham’s design). See also Bentham (1843: 235–48). The quoted phrase 
is often attributed to an anonymous architect; see Lyon (2006); Nugent 
(2011).
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theory-free way of accessing an answer to the question of what the world 
comprises” (2010: 210), throws us back to the question of the relation of 
theory to the digital machine. I will return to it, but for now I want to 
focus on the temporal dimension.
Ontologizing
Lloyd continues: “We just have to make the best use we can of such 
bridgeheads of intelligibility as will enable us to begin to make sense of 
others.” Are these bridgeheads ontologies—that is, formal specifications 
or ethnographies? I don’t think this is the best way to conceive of them, 
and not the most productive, at least for my consideration of a machine 
that is nothing but a paperweight if not “doing thinking” with us.
Lloyd avoids the closure and abstraction a formal ontology would re-
quire. Amiria and Anne Salmond note in their commentary on his “His-
tory and human nature” (2010) that these bridgeheads “are not ‘out there’ 
conveniently to hand, waiting to be discovered, but are rather cultivated 
over years, often generations” (Salmond and Salmond 2010: 304). They 
are processes in time. In “Historical ontology” Ian Hacking avoids closure 
by bringing ontology to life in time, allowing it to denote the implicitly 
changeable and changing “whatever we individuate and allow ourselves 
to talk about.” He points, for example, to new ways of “constituting our-
selves as so and so” by discovering “possible ways to be a person”—other 
ways of being human that arise, surge in popularity, then decline and lose 
their appeal (2002: 1–2; cf. 1995). Viveiros de Castro repeatedly refers 
to his anthropological project as experimental, with a perpetual revolu-
tion intended; Cannibal Metaphysics, he says, is “a beginner’s guide” to 
another, endlessly imagined book ([2009] 2014: 39). Thus, Dening: “we 
write culture in the present participle” (2002: 23). Participles “soften the 
essentializing quality of nouns with the being and acting quality of the 
verb” better to express the truth of our experience in a world that is “pro-
cessural, unfinished” (1993: 84).
What, then, is the world in processual experience or representation? 
The latter—representation—is Quinean, implying a reality out there 
that in practice can only be severally, separately, incommensurably, ap-
proximately represented. With Dening’s participle in mind, I have been 
converging on a suggestion of an ongoing, participatory, asymptotic 
ontologizing that, like Emanuel Schegloff ’s verbal/nonverbal commu-
nication (1982), is normally a commensurating activity—a bridgehead 
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cooperatively under construction from both sides. Note that I have left 
the world alone. Lloyd has offered a multidimensional world but has 
avoided limiting the number of dimensions, and he has allowed for se-
mantic stretch in how we talk about them. I think his multidimensional-
ity and my ontologizing are complementary.
Back to our face-to-face encounter with that AI. What we are talk-
ing about when we talk about AI, then, is not a catoptric sign, a reflec-
tion of ourselves, but an emergent manifestation of ourselves differently 
constituted.
Toward an Anthropology of the Artificially Intelligent?
Why, then, anthropology and AI?
To date, computer scientists have taken an interest in anthropology 
mostly to inform the design of software better to suit people who use 
and are affected by it. Anthropologists have tended to come to comput-
ing to give structure to and process data and to draw on its formally 
systematic ways of conceptualizing social behavior. My interest in prob-
ing artificially intelligent entities anthropologically is motivated not by 
the practical effectiveness of ethnographic description to improve the 
products of computer science nor vice versa but by the theoretical ef-
fectiveness of anthropology to illumine a way forward with computing. 
Simply put, anthropology is where the right sort of questions are being 
asked so that we may move beyond utility and impact. It is the discipline, 
Kant wrote in the Jäsche Logik (1800), that asks the summative question 
of philosophy in the “cosmopolitan [weltbürgerlichen] sense”: “What is 
man?” (1992: 538). Kant’s question is the principal one raised by the 
disturbingly different machine when, in fits and starts, its disturbing dif-
ference emerges and draws us in.
In the late 1980s Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores put the argu-
ment toward which I am gesturing most succinctly: “In designing tools 
we are designing ways of being” (1987: xi). In other words, in its par-
ticipant observation an anthropology of the artificially intelligent would 
have to be “a way of knowing from the inside” (Ingold 2013: 10), which 
would in turn be predicated on a human-machine resonance rather than 
a symbolically mediated representation of the world.
I conclude by returning to Margaret Masterman’s “telescope of the 
mind.” She referred in her clear-sighted article to Newton’s instrument, 
but I think a much more telling one is Galileo’s occhialino. The question 
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is, to echo Hacking, do we see through, or see through, such a telescope 
(1983: 186–209)? Today, just as in the microscopy Hacking studied, op-
toelectronics interposes a hermeneutic black box between the eye and 
its object, complicating—but not essentially altering—the philosopher’s 
question. For when Galileo looked through his spyglass, much of what 
he saw had been seen before, but the differences were enough to make 
what was “momentarily mutable,” stuff of the eye reshaped by his mind 
into “a compelling argument for Copernicanism.”13
It’s an altogether more interesting challenge we face than we have so 
often supposed.
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chapter eleven
Rhetorical Antinomies and Radical Othering: 
Recent Reflections on Responses to an Old 
Paper Concerning Human–Animal Relations 
in Amazonia
Stephen Hugh-Jones
Ever since Philippe Descola’s (1986) and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s 
(1996) seminal contributions, human–animal relations among the In-
digenous peoples of Amazonia have played a central role in what would 
later become known as anthropology’s “ontological turn.” For conveni-
ence, and sometimes for rhetorical or polemical effect, the Amerindians’ 
different understandings of these relations are often summarized in terms 
of a stark contrast or radical othering between “us” and “them.” In this 
vein, Viveiros de Castro (1996: 479) contrasts our cosmology’s postulate 
of a physical continuity and metaphysical discontinuity with the Amer-
indians’ perspectival cosmology of metaphysical continuity and physical 
discontinuity, a contrast that Descola (2005) recasts as one between our 
naturalism’s common physicality versus different interiority and their 
animism’s common interiority versus different physicality. Viveiros de 
Castro’s (1996) article also quotes Descola’s (1986: 120) aphorism that, 
for Amerindians “the common point of reference for all beings of nature 
is not humans as a species but rather humanity as a condition.”
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In 1995, before the “ontological turn” really got going and acquired 
a name, I was invited to write a paper for a conference on the subject of 
meat and meat consumption (Hugh-Jones 1996). The meeting, partly 
inspired by French meat producers’ worries about the threat to their live-
lihood posed by the rise of Anglo-Saxon vegetarianism, was attended 
by a mixed group of anthropologists, farmers, representatives of regional 
cultural affairs, and members of the public. For me, this slightly unusual 
context posed a challenge.
On the one hand, I was keen to use my experiences among Barasana, 
Makuna, and other Tukanoan-speakers living along the Rio Pirá-Paraná 
in Colombia’s Vaupés region to explore issues that would be interesting 
and relevant to people who reared animals for meat and also ate meat 
themselves. As people in close daily contact with animals, did they have 
misgivings about eating meat, especially meat from their own animals 
and, if so, how did they cope with this dilemma?
On the other hand, I was keen to distance myself from another, more 
popular kind of radical othering. I knew from previous experience that, 
however hard one may try to avoid this, in talking to lay audiences about 
Amerindians’ different ways of acting and thinking, one runs the risks 
of reaffirming deep-seated prejudices about “primitive savages who still 
have a very long way to go before they reach our level of civilization.” To 
avoid this pitfall, I decided to try the opposite tack. Instead of talking 
about obvious differences between French beef producers and Amazo-
nian hunter-cultivators, I decided to explore some points of convergence 
between Euro-American and Amerindian attitudes and behavior re-
garding animals.
At the same time, this would give me an opportunity to explore some 
of the variations, contradictions, tensions, and layered complexity that 
are often glossed over in the contrasts between “us” Euro-Americans and 
“them” Amazonians that frequently crop up in anthropological discus-
sions of human–animal relations. These contrasts represent the sharply 
delineated ontological tips of large, misshapen ethnographic icebergs. 
Lurking beneath these tips lie lumps of raw and often quite contradic-
tory data that are the daily bread of anthropological field research. At 
this ethnographic level, most would recognize that, for Amerindians, it is 
not usually all animals that fall under the rubric of humanity as a condi-
tion and certainly not “all beings of nature.”
Quoting my own work on the Barasana (Hugh-Jones 1996), Kaj År-
hem’s work on the Makuna (1991, 1996), and Gerardo Reichel-Dolmat-
off ’s work on the Desana (1971, 1976), Viveiros de Castro (1996: 471) 
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notes that, in respect of perspectivism and cosmological transformism 
“the cosmologies of the Vaupés area are highly developed.” Reichel-Dol-
matoff ’s Desana and their Master of the Animals also play important 
roles in Descola’s (2005) discussion of animist ontologies. This is right 
and proper for, in some contexts, Tukanoan-speakers are dyed-in-the-
wool animists. They tell perspectival stories about an unsatisfactory mar-
riage between a human man and a Star-Woman—she wakes up when he 
wants to sleep—and about a woman who visits her dead husband—what 
he sees as a cooking pot she sees as a coiled snake.1 They do indeed talk 
about game animals as people who suffer predation by human-jaguars 
and who, as a result, are sometimes prone to seek vengeance. For this rea-
son, before their meat can be eaten, a shaman must remove the weapons, 
body paints, and other dangerous substances that animals hide in their 
flesh, ready to injure anyone who eats it.
As these examples suggest, this animals-as-people talk typically 
happens in the contexts of shamanism, ritual, and mythology. In other 
contexts, I have heard plenty of other kinds of animal talk. Some of 
this talk concerns the identification, behavior, and habitats of different 
animal species, their evident cunning and intentionality, and the dif-
ferent strategies that hunters use to try to outsmart them. The knowl-
edge evident in this talk is based on detailed, long-term observation 
combined with information transmitted across the generations. Some 
of this is required to hunt and fish effectively but much of it is simply 
picked up during these and other activities and serves no immediate 
purpose. Although it is not phrased in the same terms, much of this 
knowledge overlaps with our own ecology, ethology, and zoology and 
is readily communicable to visiting scientists. In days gone by, other 
animal talk concerned the prices outsiders would pay for jaguar and 
otter skins; today, it is more about the prices that both neighbors and 
outsiders will pay for fish and meat. Finally, as among ourselves, much 
animal talk concerns the behavior of pets, here the host of dogs and 
other domesticated forest animals and birds that typically hang around 
Amerindian houses.
These different kinds of animal talk also correspond to a whole gamut 
of intellectual and emotional states, including investigation and enquiry, 
1. These two examples were chosen by kumu (“shaman”) Ricardo Marín when 
asking if we outsiders had a word for this kind of thought. I told him that 
we call it “perspectivism.” His question followed an earlier query about 
“metaphor “and “analogy.”
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curiosity, respect, admiration, aesthetic appreciation, fear, horror, amuse-
ment, and affection. They also correspond to different kinds of behavior. 
In different contexts I have seen both wild and domesticated animals 
treated sometimes with empathy, warmth, and care; sometimes with an 
unthinking, businesslike attitude much like that applied to various kinds 
of food and raw materials gathered in the forest; sometimes with pain 
inflicted intentionally in order to train dogs; and sometimes with out-
right torture—this last usually at the hands of young boys and often 
condemned by adults. This is a world of practical compromise and of-
ten inconsistent or contradictory ideas, attitudes, opinions, and behavior, 
one that is only rarely the subject of prolonged, systematic reflection. It 
would be hard to square such over-determined ideas and behavior with 
one single animist ontology.
This inconsistent world is not unlike that of my Welsh Marches 
sheep farmer neighbors, another population with close, daily contact 
with animals in their guises not just as pets, fellow workers, stock, mer-
chandise, or prey but also as the denizens of school biology classes, chil-
dren’s books, and TV documentaries. These are rational businesspeople 
who employ techniques, chemicals, medicines, and machines derived 
from science. But they do not fully understand the scientific knowledge 
on which they depend, are not usually given to systematization, and 
find no problem with the anthropomorphism of wildlife documentaries 
or the perspectival stance of the books they read to their children at 
bedtime. It is likewise hard to square all this with a unitary naturalist 
ontology.
But ontologies, fully fledged, came later. The aim of my 1996 paper 
was not to agree or disagree with other anthropological approaches, but 
rather to situate these in a wider context and consider issues that these 
approaches had tended to ignore. With reference to Eric Ross (1978) 
on ecologically sound food taboos—the larger animals that are subject 
to most intense restriction are also the slowest to reproduce; Reichel-
Dolmatoff (1971, 1976) on energy conservation—exchanges between 
hunters and the Master of Animals bear some resemblance to Western 
ideas of ecology and thermodynamics; and Descola (1993) on animism, 
I wrote (Hugh-Jones 1996: 131), “I do not intend to comment here on 
the merits of these arguments except to say that if European attitudes 
to animals and to the consumption of meat are complex phenomena 
which reflect considerations which are simultaneously practical, socio-
logical, moral, philosophical and ethical, the same is also likely to be true 
in Amazonia.”
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With this in mind I sought to make four basic points:
1. There is some common ground between Western attitudes to killing 
and eating animals and those of some Amazonian peoples, especially 
of the Tukanoans of Northwest Amazonia and the Xinguanos of 
Central Brazil.
2. This common ground involves awareness that, because humans and 
animals share anatomical, physiological, cognitive, and other attrib-
utes in common, the boundary between them is not always clear. This 
can result in unease about taking animal life for the benefit of human 
life.
3. In some respects, the religious, cosmological, or philosophical sources 
of Western ideas of animals’ proximity to human beings are very dif-
ferent from their Amerindian counterparts. In other respects, they 
appear to be quite similar and would seem to be grounded in every-
day observation and experience.
4. A focus on religion, cosmology, or philosophy (“good reasons”) risks 
not only exaggerating differences between “us” and “them” but also 
overlooking variations, inconsistencies and historical changes within 
and between Amerindian groups.
I tried to make clear that my arguments were intended to comple-
ment rather than replace other approaches and that I did not consider 
Amerindian and Western attitudes to animals and the natural world to 
be directly comparable in all respects. In addition, I never intended to 
suggest that Amerindians always sentimentalized their interactions with 
animals and always treated them kindly. No one who has lived with Am-
erindians could make such a claim! But I did make the mistake of refer-
ring to unease or misgivings about killing and eating animals as “bad 
conscience.” At the time, when put in juxtaposition with the “good rea-
sons” anthropological discussions gave in terms of ecology, religion, and 
cosmology, this tidy antinomy seemed to have the right rhetorical effect.
Over the years, my paper has elicited two quite critical reactions, 
an early one from Descola (1998) and a more recent one from Florent 
Kohler (2016), the one chiding me for straying too far from ontology, 
the other for sticking too close. I shall comment on the two critiques in 
reverse order.
Kohler writes about Amerindians living in the Uaçá river basin on 
the Brazil–French Guiana frontier. Although certain of these peoples’ 
ideas and practices might seem to fall under the rubric of Descola’s 
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animist ontologies or Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivism, Kohler is keen 
to distance himself from this line of thought.
Kohler first raises various problems regarding the status of animals 
as persons or social subjects. For Uaçá peoples, they are persons mainly 
to shamans and only in a space-time removed from the here and now, 
contexts that cannot be extrapolated to human–animal relations in the 
context of ordinary people’s quotidian hunting and fishing. Furthermore, 
insofar as animals might be considered to share human subjectivity and 
point of view, far from engendering any sympathy, such shared attributes 
are seen to pose a threat.
Second, Kohler argues that Uaçá peoples’ statements about animals 
as persons are to be understood not as any confusion or ontological con-
tinuity between human beings and animals but rather as metaphorical 
statements in which social relations with distant, threatening others are 
being transposed to the level of ontology. Statements about “animals as 
people” should therefore be understood to mean their opposite, namely 
that “those foreigners are animals.”
Finally, Kohler takes myself and others to task for our one-sided at-
tention to ontology or cosmology, ritual, and shamanism. This leads us to 
neglect the everyday world of hunting and fishing where animals figure 
not as subjects but rather as quasi-objects. To underline this contrast, 
Kohler describes what happened when he protested about a man who 
was tying up a caiman in a manner guaranteed to cause it acute pain. The 
man replied, “But that’s food! It’s not a person!” Furthermore, this ne-
glect of the everyday has serious consequences. Because anthropologists 
are so attached to ontological abstractions and systems of meaning and 
ecologists so concerned with species and populations, neither has any-
thing to say about Amerindians’ callous and brutal treatment of animals 
and both remain blind to the wholesale slaughter of animals happening 
throughout Amazonia. This neglect has moral implications but to call it 
cruelty would be ethnocentric, for cruelty implies thought in the form 
of a system of representations and values. Habitual, brutal behavior of 
this kind is literally thought-less. For Kohler, as far as the study of real 
animals in a nonritual context and concern for their well-being are con-
cerned, ontology is a dead end.
I think that here and elsewhere, and like Descola below, Kohler may 
have been led astray by my ill-judged use of the phrase “bad conscience.” 
This was intended as a shorthand to refer to an unease or malaise about 
taking animal life for the benefit of human life that I believed—and still 
believe—to be shared between Euro-Americans and Amerindians. But I 
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never intended “bad conscience” to imply “good treatment” or to suggest 
that ideas about the personhood of some animals in ritual contexts had 
any necessary connection with how animals were treated in everyday 
practice. Barasana hunters do indeed sometimes mistreat animals in a 
careless or intentionally brutal way—I was amiss in not having made 
this clearer.
Kohler’s position is closer to my own when he observes that the Uaçá 
peoples’ cold-blooded treatment of animals is most evident in the case 
of reptiles, creatures whose own cold blood, aquatic habitat, and lack of 
mammalian features make them relatively distant from human beings 
and closer to fish. He notes (2016: 142) that this is one example of a 
near-universal human tendency to rank living creatures along a great 
chain of being. Compared with their treatment of most mammals and 
birds, Tukanoans also treat reptiles and fish in a relatively careless man-
ner, one aspect of what I called their “hierarchy of foods” (Hugh-Jones 
1996: 128). This hierarchy is based on relatively common-sense princi-
ples—vegetable versus animal and, if animal, its size, amount of blood, 
diet, manner of capture, and manner of cooking—criteria that have some 
obvious parallels in European thinking. However, while the chain of be-
ing to which these principles relate may be common to most of human-
ity, they still play out in specific cultural contexts. In the Tukanoan case, 
they come all-of-a-piece with shamanic considerations. Thus, like Uaçá 
peoples and for the same reasons, Tukanoans put caimans on the side of 
fish. But the vulture-like scavenging habits of these reptiles produce am-
bivalent attitudes to them as creatures and mean that their meat requires 
special shamanic treatment, different from that for other “normal” fish, 
before it can be eaten. A more general malaise about killing larger ani-
mals for food also means that, with each mammal having an equivalent 
in the domain of cultivated plants, shamanic spells can be used to trans-
form meat down the food hierarchy and into fruit or vegetable (Hugh-
Jones 1996: 129–30). Considerations such as these also enter into how 
animals are treated. For this reason, as far as Tukanoan ethnography is 
concerned, like Descola’s animism and naturalism (see below), I find 
Kohler’s (2016: 137) distinction between the conceptual animals of sha-
manic ontology and the real animals that are killed in habitual practices 
related to subsistence or commerce hard to sustain.
In addition to his more general point about anthropologists’ neglect 
of the cruelty involved in everyday habitual practice, Kohler (2016: 140) 
cites the Uaçá peoples’ record of failed conservation initiatives to take 
issue with my (1996: 140–41) suggestion that when Makuna shamans 
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claim that their ritual dances ensure the reproduction of animals and 
fish, this and other similar notions have parallels with European ideas 
about stewardship of nature and about humans and animals existing in a 
single moral universe. I can only respond by saying that Janet Chernela’s 
(1989) work on Kotiria (Wanano) protection of fish-breeding sites along 
river margins, Clara van der Hammen’s (1992) study of “world manage-
ment” by Yukuna shamans, and the results of collaborative research in-
volving ecologically oriented NGOs and several Tukanoan and Arawa-
kan speaking groups (Cabalzar 2005, 2010, 2016) all suggest that, for 
NW Amazonian populations, there is some good evidence that restric-
tions on hunting or fishing around sacred sites inhabited and controlled 
by spirit Owners can create refuge areas where fish and animals are able 
to reproduce free from the pressure of predation.
But I would not wish to suggest that sacred sites were somehow in-
vented with this result in mind. This would be to repeat Ross’s (1978) 
problematic use of an imputed effect of food taboos to explain their ex-
istence. NW Amazonian sacred sites are typically salient features in the 
landscape but this salience can take many forms. Sometimes it has to 
do with concentrations of feeding or breeding animals but mythology, 
shamanism, and ritual are always involved. In other instances, with the 
salience of a particular sacred site having to do with rocks that resem-
ble people, animals, or human artifacts or the danger of a waterfall that 
sounds like thunder, it would be hard to discern any hint of what might 
look like “practical reason.” As with the hierarchy of foods mentioned 
above, here too it is hard to keep separate what Kohler (2016: 137) calls 
the “conceptual” animals of shamanic ontology and the “real” animals 
and fish that are killed in habitual practices related to subsistence or 
commerce.
However, such counterexamples are really beside the point for, given 
differences not just in ecology, social organization, ritual practice, and 
cosmology but also in involvement with the outside world, I would not 
expect the Tukanoans’ attempts at resource management to resemble, 
or have the same outcome, as those of the peoples of the Uaçá. Indeed, 
my argument concerning some measure of consistency between peoples’ 
attitudes to killing animals for meat, their attitudes toward killing other 
people, and features of their overall social organization was intended 
as part of a more general argument concerning a diversity of ideas and 
practices within and between different Amerindian groups.
In sum, whereas Kohler draws a contrast between ontology—animals 
as subjects—and what we might call “practical un-reason”—animals 
Rhetorical Antinomies and Radical Othering
245
treated thoughtlessly in the manner of objects—and takes me to task 
for a one-sided adherence to the former, I had sought to stress the com-
plex, contradictory nature of human–animal relations, to emphasize a 
plurality of ideas and the relevance of context, and to nuance ecological 
or cosmological arguments concerning the personhood of animals and 
ambivalence about eating their flesh by suggesting that another source 
of such ideas about might lie in everyday encounters with these animals 
in their guise as four-limbed, warm-blooded, sentient, and intentional 
beings like ourselves.
If Kohler still finds that I am too closely wedded to a ritualistic or 
ontological approach, in Descola’s view I stray too far from ontology. 
Descola accuses me of deriving attitudes and behavior regarding ani-
mals from individual moral concerns determined by an imputed univer-
sal “bad conscience,” a notion that implies a specifically Western ethical 
framework of recent origin and one characterized by ideas not shared by 
Amerindians. Such an exercise would render any properly anthropologi-
cal analysis impossible for it cannot account for the systemic, structural 
character of human–animal relations where attitudes and behavior are 
shared by members of the same group and vary systematically from one 
group to another in parallel with variations in attitudes and behavior 
toward other human beings (Descola 1998: 32–33, 35).
“Structure or sentiment,” the title of Descola’s (1998) paper, evokes 
Rodney Needham’s (1962) Structure and Sentiment, a rebuttal of George 
Homans and David Schneider’s (1955) critique of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s 
(1949) theory of prescriptive marriage. Needham takes Homans and 
Schneider to task for reducing structural relations of affinity to the final 
cause of sentiments.2 Descola’s allusion to Needham suggests that he has 
misunderstood what I had to say, for I never intended to suggest that 
a “bad conscience” was the final cause behind what I too tried to treat 
as coherent, socially grounded cultural patterns. Interestingly enough, 
Viveiros de Castro (1996: 471) cites my paper as exemplifying perspec-
tivism and, in it, I stated my general agreement with Descola’s argument 
2. Their argument suggests that, rather than being an expression of Lévi-
Strauss’ structural principle of prescriptive marriage, the statistical prepon-
derance of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage found in some societies is 
one outcome of the avunculate. Put simply, this would be that, because they 
have special affective relations with their mothers and their brothers, men 
tend to visit these brothers and end up marrying their mother’s brother’s 
daughters, the girl next door.
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concerning structural homologies between human-human and human–
animal relations and its specific application to the contrasting Jivaroan 
and Tukanoan cases, and I went on to suggest the possible relevance of 
this to the Kalapalo’s abandonment of meat-eating (Hugh-Jones 1996: 
144–45). Although rhetorical antinomies such as my own “good reasons 
versus bad conscience” or Descola’s “humans as species versus humanity 
as condition” can serve as useful shorthands, they can also mislead. When 
I wrote my paper, I was already aware that “bad conscience” risked intro-
ducing the distracting cultural baggage of Western ethics that Descola 
mentions. This is why I wrote (1996: 146): “‘Bad conscience’ evokes a 
morality of sin and guilt which is not readily transposed to an Ama-
zonian context; perhaps Erikson’s (1987: 105) more neutral ‘conceptual 
malaise’ would be more appropriate.”
Descola (1998: 31, 35) comes closer to what I had in mind when 
he recognizes that a conceptual malaise concerning the eating of ani-
mal flesh could be linked with cognitive psychological studies of the 
construction of living-kind categories in infancy. Such living-kind cat-
egories are highly relevant to Amerindian and Euro-American categori-
zations of animals, both as species and as food. But if living-kind catego-
ries are part of a basic, universal human cognitive apparatus, they must 
also be shared across the different animist and naturalist ontologies that 
separate “them” from “us.” Although Descola does not elaborate on this 
further, his (1986: 124) suggestion that the human tendency to anthro-
pomorphize animals is as much a matter of “popular knowledge” (“science 
populaire” in the French original) as mythic thought also goes along simi-
lar lines to my own. This popular knowledge or empirical science comes 
to the fore in the practical contexts of hunting, fishing, and gardening 
and can generate fruitful collaborative research with professional scien-
tists.3 Nonetheless, hunting, fishing, and gardening still involve much 
ritual and shamanism and, as Lévi-Strauss (1966) suggested, this same 
popular science provides the basis of the concrete logic apparent in sha-
manic and mythological contexts where animist ideas are dominant.
I would take this further. I suggest that this conceptual malaise 
stems from a more general awareness of various morphological, ana-
tomical, physiological, cognitive, and behavioral characteristics that are 
shared between humans and animals. This recognition of trans-specific 
3. Cabalzar (2005), containing the results of research on upper Rio Negro fish 
by Brazilian ichthyologist Flávio Lima and Tukano and Tuyuka fishermen, 
is a case in point.
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similarity-with-difference between human beings and higher mammals 
is probably universal even though its intellectual, behavioral, emotional, 
and ethical consequences will vary with respect to different cultural, in-
dividual, and situational contexts. However, while characteristics such as 
anatomy or physiology that are recognized as shared between humans 
and animals fall on the side of Descola’s “physicality,” cognition (includ-
ing intelligence, intentionality, etc.) falls on the side of “interiority.” That 
this recognition is common to both Euro-Americans and Amerindi-
ans becomes obscured when, according to Descola, “we” and “they” are 
opposed in terms of continuity/discontinuity along these same axes of 
“physicality” and “interiority.”
Finally, it should be noted that awareness of these same, shared char-
acteristics can also result in inconsistent or contradictory outcomes. The 
bullfight aficionado who sees a bull tormented before being put to death 
in the corrida probably finds no conflict between his enjoyment of this 
spectacle and the sentimental pleasure he derives from playing with his 
cherished pet dog. I suggest that neither activity would have much point 
if this man were unable to perceive some measure of similarity between 
himself and the animal concerned.
Given these clarifications, the key issue turns out not to be one of 
sentiments but rather one of ontologies. As explained above, while ac-
knowledging differences between “us” and “them,” my paper took the 
opposite tack and sought to explore common ground. This urge to high-
light some similarities between “us” and “them” to a French audience 
concerned with eating meat sprang from two kinds of personal experi-
ence. On the one hand, that of interacting with Amerindians on a daily 
basis where, for much of the time, the animals-as-people talk went on 
alongside other kinds of animal talk, some of it already more familiar to 
me in my home context. On the other hand, that of talking to people 
at home who took my efforts to render strange Amazonians familiar as 
merely confirming what they thought they already knew—just how dif-
ferent those “primitive people” really are.
Against this, Descola (1998: 34) says that we should not be afraid 
of making Amerindians seem very different from ourselves—for that is 
indeed what they are. Although we may project human characteristics 
such as sensitivity, altruism, or maternal love onto animals, any similarity 
between this Western personification of animals and Amerindian ani-
mism is purely superficial because our anthropocentric attitudes are part 
and parcel of a naturalistic ontology that allocates humans and nonhu-
mans to the two discrete and different domains of “culture” and “nature.” 
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By contrast, in Amerindian cosmologies, “animals and to a lesser degree 
plants are perceived as social subjects possessed of institutions and be-
haviors perfectly symmetrical with those of men. For us the referent is 
man as species; for them it is humanity as a condition” (Descola 1998: 
27, 29).
Descola intends his ontologies to be ideal-type models derived, in 
a classic structuralist manner, from an exhaustive examination of the 
logically possibly permutations of a set of relations, in this case a four-
fold grid between physicality (“material processes”), interiority (“mental 
states”), identification, and difference (see Descola 2005: 323). Physical-
ity and interiority are abstract, generic labels for the kind of phenomena 
that ethnographers deal with—such as particular cultural ideas about 
(what we call) the “bodies” and “souls” of humans and animals. But these 
models are not to be understood as descriptions of any particular ethno-
graphic reality, nor are they intended as a method for classifying whole 
societies in terms of one or another isolated “world view” (Descola 2010: 
338). Their purpose is heuristic, to allow the anthropologist to see the 
wood from the trees, to penetrate through the fog of ethnographic detail, 
to give some precision to familiar intuitions about differences in cultural 
style in different parts of the world, and to provide answers to questions 
such as “What is it about Amazonian societies and cultures that make 
them so different from those of Africa?” or “Why don’t we find sacrifice 
or domesticated animals in Indigenous Amazonia?”; the kind of wide-
ranging, comparative questions that much of contemporary anthropol-
ogy seems to have abandoned.
This means that when people of society X are described as “animist” 
or as “having an animist ontology,” this is to be understood not as sug-
gesting that they are animist at all times, in every respect and to the ex-
clusion of anything else but rather as a convenient shorthand for which 
mode of identification is dominant and most evident in that society’s key 
institutions, practices, and ideas. In practice, Descola tells us, the most 
common situation is one of hybridity “where (one) mode of identifica-
tion will slightly dominate over another, resulting in a variety of com-
plex combinations.” To illustrate such hybridity, Descola (2010: 338–39) 
raises the relatively trivial case of his readers—most probably natural-
ists—behaving occasionally as animists when talking to their dog or cat 
as if they could thus establish some sort of intersubjective relation with 
their pet.
But let us take a look at a rather more complex example, that of my 
Welsh sheep-farming neighbors who, day after day, rely on long-term 
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and very effective intersubjective relations with their border collie dogs 
in order to herd their sheep, a situation not unlike Amazonians out 
hunting with their dogs. Here the synergetic farmer-dog pair would ap-
pear to take the point of view of the sheep, acting on assumptions about 
the interiority of these sheep in order to anticipate their movements 
and thus to outwit them. If situations such as these seem to fall outside 
naturalism, to describe this synergy between farmer and sheepdog as 
animism on a par with its Amazonian counterparts would seem to be 
stretching the model much too far. It is both quite similar to, and also 
has some of its roots in, the hunting that Descola (2010: 335) identifies 
as an experiential basis of animism. But it is not animism itself because 
it is not discursively systematized in myth or ritual. My farmer neigh-
bors would certainly not suppose that their dogs have institutions and 
behaviors that are perfectly symmetrical with their own. But I am far 
from convinced that my Amazonian Barasana neighbors would make 
such an assumption at all times and in all contexts either. Yet, against 
the more usual situation of hybridity, Descola (2010: 339) suggests that 
Amazonia stands out as a region that evidences animism as a mode of 
identification in a very pure form. This may be true of the Achuar but not 
I think of Tukanoans. Amazonia is a large region and cultural diversity 
was a central theme of my paper.
In some contexts, Barasana certainly do talk and act in the clas-
sic mode of Amazonian animism. This is what Descola has in mind 
in discussing Tukanoan relations with the Master of Animals as an 
example of exchange, itself one of his three ways of relating to animal 
others within animist ontologies. In this context, mythology has it that 
humanity is the original default “spirit” condition of all sentient beings 
with today’s animals, in their mundane, bodily form, the result of their 
subsequent fall from grace. But in the context of Tukanoan initiation 
rituals and in their stories of origin associated with patriliny, hierar-
chy, and ancestors, human–animal relations figure in a rather different 
guise.
To begin with, in these origin stories, animals play second fiddle to 
personified objects, something that already sets the Tukanoans apart 
from the Amazonian animist or perspectival norm (see Hugh-Jones 
2009). Second, instead of a fall from grace, animality in the form of fish 
here figures as an original condition from which true human beings be-
came progressively differentiated. On a journey of transformation, hu-
man beings became separated off from “fish people” (wai masa), a re-
sidual category of dangerous spirit beings who manifest themselves in 
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bodily form as both fish and animals and who are united in a vengeful 
resentment of human beings for having left them behind.
In one sense, any resemblance between this Amerindian version of 
evolution and that of Western naturalism is entirely superficial, precisely 
because each is embedded within different overarching sets of knowledge 
and assumptions. But, in another sense, there is some overlap. While the 
Tukanoans’ origin story is not wholly or simply about observation and 
experience of mundane contexts, it clearly draws upon knowledge de-
rived from them. The story is partly about sex and gestation and here it 
builds on knowledge that conception involves watery fluids, that birth 
involves a passage from a watery (“riverine”), uterine state to a dry, ter-
restrial existence, and that, compared to human beings, fish and animals 
are both “lower” forms of existence. The story is also about naming, ini-
tiation, and the passage from infancy to adulthood. Here it builds on the 
knowledge that, to different degrees, fish, reptiles, and mammals share 
attributes in common and fit into some kind of evolutionary sequence—
a literal gloss for wai bükü, the generic Barasana term for “game animal” 
would be “mature fish.” This sequence corresponds to Kohler’s “chain of 
being” or to my “hierarchy of foods” mentioned above.
The Tukanoans’ origin story is one of several contexts in which, in-
stead of humanity as a common condition, it is precisely the differences 
between humans and animals that are being stressed. Another such 
context is the habitual situation of hunting that Kohler has in mind. 
Here and on most occasions, even the jaguars that in other contexts are 
considered to be on a par with human beings are simply jaguars—es-
pecially when it comes to selling their skins. But when jaguars behave 
in an unexpected manner, some people, especially shamans, may assert 
that these jaguars are really other shamans in animal form. The sha-
man’s authority to make pronouncements of this kind is underscored 
by a formulaic phrasing typically used to indicate a different, shamanic 
point of view: “You see it as X but a shaman would see it as Y.” It follows 
from this that assertions about animals as people typically refer to sha-
man-others or imply some claim to shamanic expertise on the speaker’s 
behalf. But such talk can also go in a reverse, “naturalistic” direction. I 
have witnessed occasions on which one shaman has said of another: “He 
claimed that that animal was a person but he was lying. Actually, it was 
just an animal.”
Finally, there are situations where what might look like a shamanic 
animals-as-people statement turns out to be a case of straightforward 
anthropomorphism. Talking of two macaws, a man once said to me, “he’s 
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off back home with his wife.” It was clear from the context that I was 
being told about macaw behavior: the man knew that macaws are mo-
nogamous and knew where the pair in question had their nest.
These examples—all instances where it is not humanity as a condi-
tion but rather man and animals as species that is being foregrounded—
are offered in order to qualify the notion of a “pure” Amazonian form of 
animism—at least as it might apply in NW Amazonia. But to describe 
such instances as “naturalism,” to describe sheep farmers who talk to 
their working dogs as cases of “animism,” or to refer to either as cases of 
“hybridity” does not seem helpful. So much is being left aside that the 
model becomes overstretched and what remains is a systematization that 
is largely in the head of the observer.
My 1996 paper was written before the full flowering of anthropolo-
gy’s ontological turn. Although I nowhere referred to “ontology,” Kohler 
is correct in identifying parts of my argument as ontological in tone. 
I based my argument on my experience among people who, in some 
contexts, are unquestionably animist or perspectivist in outlook. But the 
spirit of the paper was to explore diversity in Amazonia and to use eth-
nography to go against the grain of what I referred to as “a monolithic 
opposition between Western culture and tribal peoples” (Hugh-Jones 
1996: 147) by seeking out common ground instead. Much of this com-
mon ground lies in the space between Kohler’s “habitual practice” and 
the “ontology” to which it is opposed. With hindsight, I can see that us-
ing “bad conscience” as shorthand to characterize elements of this com-
mon ground simply muddied the waters. Let us stick with “conceptual 
malaise.” Descola uses another binary contrast, this time between “us” or 
man as species and “them” or humanity as condition to critique a paper 
that sought to go beyond such oppositions. This contrast risks a confu-
sion between the details of ethnography and the comparative heuristics 
of ontology, a confusion between trees and wood. My concern was eth-
nography and not with ontology in this sense.
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Turning to Ontology in Studies of Distant Sciences
Nicholas Jardine
Until quite recently I was inclined to be dismissive of the so-called “on-
tological turn” currently sweeping into science and technology studies 
(STS) from anthropology. My supercilious attitude sprang in part from 
incomprehension faced with its pervasive jargon—“obviation,” “dividu-
als,” “infrastructural fractals,” et cetera—and with such wondrous pro-
nouncements as “ontology, as far as anthropology in our understanding 
is concerned, is the comparative, ethnographically-grounded transcen-
dental deduction of Being (the oxymoron is deliberate) as that which 
differs from itself (ditto)” (Holbraad, Pederson, and Viveiros de Castro 
2014: 1). I was baffled also by passages that appeared to imply that an-
thropologists, having “gone native,” should (figuratively) stay out there 
rather than returning in order to communicate their findings in terms 
comprehensible to us. As for aspects of the ontological turn that I felt 
able to grasp, it seemed to me that it brought little real innovation to 
our field of STS. Its insistence that in interpreting others we should 
set aside our own “worlds” in order to immerse ourselves in theirs has a 
history in theory of interpretation going back at least to the eighteenth 
century (see Szondi 1995; Venuti 1995). Its “ecological” approach, focus-
ing on the embodiment of persons in their environments and on their 
prereflective engagements and attunements with things, traces back to 
the works of, among others, Alfred North Whitehead (2011), Martin 
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Heidegger (1999, based on lectures in 1923), Jakob von Uexküll (1926), 
and James J. Gibson (1979). Further, its more specific recommendations 
seemed to me (wrongly as I now believe) to have been already accom-
plished through earlier “turns” in STS: its focus on practice rather than 
theory, and on interplay with tools and instruments, being anticipated 
by the “practical” and “material” turns of the 1970s and 1980s; and its 
recognition of the “hybrid” agency of complex alliances of humans and 
nonhumans being central to actor network theory (ANT) from its outset 
in the early 1980s.1
Crucial for my eventual grasp and present appreciative view of the 
ontological turn was my reading of Annemarie Mol’s The Body Mul-
tiple, a work whose case studies of clinical, surgical, and pathological 
“enactments” of an illness are accompanied by a subtext spelling out 
central theoretical and practical tenets of the ontological turn (Mol 
2002).2 Guided by Mol, and helped also by Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s 
The Mushroom at the End of the World (Tsing 2015), I was able on sec-
ond reading to come to grips with works of such avatars of the turn as 
Marilyn Strathern (1988, 2004), Tim Ingold (2000), Eduardo Viveiros 
de Castro (2009), and Philippe Descola ( [2005] 2013). So, as a prelude 
to my observations on the ontological turn as manifest in contributions 
to Science in the Forest, Science in the Past, let me run through some of the 
main points raised by Mol and Tsing.
In the opening chapter of The Body Multiple, Mol declares the gen-
eral principle of her ontological approach: “It is possible to refrain from 
understanding objects as the central points of focus of different people’s 
perspectives. It is possible to understand them instead as things manipu-
lated in practices. If we do this—if instead of bracketing the practices 
we foreground them—this has far-reaching effects. Reality multiplies” 
(Moll 2002: 4). The following chapters explore the multiple realizations 
of an illness/disease, atherosclerosis, within a single hospital in different 
settings: clinical, pathological, and surgical. It is shown in detail how 
complex are the interactions of persons, bodies, body parts, instruments, 
reports, et  cetera, in the processes that realize atherosclerosis in these 
1. On the practice and material turns, see Law (2010) and Soler et al. (2014), 
and on ANT, see Callon (1986) and Latour (1987).
2. I am indebted to Jennifer Bangham for alerting me to Mol’s book. On the 
connection of the ontological turn with study of the material practices of 
the sciences, I was helped also by Klein (2005), the articles in Woolgar and 
Lezaun (2013), and Boris Jardine (2017).
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different settings, and how much of the knowledge involved is embed-
ded in these practices. As Mol notes, this recognition of complex net-
works of persons and things is in line with actor network theory, but 
where ANT tends to focus on conflict and closure, Mol’s emphasis is 
on “non-closure,” on difference and mutual accommodation without 
conflict. Rather than establishing any general correlation of findings as 
symptoms of a disease, communications between the different settings 
are partial, involving context-dependent matches and mismatches. On 
the issue of scale, Mol follows other new ontologists in rejecting any 
straightforward spatiotemporal scaling. Though devoted to practices in 
a single Dutch hospital relating to a single (though multiply enacted) 
disease, the book cannot, Mol insists, be consigned to microhistory. For 
the materials, practices, and communications studied are connected to 
varying degrees with those elsewhere, some in adjacent rooms, some in 
other Dutch hospitals, some worldwide.
Likewise exemplary in its exploration of interactions of local and 
global worlds is Tsing’s The Mushroom at the End of the World. The mush-
room in question is matsutake, inhabitant of ruined northern hemi-
sphere coniferous forest and a highly valued delicacy in Japan. The local 
worlds of forests, fungi, foragers, sellers, buyers, dealers, and consumers 
are presented in detail, and it is shown how these worlds are linked and 
sustained through international commerce in the mushroom. As with 
communication within Mol’s Dutch hospital, so in these worldwide 
dealings Tsing shows how productive collaboration and coalition often 
involve not consensus but friction and compromise.3
Before considering how these aspects of the ontological turn as high-
lighted by the works of Mol and Tsing figure in the conference contri-
butions on history and anthropology of mathematics, a moment’s re-
flection on the general principle of the turn is needed. Proponents of 
the ontological turn are almost unanimous in breaking with the nature/
culture division. In doing so they break with both strong realism, belief 
in the existence of a single coherent and exclusive truth about the world, 
and strong relativism, belief in the existence of many equally valid but 
radically different perspectives on the world (Paleček and Risjord 2012). 
Instead they are pluralists, prepared to recognize many worlds or many 
“dimensions” of reality. Precisely how such pluralism is to be spelled out 
3. On friction, compromise, and collaboration, see also Tsing’s (2005) study of 
the communities and organizations involved in exploitation and defense of 
Indonesian rainforests.
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and whether it is tenable as a general philosophical position are conten-
tious issues. However, there are domains in which some such plural-
ism seems eminently plausible. The subject of Mol’s book, the diagnosis, 
treatment, and study of illness and disease, with its complex interactions 
of scientific, practical, psychological, social, and ethical issues, is one such 
domain. Mathematics is another. There are, indeed, those who main-
tain that unique numbers and measures exist entirely independently of 
us, our languages, and our practices. But pluralism about numbers is a 
well-established position; and it is relatively uncontentious to regard the 
lengths embedded in the practices of Liberian tailors as different from 
those grounded in the standard meter in Paris or the speed of light.4 As 
for the various fields of “science,” the plausibility of pluralism depends 
heavily on the ways in which science and its disciplines are defined. If, 
as in Manuela Carneiro da Cunha’s contribution, agricultural science is 
taken to include all practices of plant cultivation and harvesting, then a 
pluralist view of that science is in order. Similarly with chemistry, if that 
science is taken to cover the skills involved in Indigenous practices of 
pigment preparation. If, by contrast, science and its disciplines are more 
strictly defined, radical ontological pluralism becomes deeply problem-
atic. Consider the Wikipedia definition of chemistry: “Chemistry is the 
scientific discipline involved with elements and compounds composed 
of atoms, molecules and ions: their composition, structure, properties, 
behavior and the changes they undergo during a reaction with other 
substances.”5 On this definition, a modest pluralism with regard to cur-
rent chemistry, as with many other strictly scientific disciplines, is ap-
propriate (cf. Dupré 1993; Cartwright 1999; and Kellert, Longino, and 
Waters 2006). Indeed, it has even been argued on historical and experi-
mental grounds that phlogiston could be resuscitated (Chang 2012). But 
the world of alchemical elixirs and the philosopher’s stone has obviously 
gone forever.
Guided by Mol and Tsing, let me now turn to mathematics in the 
forest and the past. All of the relevant contributions move away from 
classification of mathematics according to the mentalities, styles, sym-
bolic forms, et cetera of different cultures. Rather than privileging ex-
plicit theoretical knowledge, they attend closely to the mathematics em-
bedded in everyday transactions and material practices—that is, to what 
in her contribution Strathern calls “invisible ontology.” Further, there is 
4. On Liberian tailors see Lave (1988); on standard lengths, see Zupko (1990).
5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemistry.
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a general opposition to the overgeneral categories so prevalent in cultural 
anthropologies and histories. Thus, Karine Chemla and Serafina Cuomo 
resist the lumping together of “ancient Greek” or of “ancient Chinese” 
mathematics, and Agathe Keller contests the notion of a unified “Hin-
du/Indian” mathematics.
There is opposition also to stereotyping of persons. Aparecida Vilaça, 
for example, considers translations of our impersonal arithmetic into an 
adapted and extended Wari’ language in which numbers are emotionally 
and morally loaded—for example, with 1, conveying loneliness, hunger 
and ineptitude. She also notes the “alternation” of personal identity in-
volved as Wari’ teachers, trained at an intercultural university, and their 
students switch between our register and their own. Keller comments on 
the long history of interaction between high and low Tamil mathemat-
ics. And Cuomo contests Marcus Asper’s assignment of ancient Greek 
theoretical and practical mathematics to distinct cultures, emphasizing 
the mathematicians’ capacity for “code-switching” between the theo-
retical and practical registers required in different settings (cf. Lave and 
Wenger 1991; Burke 2005; Asper 2009). In Strathern’s terms (Strath-
ern 1988), the Wari’, Tamil, and ancient Greek mathematicians are not 
individuals but “dividuals,” persons who assume different identities in 
different settings.
As recommended and put into practice in the works of Mol and 
Tsing, these studies focus on knowledge embedded in material and social 
practices: the uses of rods on calculating surfaces (Chemla); estimation 
of the fineness, purity, and value of gold (Keller); the establishment of 
kinship relations (Almeida). Again in line with the approaches of Mol 
and Tsing, though focused on particular mathematical practices, they 
cannot be classed as microhistories. For many of these practices are and/
or were widely spread, either through direct communication or indirectly 
through their involvements in trade and commerce; and, as shown in 
the contributions of Keller and Chemla, certain of them have extensive 
histories of transmission and commentary.
The central methodological issues raised by contributions to the 
conference concern interpretation and translation. How, as historians, 
sociologists, and anthropologists are we to gain access to, and commu-
nicate to others, the sciences (or analogues thereof ) of the forest and/or 
the past? As Lloyd, Keller, Strathern, and others make clear, the types 
of evidence—oral, textual, material—differ widely according to the 
type of science in question, whether it is past or present, and whether 
our encounter with it falls into a history of encounters or is a first. So 
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the question arises whether, in the face of such diversity, there can be 
any general guidelines and criteria of adequacy for interpretation and 
translation.
Philosophers have proposed a range of general conditions of adequacy 
of interpretation under the headings of “principle of charity” and “princi-
ple of humanity” (Fitzgerald 2008). Donald Davidson, for example, has 
claimed that “charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we 
want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters” 
(Davidson 1974: 19). Richard Grandy has proposed as a principle of 
humanity “the condition that the imputed pattern of relations among be-
liefs, desires, and the world be as similar to our own as possible” (Grandy 
1973: 443). And David Wiggins has urged us in the name of humanity 
to so interpret others as to “diminish to the bare minimum the need for 
the interpreter to ascribe inexplicable error or inexplicable irrationality to 
them” (Wiggins 1988: 146). Sensible as they may sound, such principles 
are problematic on several counts.6 They are applicable to forms of inter-
pretation that engage primarily with systems of belief rather than actions 
and material practices; as such, they align with cultural rather than on-
tological approaches. They yield to what in his contribution Lloyd calls 
“the temptation to legislate,” inviting us to impose on the beliefs of oth-
ers what we know to be true, right, and rational. Thus they “familiarize,” 
where what is often needed, at least at the outset of our interpretative en-
terprises, is “defamiliarization”—that is, recognition of the distance from 
ours of others’ practices, norms, and beliefs. Further, they offer little in 
the way of practical guidance, Wiggins’s principle of charity being gener-
ally unworkable, since negative existential claims are largely unverifiable, 
and the others being at a high level of generality and abstraction.
Building on Lloyd’s contribution, let us turn to more down-to-earth 
guidelines, useful to ourselves as interpreters and to our audiences. As 
just remarked, there is the general requirement of preparedness to recog-
nize radical otherness. Consequent on such recognition is the problem of 
access; and on this score the contributors’ approaches to the sciences and 
mathematics of “others” are highly instructive. Keller and Mauro Almei-
da demonstrate ways in which our own nonstandard forms of math-
ematics can provide keys to understanding the mathematics of others. 
Chemla, Strathern, and Vilaça variously indicate ways in which indirect 
encounter, through engagement with the history of communications, 
6. For a characteristically brisk and effective debunking, see Williamson 
(2007: chap. 8).
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interactions, and appropriations, may facilitate access. And, taking “oth-
ers” to include software systems, Alan Blackwell and Willard McCarty 
consider the grounds on which we understand and explain findings of 
artificial intelligences. In evidence also in several of the contributions 
are the opportunities provided by serendipitous matchings and analo-
gies. Almeida, for example, notes the analogy between Tamil kinship 
structures and a form of non-Boolean algebra; and Lloyd points to the 
successful prediction of eclipses by the Babylonians as a way into their 
mathematics/astronomy.
Since the 1960s there has been ever more general recognition of the 
varying degrees of openness of texts to multiple interpretations and ap-
propriations, and of the often-complex dependencies of texts on earlier 
ones.7 Proponents of the ontological turn go along with this, opposing 
the identification of works with unique original texts and recognizing 
rather their multiplicity as clusters of texts, variously related to each 
other and to their readerships. The practical implications of this view are 
at once mild and onerous: mild in releasing us from obsessive quests for 
lost originals and unique best readings; onerous in requiring meticulous 
attention to textual reception and appropriation.8 Close concern with 
reception and appropriation is evident in the contributions of Keller and 
Chemla, and an excellent example of its fruitfulness is Michela Malpan-
gotto’s study of the history of diagrammatic representation in versions of 
Theodosius’s Spherics (Malpangotto 2010).
In accord with the ontological turn, the contributors show a marked 
move away from general schemes, systems of belief, epistemes, et cet-
era to close engagement with specific utterances, activities, and material 
practices. In this connection, let me conclude by offering an alternative 
to the principles of charity and humanity of interpretation. This is the 
principle that when we so interpret the actions, declarations, and mate-
rial productions of others as to attribute to them success, whether practi-
cal or cognitive, it is incumbent upon us in cases where it is not obvious 
how it is achieved to provide explanation of that success.9 Consider, the 
7. The classic work on such openness is Eco ([1962] 1989).
8. For reflections on the philological and philosophical implications of plural-
ist conceptions of works, see Gurd (2005).
9. Compare with the passage in Cicero’s De divinatione, in which Cicero’s 
namesake Marcus, faced with Quintus’s endorsement of testimonies of re-
markable divinations, chides him for his failure to produce “arguments and 
reason” (Cicero 1927, II: 27).
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following attributions: to Babylonians, successful prediction of eclipses; 
to Cambodian immigrants in Oregon, successful harvesting of matsutake 
mushrooms; to ancient Chinese mathematicians, successful calculations 
using rods, blocks, and diagrams. In all such cases, those who make the 
attributions should follow the example set by contributors to this volume 
in explaining how those remarkable feats were achieved.
As for the practice of translation this principle is consistent with “for-
eignizing,” exploiting the flexibility of our language and the admissibility 
of neologisms, as opposed to “domesticating,” confining the wording of 
translations to literal use of our current vocabulary.10 For the domestica-
tion required by this principle lies not in translation, but in the explana-
tory exegesis of the passages translated. The focus on success rather than 
failure is pragmatically motivated; for, as the saying goes “truth is one, 
error many,” and the possible explanations of failure are innumerable 
compared with those of success. Further, in achieving such explanations 
of success, whether of Babylonian successful prediction of eclipses or of 
Etruscan accurate estimation of field areas, we may greatly enrich our 
understanding, capturing the modes of existence that constitute others’ 
worlds. Conversely, failure to find an explanation may cast doubt on the 
initial interpretation. To take just one example, the ethnobotanist Rich-
ard Evans Schultes spent many years in Amazonia failing to find a com-
plete resolution of “Schultes’s enigma,” the supposed ability of inhabit-
ants of Northwestern Amazonia to distinguish at a glance specimens 
of the same species of plant that produce different kinds and degrees of 
hallucination (Schultes 1986). This surely raises doubts about Schultes’s 
interpretation of the relevant actions and utterances of the Amazonians 
he encountered.11
This demand for explanations is proposed not out of condescend-
ing charity toward those we interpret, but out of respect for those who 
hear and read our interpretations. For however deep the understanding 
we may achieve by “going native” in the forest or the past, we owe it to 
ourselves and our audiences to provide comprehensible interpretations.12 
So I call it “the principle of responsibility.”
10. On the long traditions of foreignization and domestication in translation, 
see Venuti (1995).
11. My thanks to Merlin Sheldrake for introducing me to Schultes’s ethnobo-
tanical work.
12. For witty reflections on the problems of returning from the past to the pre-
sent, see Hexter (1954).
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Epilogue: The Way Ahead
Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd and Aparecida Vilaça
The contributions to this volume range over a vast variety of topics. To 
some readers this may seem somewhat bewildering, but we consider it to 
be one of its great strengths, for our explorations are limited neither in 
time nor space nor intellectual discipline. The topics in question relate to 
many different kinds of practices, knowledge systems, interactions, issues 
of understanding and misunderstanding, whether between different lan-
guage communities or within a single one, all separated in time or place 
or both. However, one obvious consequence of our wide-ranging discus-
sions is that there can be no question of trying to draw up a neat bal-
ance sheet of concrete conclusions. Rather, it is more useful to highlight 
certain recurrent themes that can yield some guidelines for future work.
Each study exemplifies one or another mode of the problem of mak-
ing sense of what is often represented as the radically other. All raise, to 
a greater or lesser degree, the question of the evidence available to us, 
the source material we are dealing with, with all of its limitations and 
possible biases, exhibiting the risk of prejudicing from the outset any 
interpretation we might propose. Even more fundamentally we have to 
question the very conceptual framework in which we conduct our inquir-
ies. Given that a totally neutral framework is an impossibility, we have to 
probe the presuppositions we bring to the task with particular determi-
nation, especially when, as so often, these reflect typical preoccupations 
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of Western modernity or even postmodernity. Such a critical examina-
tion of some fashionable current assumptions—concerning both ontol-
ogy and science in particular—is, indeed, we would like to claim, one of 
the achievements of our project.
Let us focus here on three recurrent questions of special importance: 
(1) the issue of the diversity of ontologies; (2) the problems of transla-
tion and mutual intelligibility; and (3) the political ramifications of the 
issues that our studies raise.
(1) It soon became abundantly evident in our discussions and explo-
rations that however fashionable the idea of ontologies has recently be-
come in social anthropology and in science and technology studies, quite 
what that term implies is far from clear. Some contributions underline 
the difficulty of assigning a single coherent ontology to any given group, 
and how indeed is any relevant “group” to be defined (Cuomo)? Are 
ontologies a matter of certain beliefs or of certain practices or of both, 
where problems of scale are deeply implicated (Strathern)? Where on-
tology corresponds to nothing in the actors’ own explicit categories, who 
or what is to be taken to be its spokesperson (the question of evidence, 
stressed by Hugh-Jones in particular)? What kind of ontological com-
mitment is implied by the actors’ understandings and lived experiences 
of such other fundamental concepts as person (Vilaça), or law, or time 
(Strathern)? Do such commitments extend across the entire lived expe-
rience of the population concerned—a point pressed by Stephen Hugh-
Jones in his exploration of the similarities, and the similar complexities, 
in the lives, attitudes, and practices of NW Amazonians and Welsh sheep 
farmers. Where “time” is concerned, Marilyn Strathern spells out the 
ontological implications of the contrast between an evolutionary and an 
episodic apprehension of it—where, however, those ontological differ-
ences may not be perceived as such by the actors concerned. That would 
mean that in such instances, ontology is as it were below the radar of 
an investigation of so-called cultural divergences—with corresponding 
consequences for the universal viability of the concept of “culture” itself.
Several contributors do not just issue something in the nature of a 
health warning concerning the use of “ontology” so much as implicitly 
recommend bypassing it altogether (Carneiro da Cunha). Thus, Serafina 
Cuomo, having examined the pluralism in the ways of doing mathemat-
ics in the Greco-Roman world raises problems for any view that would 
treat them as hermetically sealed entities, emphasizing the risks of fram-
ing the analysis in terms of “cultures,” “traditions,” or indeed “ontolo-
gies.” She mounts a strong case for an alternative framework in terms of 
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situated learning and the possibility of code-switching. Nicholas Jardine, 
in turn, while not rejecting “ontologies” in toto, argues for a refinement of 
their use, to focus on practices rather than on objects. Mauro Almeida’s 
tactic is different again. Accepting plural ontologies in mathematics still 
leaves room, in his view, for intertranslatability between them if one con-
centrates on the pragmatics of their application.
Surprisingly, perhaps, one context in which it is comparatively un-
problematic to say that we are dealing with a plurality of “ontologies” 
relates to the world of computing, where, as Alan Blackwell shows, it 
is the job of artificial intelligence engineers not to discover ontologies 
but rather to invent new ones. To be sure, the assessment of those in-
novations poses plenty of issues for the present and more especially the 
future. Pursuing that question and taking his cue from the pluralism of 
the anthropologists, Willard McCarty engages in deeply suggestive ex-
plorations for the differences that may be in train in modes of reasoning 
and in our understanding of intelligence. What, for instance, might be 
the price that has to be paid to meet the demands of what McCarty calls 
“complete consistency and absolute explicitness”?
(2) Several contributions, including those of AI specialists, give star-
tling examples of the problems of translation and of mutual intelligi-
bility that arise. There can, of course, be no perfect translation from 
one language to another, nor indeed a perfect rendition of the sense 
of any given speech act in other terms in the same “natural language.” 
Aparecida Vilaça’s Wari’ assimilate what they are taught by missionaries 
and educators, but, in ways that those outsiders may themselves not be 
aware of, contrive to preserve their own Wari’ understandings alongside 
those extraneous lessons. Agathe Keller’s Tamil and Sanskrit practition-
ers can be brought into communication with one another and yet may 
have or have had very different views on the substance of the problems 
they in some sense share. Strathern, too, suggests that local Indigenous 
peoples may have been more aware of their divergent understanding 
of key parts of experience that we gloss as “time” and “law” than the 
original Australian officials and settlers when they first arrived. Pressing 
the relationship between intelligibility and ontology, Strathern argues 
forcefully that mutual interaction and interchanges are possible without 
mutual intelligibility, where the divergence—indeed, clash—between 
ontologies is not necessarily visible to the actors themselves. The chal-
lenging conclusion, in her own words, is that “the world plays back to 
people what they apprehend about it through the supports it gives to 
their ideas.”
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But examples of potential misunderstandings are not limited to those 
that involve more than one natural language. Cuomo illustrates such 
tensions by different mathematical practitioners who all share Greek. 
Karine Chemla, too, discusses the variety of mathematical practices in 
different texts that all use the Chinese language, and concludes that in 
that case ontology cannot be said to be determined by language. Blackwell 
explores the ambiguities of “objective function” used by computer engi-
neers and the ways in which they and nonspecialists (or specialists in 
other disciplines such as philosophy) may be radically at cross-purposes 
in their use of the same terms in the English language. McCarty ex-
amines how, in order to use the calculating capacities of computers, the 
problems have to be reformulated in their language—with a consequent 
loss of elements of text through the process of digitalization.
Over and over again our contributors have challenged the terms in 
which we talk of what we assume to be well-defined intellectual disci-
plines. What we should understand by “mathematics” and what by “sci-
ence” has to be radically problematized if we are to do justice to the 
variety of practices, experiences, and knowledge that we encounter in the 
field and in history. Making the most of developments in modern math-
ematics, Almeida shows the pervasiveness of mathematical structures 
and pragmatic applications across widely divergent domains, including 
Indigenous kinship systems. As Jardine points out, a narrow view of “sci-
ence” excludes much of what has been accepted as knowledge by other 
peoples and at other times. We work, therefore, toward a broader concep-
tion of “science,” a pluralist one that avoids the twin pitfalls of universal 
relativism and of a narrow strong realism. Joining forces with Strathern, 
he argues for a “foreignization” of our analytic framework to accommo-
date a principle of responsibility to the peoples we investigate. Manuela 
Carneiro da Cunha probes the underlying assumptions at work in what 
might seem the relatively unproblematic term agriculture, both challeng-
ing in particular our current dominant models that assume an evolution 
from foraging to domestication, and in the process restoring the claims 
that can be made on behalf of Indigenous knowledge practices.
(3) As that last remark already indicates, the political repercussions of 
our investigations underlie most of them and come to the fore in several. 
Carneiro da Cunha reveals the narrow-mindedness of many of our com-
mon assumptions about agricultural practices and shows how mistaken 
the policies of governments and NGOs have often been, even when 
their aims have been ecological conservation and sustainable productiv-
ity. Strathern and Vilaça, too, point to the threats that the imposition of 
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Western concepts and practices poses to the groups they study. Keller 
charts the interference of nationalist agenda in the representation of 
the varieties of mathematical pluralism in India. A different but still 
very tangible danger is present in the current, often overhyped debates 
about the future of artificial intelligence, where, as both McCarty and 
Blackwell point out, it is not just an understanding of rationality that is 
at stake but even some assumptions about what makes humans human.
Every contributor stresses the amount of further research that needs 
to be done to make the most of the opening up of study to which they 
bear witness. Our efforts here are avowedly provisional and preliminary. 
But the way ahead we envision involves not just individual disciplines 
but also their joining forces. We believe Science in the Forest, Science in 
the Past offers a model for fruitful cross-disciplinary exchanges on some 
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